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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS A PROPERTY THEORY? 
We begin with a truism. 1 A property theory is a theory that deals with prop-
erties. More precisely, it is a theory that formulates general, non-contingent 
laws that deal with properties. There are two salient ways of talking of 
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the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Both authors thank the Seminar für natürlich-
sprachliche Systeme at the University of Tübingen for facilitating their joint work on this 
project. Special thanks to Danny Korman. 
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properties. First, they can be talked ab out as predicables (Le., as instan-
tiables). Accordingly, one sort of property theory would be a theory that 
provides general non-contingent laws of the behaviour of the predication 
relation (instantiation relation). Nothing prevents the logical framework of 
such a theory from being extensional; that is, it could be formulated in a 
logical framework in which equivalent formulas are intersubstitutable salva 
veritate. For example, this sort of property theory could be formulated in 
a first-order extensional language with identity and a distinguished binary 
logical predicate for the predication relation. The major challenge facing 
this sort of property theory is to resolve various paradoxes that result from 
naive predication principles such as the following analogue ofRussell's para-
dox: (3x)(Vy) (x is a predicable of y +-+ y is not predicable of itself). The 
second salient way of talking about properties is by means of property ab-
stracts such as 'the property of being a man'. Property abstracts belong to 
a family of complex singular terms known as intensional abstracts. These 
include gerundive phrases, infinitive phrases and 'that'-clauses. These singu-
lar terms are intensional in the sense that expressions occurring within them 
do not obey the substitutivity principles of extensional logic. Accordingly, 
another sort of property theory would be a theory that provides general, 
non-contingent laws for the behaviour of intensional abstracts. The major 
challenge facing this sort of property theory is to systematise various subtle 
non-extensional substitutivity phenomena such as the non-substitutivity of 
necessarily equivalent formulas, the non-substitutivity of co-denoting names 
and indexicals, the paradox of analysis, and Mates' puzzle. These two types 
of property theory can be developed independently. Onee this is done, one 
would then want to combine them to arrive at a single theory that treats 
both predication and intensional abstraction. 
Although both types of property theory are important, the second type 
has an epistemologie al primaey, which we will now explain. Evidently, the 
best argument for the existence of properties-and for intensional entities, 
generally-is the following argument from intensional logic. 2 (Intensional 
logic is that part of logic in which the principle of the substitutivity of equiv-
alent formulas fails.) The argument has three premises, which of course must 
2This argument is refined in certain respects in [Bealer, 1993a]. We do not rule out the 
possibility of an argument to the eifect that intensional entities are required for acceptable 
definitions of such notions as evidence (data), explanation, necessity, causation, law of 
nature, simplicity, and so forth. The worry is that opponents of intensional entities 
might maintain that we should simply take these notions as primitives rather than trying 
to define them at the cost of adding intensional entities to our ontology. In the text 
we are see king an argument that cannot be rebutted in this fashion. The idea is to 
show that any acceptable comprehensive theory would be self-defeating unless it makes 
use of a background intensional logic; but such use of intensional logic generates an 
ontological commitment to intensional entities. The conclusion is that our opponents 
cannot consistently deny tbe existence of intensional entities unless their comprehensive 
tbeory is unacceptable by tbeir own standards. This style of argument derives from 
[Myro, 1981]. It is developed further in [Bealer, 1988, Section 7]. 
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be established. First, the best way to formulate intensionallogic is to ad-
join an intensional abstraction operation to standard extensionallogic with 
identity and then to formulate laws governing the substitutivity conditions 
on expressions occurring within intensional abstracts. Second, on any ac-
ceptable interpretation of this intensional logic, intensional abstracts must 
be interpreted as being semantically correlated with real intensional enti-
ties, specifically, entities whose identity conditions match the substitutivity 
conditions of the intensional abstracts with which they are semantically cor-
related. From this premise it follows that intensionallogic is committed to 
the existence of intensional entities. Third, intensionallogic is an indispens-
able part of any acceptable comprehensive theory of the world. (It is under-
stood here that any acceptable comprehensive theory of the world should 
include an account of its own acceptability.)3 From these three premises 
it follows that intensional entities-and properties, in particular-are in-
dispensable to any acceptable comprehensive theory of the world. Every 
acceptable comprehensive theory of the world is committed to the existence 
of intensional entities.4 
However, suppose per impossibile that intensionallogic could be omitted 
from an acceptable comprehensive theory. In that event, it is plausible that 
intensional entities-and properties, in particular-could be dispensed with. 
True enough, the sort of property theory that codifies laws for the predi-
cation relation might have nice theoretical payoffs; for example, it might 
provide an elegant construction of the foundations of mathematics or of the 
extensional semantics of extensionallanguage. However, these payoffs on 
their own do not appear to justify an ontology of properties. The reason is 
that, for all we can tell, each of these theoretical payoffs could be provided 
by a theory of extensional entities (such as sets, or mathematical categories, 
or perhaps some new type of extensional theoretical posit). Thus, in the 
absence of the argument from intensional logic, intensional entities would, 
for all we can tell, be dispensable in favour of such extensional entities. It 
is for this reason that property theory construed as an intensional logic is 
epistemologically more primary than property theory construed as a theory 
of predication. It is needed to show that properties really exist. 
3We believe that any acceptable comprehensive theory must include an intensional 
semantics for natural language. But in a debate with a diehard opponent of intensional 
entities, this thesis must be establishedj it may not be assumed. The way to trap diehard 
opponents of intensional entities is to catch them in a self-defeat. In their own comprehen-
sive theories opponents of intensional entities must have an account of the acceptability 
of their own theories. Such accounts, we will argue, must make use of a background 
intensional logic. 
4Since one is justified in believing that one's acceptable comprehensive theory is true, 
it follows that one is justified in believing that intensional entities exist. Anyone who 
denies that intensional entities exist does so at the price of not having an acceptable 
comprehensive theory. 
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Once one has established the need for the former sort of property theory 
one would be justified in going on to develop the latter sort of property the-
ory. There are two reasons. First, once one has established that properties 
exist, Ockham's rawr directs one to attempt to dispense with the more com-
plex ontology of both sets and properties in favour of the simpler ontology of 
just properties. However, one can accomplish this ontological simplification 
only if one has a property theory that has all the theoretical payoffs that 
set theory has. This is what a satisfactory theory of predication promises 
to do. Second, when a theory of intensional abstraction is combined with 
a satisfactory theory of predication, the resulting theory promises to yield 
several additional theoretical payoffs (for example, adefinition of truth for 
propositions, adefinition of necessity for propositions, adefinition of logical 
validity and analyticity for propositions, and so on).5 
Although there are good reasons to look forward to a unified theory of in-
tensional abstraction and predication, there are nevertheless good method-
ological reasons for proceeding in separate stages. For example, the immedi-
ate prospects offinding a truly satisfactory (as opposed to merely workable) 
resolution of the paradoxes of predication are much less bright than those for 
a satisfad;ory intensional logic. This and other methodological reasons for 
keeping the two projects separate at this stage of research will be elaborated 
upon below. 
Our plan in this chapter is the following. In Part I, we will spell out the 
argument from intensionallogic. In Part 11, we will show in detail how to 
construct a property theory that is suited to serve as an intensional logic. 
In Part 111, we will elose with a discussion of a few somewhat more sophis-
ticated issues in property theory, namely, the propositional-function thesis, 
type-free predication theories, and a proof of nonextensionality within pred-
ication theories with unrestricted abstraction principles. 
The propositional-function thesis is the thesis that there is a strong cor-
relation between properties and propositional functions. A theory that 
takes properties as primitive entities can capture the extremely fine-grained 
substitutivity conditions that hold in propositional-attitude contexts. The 
question we will address in connection with the propositional-function the-
sis is whether a propositional-functional theory can capture these extremely 
fine-grained substitutivity conditions as well. 
When we speak of type-free predication theories, we have in mind theories 
in the style of [Gilmore, 1974; Feferman, 1975; Scott, 1975; Aczel, 1980; 
Feferman, 1984; Reinhardt, 1985; Flagg and Myhill, 1987a; Turner, 1987], 
and others. As we indicated above, we do not believe that any of the existing 
theories can be singled out as embodying a final resolution of the paradoxes. 
Nevertheless, these recent type-free predication theories have an attractive 
feature from our point of view: one can actually prove within them that 
5This theme is developed in Chapter 9 of Quality and Concept. 
PROPERTY THEORIES 147 
the most general form of abstraction principle for the predication relation 
entails a principle of nonextensionality. We will present an outline of the 
argument in Part III. 
Despite the bewildering diversity of the diagnoses and eures for the para-
doxes offered within a type-free setting, all these theories share one com-
mon theme, namely that the mathematics that can be derived within them 
is rather weak. Because of the missing link between our favoured theory 
of intensional abstracts and an ideal resolution of the paradoxes and be-
cause of the limited success of existing predication theories in providing 
a non-set-theoretic foundation of mathematics, we have foregone a critical 
review of these theories. Nevertheless, Part III does contain some discus-
sion of the ubiquitous technique in this area, namely, the use of fixed-point 
constructions to establish the consistency of systems that admit unlimited 
self-reference in the presence of a principle of full abstraction. 
Finally, a word about other research on property theory. Given the pur-
pose of the present volume, we thought it would be valuable to defend and 
to formulate in detail one particular version of a property theory rather than 
to attempt a comprehensive overview. The reader will nevertheless find ref-
erences to competing property theories at various points in our discussion 
and also in the bibliography. 
I: The Argument from Intensional Logic 
The hallmark of extensionallogic is the principle that equivalent expres-
sions can be substituted for one another salva veritate. That is, when-
ever two expressions of the same syntactic type apply to exactly the same 
things-or, in the case of sentences, are alike in truth value-they can be 
substituted for one another without altering the truth values of the whole 
sentences in which they occur. The safest general characterisation of inten-
sionallogic is that it is the part of logic in which there are exceptions, or at 
least apparent exceptions, to this substitutivity principle. 
Sometimes, however, a second criterion is used to characterise intensional 
logic. According to this criterion, intensional logic is the part of logic in 
which the rule of existential generalisation fails or at least appears to fail. 
For example, the inference from 'Pythagoras was looking for the rational 
V2' to 'There exists something such that Pythagoras was looking for it' 
is intuitively invalid; therefore, the occurrence of 'the rational V2' in the 
first sentence would qualify as intensional according to this second criterion. 
And this is as it should be. However, this criterion is not quite right as it 
is usually stated, for existential generalisation appears to fail in some cases 
that would not standardly be counted as intensional. For example, the 
inference from 'The rational V2 does not exist' to 'There exists something 
such that it does not exist' is intuitively invalid, but the occurrence of 
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'the rational ..;2' in the first sentence would not standardly be counted as 
intensional.6 
The first criterion-substitutivity failure-avoids this sort of difficulty. 
Since 'the rational ..;2' is a vacuous term, the only other terms that ap-
ply to the same (real) things must themselves be vacuous; and whenever 
another vacuous term is substituted for 'the rational ..;2' in 'The rational 
..;2 does not exist', the resulting sentence has the same truth value as the 
original. So according to the substitutivity criterion, 'the rational ..;2' does 
not occur intensionally in this sentence. And this is the desired result. At 
the same time, in sentences like 'Pythagoras was looking for the rational 
..;2', this vacuous term does occur intensionally according to the substitu-
tivity criterion, for when we put in some other vacuous term, the resulting 
sentence will often have a different truth value. (For example, 'Pythagoras 
was looking for the largest integer' is false.) So once again this criterion fits 
our standard not ion of intensional occurrence. It appears, therefore, that 
faHure of substitutivity is indeed the best criterion to use in characterising 
intensionallogic. This, at least, is what we will ass urne in the remainder of 
this Chapter. 
There are a number of interconnected logical phenomena that any ad-
equate formulation of intensional logic ought to accommodate. Although 
some of them are widely recognised, others are not (for example, the exis-
tence of transcendental and self-embeddable predicates). Taken together, 
these phenomena more or less force one to formulate intensional logic as a 
certain sort of first-order theory of properties. Our argument for this thesis 
will be divided into the following sections: (1) generality, (2) 'that'-clauses, 
gerundive phrases, and infinitive phrases, (3) quantifying-in, (4) learnabil-
ity, (5) referential semantics for intensional language, (6) what intensional 
abstracts denote, (7) nominalism, (8) conceptualism, (9) realism, (10) tran-
scendental predicates and type-free languages, (11) self-embeddable prop-
erties, relations, and propositions, (12) the first-order vs. higher-order lan-
guage controversy, (13) names and indexicals, (14) Mates' puzzle, the para-
dox of analysis, and the need for fine-grained intensional distinctions. 7 
6proponents of free logic believe that existential-generalisation failures in extensional 
logic are not confined to extraordinary cases like this one; they hold that even the most 
ordinary extensional instaIlCes of this rule are, strictly speaking, not valid. So free logi-
cians would agree that failure of existential generalisation cannot be used as a criterion 
for distinguishing intensional logic from extensional logic. 
7 Some of these arguments are fuller presentations of arguments already given in Chap-
ter 1 of Quality and Cancept. Tt is hoped that these fuller presentations will help to answer 
certain questions that critics have raised. 
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1 G ENERALITY 
Substitutivity failures typically arise in connection with talk about such 
matters as intentionality (assertion, belief, desire, intention, perception, 
etc.), the logical modalities (necessity, possibility, contingency), definition, 
analyticity, meaning, strict implication, relevant implication, moralobliga-
tion, purpose, probability, causation, explanation, epistemic justification, 
evidence, counterfactuality, etc. However, many philosophers, logicians, 
and linguists have failed to notice that, when we talk about these matters 
in a general way, our dis course is typically extensional. For example, the 
sentence 'Whatever is necessary is possible' says something general about 
necessity and possibility, and it is a fully extensional sentence. Any ade-
quate formulation of intensional logic should be able to accommodate, not 
just intensional talk about intentionality, modality, etc., but also this sort 
of general extensional talk. In particular, an adequate formulation of in-
tensional logic ought to be able to represent intuitively valid extensional 
arguments like the following: 
Whatever x believes is necessary. 
(I) Whatever is necessary is possible. 
Whatever x believes is possible. 
Suppose that 'is necessary' and 'is possible' are treated as I-place predicate 
express ions and 'believes', as a 2-place predicate expression. Then this 
argument can be represented as valid in a standard quantifier logic: 
(Vy) (B 2 xy -t N1y) 
(I') (Vy)(N1y -t Ply) 
(Vy) (B 2xy -t Ply). 
Now in theoretical matters, if a currently accepted theory can be easily and 
naturally employed to account for new phenomena, then other things be-
ing equal it is desirable to do so. In logical theory, the currently accepted 
theory includes quantifier logic. By treating 'is necessary' and 'is possible' 
as I-place predicate expressions and 'believes' as a 2-place predicate ex-
pression, we can easily and naturally account for the validity of (I) within 
this currently accepted theory. Therefore, other things being equal it would 
seem desirable to do so. Indeed, none of the alternatives appears to be 
satisfactory. 
For example, one alternative is the sentential-operator approach, which 
posits an open-ended list of special sentential operators (that is, operators 
that can be applied to sentences to yield new sentences). On this approach, 
there is a separate operator for each of the topics mentioned earlier-
assertion, belief, desire, intention, necessity, possibility, contingency, defi-
nition, analyticity, meaning, strict implication, relevant implication, moral 
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obligation, purpose, probability, causation, explanation, epistemic justifica-
tion, counterfactuality, etc. A major problem with this approach is that 
it does not provide a unijied theory of intensionality; it is eclectic and in-
complete at best. Furthermore, on the first-order version of this approach, 
elementary arguments like (I) cannot even be expressed. The reason is that 
in a first-order language sentential operators like 'Bx ', '0', and '0' may 
only be applied to specijic first-order sentences. (By 'first-order' we mean 
syntactically first-order. In a language that is syntactically first-order there 
are no sentential variables.)8 But arguments like (I) are general; in such ar-
guments expressions like 'x believes', 'is necessary', and 'is possible' are not 
applied to any specific sentences at all. Plainly a variable-cum-quantifier 
apparatus-or something comparable-is needed. 
Of course, such an apparatus is available on a higher-order sentential-
operator approach that contains sentential variables, that is, variables that 
are themselves counted as sentences and that take other sentences as sub-
stituends. (By 'higher-order' we mean syntactically higher-order.)9 On such 
an approach (I) would be represented along the following lines: 
(Vp) (Bxp -t Op) 
(Vp)(Op -t Op) 
(Vp)(Bxp -t Op). 
On this approach, however, there is no clear distinction between sentential 
operators, on the one hand, and predicates that take sentences as argument 
expressions, on the other hand. Consequently, this approach may be viewed 
as a variant of-rather than a genuine alternative to--our official logical 
syntax which treats 'believes', 'is necessary', 'is possible', etc. as predicate 
expressions. 
Should the higher-order sentential-operator approach be adopted? In the 
next paragraph we will give some surface grammatical evidence against this 
approach. We wish to emphasise that our larger line of argument does not 
depend on this. So if this grammatical evidence should strike our readers as 
unconvincing, they should not for this reason be doubtful about our other 
conclusions. In particular, the argument in the next section that 'that'-
clauses should be treated as singular terms will hold with at most minor 
alterations: on the higher-order sentential-operator approach, sentences are 
already treated as singular terms, and expressions like 'x believes that p' 
and 'x believes p' are in effect counted as mere notational variants of one 
another. 
Now although the higher-order sentential-operator approach succeeds in 
representing arguments like (I), it has prima facie implausible side-effects. 
8In a syntactically first-order language, neither sentences nor predicates are allowed as 
singular terms; accordingly, one is not allowed to replace them with quantifiable variables. 
gIn a syntactically higher-order language, in contrast to a first-order language, there 
are variables whose substituends are predicates and/or sentences. 
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In particular, it is forced to treat sentences as full-fledged singular terms. 
Consider the sentence 'There is something that x believes that is different 
from something that y believes'. On the higher-order approach this sentence 
would be represented as folIows: 
(3p)(B:ep & (3q)(...,p = q & Byq)). 
This shows that these special sentential variables are able to flank the 
identity symbols as in the (open) sentence 'p = q'. But since specific 
(closed) sentences are supposed to be substituends for these variables, spe-
cific (closed) sentences may themselves flank the identity symbol, for exam-
pIe '5 + 7 = 12 = 7< 9', '2 + 2 = 4 = 3 + 5 = 8', etc. This, however, is un-
grammatical nonsense. The problem seems plain: sentences are not genuine 
singular terms. But if they are not, then sentential variables-that is, vari-
ables for which specific closed sentences are supposed to be substituends-
must themselves be illegitimate. It follows that, if a sentential-operator 
approach makes use of such variables, it too is illegitimate. This, of course, 
is not to say that the use of a special sort of variable (say, 'p', 'q', 'r', ... ) 
whose values are supposed to be sentences is illegitimate; what is illegitimate 
is the use of a variable whose substituends are supposed to be sentences. But 
the latter sort of variable is what is needed to enable a sentential-operator 
approach to represent general sentences and general arguments. 
Whether or not this grammatical evidence against the higher-order 
sentential-operator approach is convincing, this approach does not in any 
event provide a genuine alternative to our favoured approach, which treats 
'believes', 'asserts', etc. as 2-place predicate expressions and 'is necessary', 
'is possible', etc. as 1-place predicate expressions.lO This conclusion is all 
that matters for the rest of our argument. 
There are two further alternatives to our favoured approach that deserve 
to be mentioned-the adverbial approach and the adjectival approach. Ac-
cording to the adverbial approach 'x believes that 7 < 9' would be repre-
sented by '((that 7 < 9)-ly BI)x', where 'BI' is a 1-place predicate that 
expresses the property of believing, '(that 7< 9)-ly' is a complex adverbial 
phrase that expresses a certain 'mode ofbelieving', and '(that 7 < 9)-ly BI, 
is a complex 1-place predicate that expresses the property of believing un-
der that mode. According to the adjectival approach 'x believes that 7 < 9' 
would be represented by '(3y)(x is-in-state y&BIy& ((that 7 < 9)-ish)y)', 
where 'BI' is a 1-place predicate that expresses the property of being a be-
lief state and '(that 7 < 9)-ish' is a complex 1-place predicate that expresses 
the property of being astate with a '7 < 9-ish content'. 
But how do these approaches represent general sentences, for exam-
pIe, the sentence 'x believes something', which we would represent with 
'(3y)B2 xy'? Evidently, the adverbial approach must use something like 
lOFor other counts against the higher-order approach, see Section 12 below. 
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'(3a)((a-ly BI )x)', and the adjectival approach, something like '(3a)(3y) 
(x is-in-state y&B1y& (a-ish)y)'. But notice that on both approaches 
the everyday use of the verb 'believes' is in effect represented by a com-
plex 2-place predicate expression: either '(~-ly BI )(1)' or '(3y)(Cü is-in-state 
y&B1y& (~-ish)y)'. Now our thesis is that the verb 'believes' should be 
treated as a 2-place predicate expression. So, evidently, the adverbial and 
adjectival approaches just turn out to be complex variants of our logical 
syntax and, as such, are not genuine alternatives to it. At the same time, 
these two approaches involve significant additional complexity, and with no 
apparent gain. Let us take a moment to show that this is really so. 
First, the issue of complexity. The adverbial approach requires that we 
complicate our logical syntax by adding a new syntactic category, narnely, 
the category of predicate adverb and by adjoining an adverb-forming op-
erator '-ly'.u In turn, it requires that we devise a new semantical method 
to deal with these new syntactic structures, a semantical method that in-
evitably will lead to ontological and ideological complications of its own. 
And the adjectival approach requires that we complicate our logical syntax 
by adjoining special vocabulary for dealing with states and by adjoining 
a predicate-forming operator '-ish'. In turn, it requires that we develop 
an associated semantical method, which also will carry with it new onto-
logical and ideological complications. Of course, the operators '-ly' and 
'-ish' might be contextually defined. For example, (a-ish)y iffdf (3z) (z 
is-a-propositional-content-fixing-property-that-corresponds-to a and y is an 
instance of z). However, such contextual definitions would themselves in-
voke new logical machinery, for exarnple, the new primitive predicate 'is-a-
propositional-context-fixing-property-that-corresponds-t0' and a device like 
'is an instance of' for attributing properties to their instances, and such ma-
chinery would lead to corresponding complications in the semantics. Later 
on, we will give an argument that devices like cis an instance of' have no 
place in intensionallogi<: per se. In our introduction, we outlined our reason 
for thinking that intensional logi<: is epistemologically more primary than 
the logic for the instantiation (predication) relation. 
Now these complications in syntax and semantics are considerable. Yet 
they are gratuitous inasmuch as they do nothing whatsoever to advance the 
formulation of a comprehensive intensional logic, as we will now show in 
11 We prefer treating predicate adverbs right within our sort of standard logical syntax. 
For example 'x is running quickly' can be represented (very roughly) along the following 
lines: '(3y)(y is running &y is quick &x is doing y)'. This approach requires adding no 
new syntactic categories to our logical syntax; and, semantically, it requires no special 
ontological items beyond properties, relations, and propositions (hereafter: PRPs), which 
as we will see are required to deal with 'that'-clauses and gerundive and infinitive phrases. 
Incidentally, on ce we are able to represent 'that'-clauses, sentential adverbs are easy 
to treat. For example, 'Necessarily, 7 < 9' can be treated as a transformation from 
'N1 [7 < 9]" where '[7 < 9]' is a singular term corresponding to the 'that'-clause 'that 
7< 9'. 
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detail. (We will focus on the adverbial approach, but the argument applies 
mutatis mutandis to the adjectival approach.) 
Recall that the adverbialist's rendering of 'x believes that 7 < 9' is '((that 
7 < 9)-ly BI )x'. In this formula, '7 < 9' occurs intensionally, for we cannot 
replace it with an equivalent sentence--for example, '7 < the number of 
planets'-without risking an alteration in the truth value of the whole for-
mula. This might lead one to think that the adverb-forming operator '-ly' 
is what generates the intensionality in sentences concerning intentionality, 
modality, etc. But this would be an error. We have already seen that sen-
tences like 'x believes something' force the adverbialist to apply the adverb-
forming operator '-ly' to a straightforward externally quantifiable free vari-
able like 'a': (3a) (a-Iy BI)x. Moreover, kindred sentences show that the 
adverbialist is forced to use variables like aasterms in elementary identity 
statements. For example, the adverbialist has no choice but to represent 
'x believes something that is different from everything u believes' along the 
following lines: (3a)((a-Iy BI) x & (Vß) ((ß-Iy BI)u -t a "I- ß)). Given that 
variables like 'a' and 'ß' may occur as terms in elementary identity state-
ments and given that 'a' and 'ß' occur in '(a-Iy BI)X' and '(ß-Iy BI)x' as 
straightforward externally quantifiable free variables, the adverbialist has 
no choice but to accept the following sentence as well-formed and logically 
true: (Va)(Vß)(a = ß -t ((a-Iy BI)x == (ß-Iy BI )x). Now, we may as-
sume that 'that'-clauses are permissible substituends for the variables 'a' 
and 'ß'. (If the adverbialist were perversely to require instead that the sub-
stituends of these variables be in some other syntactic category-say, the 
category of sentence--the remainder of our argument still would go through 
mutatis mutandis. It is true that intuitively ill-formed expressions-for ex-
ample, 'The cat is on the mat = 7 < 9' or '7 < 9 = 7 < the number of 
planets'-would result from the adverbialist's requirement, but that would 
be the adverbialist's responsibility, not ours.) Accordingly, the adverbialist 
must accept the following sort of instantiation of the above logically true 
sentence: 
that 7 < 9 = that 7 < the pattern of planets -t 
(((that 7 < 9)-ly BI)x == 
((that 7 < the number of planets)-ly BI)x). 
However, the original intention ofthe adverbial theory is that '((that 7 < 9)-
ly BI)x' and '((that 7 < the number of planets)-ly BI)x' should be able 
to differ in truth value. It follows that the adverbialist is forced to accept 
the truth of the sentence 'that 7 < 9 "I- that 7 < the number of planets'. 
(Other things being equal, this outcome should be welcome, for intuitively 
this sentence is true!) But if this sentence is true, it follows that '7 < the 
number of planets' occurs intensionally in it. After all, '7 < 9' has the same 
truth values as '7 < the number of planets'. But when we substitute '7 < 9' 
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in the true sentence 'that 7 < 9 i- that 7 < the lUlmber of planets', we 
obtain a logically false sentence 'that 7 < 9 i- that 7 < 9'. A clear case 
of intensionality, a case that does not involve adverbial constructions even 
implicitly. Now how are such cases ofintensionality to be handled logically? 
The complicated apparatus ofthe adverbial theory is of no help whatsoever. 
Moreover, once we have a theory able to handle complex singular-term cases 
of intensionality like this, we can easily and economically extend it to handle 
alt standard cases of intensionality, and we can do so without recourse to 
any of the complications of the adverbial theory. For this reason, then, the 
complications of adverbial theory are gratuitous, having nothing special to 
contribute to the formulation of a comprehensive intensionallogic. 
In view of this, the only reasonable decision is to reject the adverbial 
theory in favour of the essentially simpler theory that treats 'believes', 'as-
serts', etc. at face value as ordinary 2-place predicates. Furthermore, as 
we have already indicated, a fully analogous argument can be given against 
the adjectival theory. And so our original conclusion stands: 'believes', etc. 
should be treated as ordinary 2-place predicates. 
2 'THAT'-CLAUSES, GERUNDIVE PHRASES, AND INFINITIVE 
PHRASES 
Our conclusion that 'believes', 'asserts', 'is necessary', 'is possible', 'is true', 
etc. are predicative expressions has an important consequence. Consider 
the following intuitively valid argument, where A is any formula: 
Whatever x believes is possible. 
(II) x believes that A. 
It is possible that A. 
Suppose, as we have concluded, that one should treat 'is possible' as a 1-
place predicate and 'believes' as a 2-place predicate. In this case, we seem 
to be left with no alternative but to parse the second and third lines of (II) 
as folIows: 
;f. believes that A 
It is possible that A 
where 'that A' is counted as a singular term syntactically. As a notational 
convenience, let us represent the singular term 'that A' by means of '[A]'.12 
When this bracket notation is adopted, (II) can be naturally represented as 
folIows: 
12This notation is introduced by Quine for somewhat similar purposes [Quine, 1960, 
§35], and is used throughout Quality and Concept. For the moment we leave open what 
semantical significance the bracket notation shall have, and the possibility of indirectly 
defining the bracket notation shall also be left open here. 
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(Vy)(B2 x ,y -+ pIy) 
(11') B 2 x, [A] 
pI [A]. 
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The conclusion of (11') is straightforwardly derivable from the two premises 
by an application of universal instantiation and modus ponens, two rules of 
inference valid in standard quantifier logic. Thus, one can bring arguments 
like (11) within the scope of standard quantifier logic simply by adopting 
the hypothesis that 'that'-clauses are singular terms representable with the 
bracket notation. To represent such arguments successfully, one needs no 
new logical principles, and one needs no knowledge about the logic of expres-
sions occurring within the singular term '[A]'. It would seem, therefore, this 
is the simplest way to represent such arguments. Thus, on the assumption 
that the logic for the new singular terms '[A]' can be satisfactorily worked 
out, we conclude that it is desirable to treat 'that'-clauses as singular terms 
that may be represented by means of the bracket notation.13 
Now analogous considerations show that certain other complex nominal 
expressions-for example, gerundive phrases 'being something that is F' 
and infinitive phrases 'to be something that is F'-are also best treated as 
singular terms. An easy extension of the bracket notation provides a natural 
way to represent these complex singular terms. Accordingly, let A be a 
formula and VI, ... , Vm be distinct variables where m 2: 1. Then '[A]vl ... v~ , 
will be our canonical singular term corresponding to the gerundive phrase 
'being VI, ... , Vm such that A' and to the infinitive phrase' to be VI, ... , Vm 
such that A'. 
We shall see that what is logically distinctive about these singular terms 
'[A]' and '[A]", ' is that expressions occurring within them do not obey the 
substitutivity principles characteristic of extensional logic. That is, when a 
13 Advocates of free logic might claim that argument (11) is not strictly speaking valid 
unless it is supplemented with the premise rThat A is something' or rThere is something 
that is identical to that A'. We need not suppose otherwise. To accommodate the free 
logician, we would supplement (11') with the premise r(3x)x = [A)'. The philosophical 
point is this. We are, at the present stage, arguing merely that 'that'-clauses should be 
treated as singular terms. This treatment is compatible with free logics. The question 
of whether 'that'-clauses actually refer to anything and, accordingly, whether they have 
ontological significance is aseparate question. Our argument that they do is given in 
Section 5. 
So far we have established only that 'that'-clauses are singular terms. This thesis 
implies, for example, that 'that'-clauses cannot be treated in the way expletives are 
treated, that is, in the way 'it' in 'it is raining' is treated. 
We should also make it clear that, strictly speaking, our treatment of 'that'-clauses in 
this section is consistent with the higher-order theory that entire sentences can occur as 
singular terms, for not hing we have said prevents a higher-order theorist from treating, 
say, r[A) = [B)' as a notational variant of rA = B'. However, as we have already indi-
cated, this higher-order theory has the unacceptable consequence that, for example, the 
grammatical nonsense 'The cat is on the mat = 7 < 9' is a well-formed sentence. For this 
and many other reasons (see Section 12), we do not advocate the higher-order theory. 
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formula A is enclosed within square brackets (followed by appropriate sub-
scripts), an intensional context is generated. This bracketing operation may 
therefore be viewed as a generalised intensional abstraction operation. Now 
most types of substitutivity failures result from the fact that the offending 
expressions explicitly occur within intensional abstracts. This suggests the 
general working hypothesis that alt substitutivity failures can be traced to 
explicit or implicit occurrences of intensional abstracts. (Consider an ex-
ample of intensionality that does not involve an explicit occurrence of an 
intensional abstract, say, 'Pythagoras was seeking the rational y'2'. The idea 
would be that such a sentence can be treated as a transform of an under-
lying sentence that explicitly contains an appropriate intensional abstract, 
for example, the sentence 'Pythagoras was seeking to find the rational y'2'. 
The fact that 'the rational y'2' occurs intensionally in the transform would 
then be explained by the fact that it occurs (with narrow scope) in the 
intensional abstract 'to find the rational y'2' in the underlying sentence. ) 
Although we need not cornmit ourselves to this hypothesis, its attractive--
ness is striking: if true, it would have considerable explanatory power, and 
it would serve to simplify and unify the entire subject of intensionallogic. 
Indeed, intensional logic could be identified with the logic for intensional 
abstraction. So we urge it as a working hypothesis. 
3 QUANTIFYING-IN 
Consider the following argument: 
x believes that he believes something. 
(111) There is someone v such that x believes 
that v believes something. 
There is areading according to which (111) is intuitively valid. This reading 
provides an example of the logical phenomenon of quantifying-in. It is 
desirable that all valid cases of quantifying-in should be representable in a 
comprehensive intensional logic. In the previous two sections we reached 
these conclusions: 'believes' should be treated as a 2-place predicate; 'is 
possible', as a I-place predicate; 'that'-clauses, as singular terms. These 
conclusions a11 but entail an answer to our problem. Consider the fo11owing 
instance of argument (11), which we considered in the previous section: 
Whatever x believes is possible. 
(IV) x believes that v believes something. 
It is possible that v believes something. 
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Given our previous conclusions, we must represent (IV) as follows: 
(Vy)(B2 xy -t Ply) 
(lVI) B 2 x[(3u)B2 vu] 
pl[(3u)B2vu]. 
And by analogy we must represent (111) as follows: 
(III/) B 2 x, [(3u)B 2 xu] 
What is important about this is that the occurrence of 'V' in the singular 
term '[(3u)B2vul' is an externally quantifiable occurrence of a variable.14 We 
are thus led to conclude that 'that'-clauses ought to be treated as singular 
terms which may contain externally quantifiable occurrences of variables. 
Now there are several alternate treatments of quantifying-in, but we find 
none of them acceptable. Before proceeding, let us give a critical survey 
of these alternatives. Perhaps the most popular one involves multiply-
ing the senses of 'believe' so that, e.g., 'x believes that v believes some-
thing' would be represented as 'B3 X , v, [(3u)B 2 w, u]w' (roughly x believes 
of v that it has the property of being something w such that w believes 
something). But on this approach one cannot even begin to represent 
mixed arguments like (IV)-that is, argument that 'mix' the intentional 
verbs like 'believe' and modals like 'possible'-unless one also multiplies 
the sens es of modals as weIl. And this is only the tip of the iceberg; 
sens es of all expressions that take 'that'-clauses as arguments must simi-
larly be multiplied-all intentional verbs, modals, 'imply', 'explain', 'jus-
tify', 'probable', etc. and even 'true' and '='. Furthermore, this multiple-
sense approach is unable to represent formulas that intuitively involve only 
one sense of 'believe' but two 'that'-clauses, one containing an externally 
quantifiable variable and the other containing none: for example, 'x be-
lieves both that v believes something and that everything is self-identical'. 
On our approach we would use 'B2 x, [(3u)B 2v, u] & B 2 x, [(Vu)u = u]' to 
represent this sentence. Evidently, the best someone can do using B3 is 
'B3 X ,V, [(3u)(3z)B3w,z,u]w&B3 x ,4>, [(Vu)u = u]' (where 4> represents the 
null sequence), thus abandoning altogether the familiar 2-place sense of 'be-
lieve'. Moreover, similar examples would then seem to force proponents of 
the 'B3' -approach to abandon the familiar 2-place sens es of '=', 'assert', 
'explain', 'justify', etc. and the familiar I-place senses of 'true', 'necessary', 
'possible', 'contingent', 'probable', etc. For example, whereas we would rep-
resent 'x asserted two things; one was that v asserted something and the 
other was that everything is self-identical' with 
(3y)(3z)(A2 x,y & A2x, Z & y = [(3u)A2v,u] & z = [(Vw)w = w], 
14The possibility of externally quantifiable occurrences of variables is not allowed in 
Quine's original bracket notation. 
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the opposing approach is forced to use something like 
(3y)(3y')(3z)(3z')(A3x, y, y' & A3 X , z, z' & 
y, y' =4 V, [(3u)(3u')A3 v , u, ul]v & 
z, z' =4 cp, [(Vw)(Vwl)w, wl =4 w, wl], 
where ,=4, is a new 4-place "identity" predicate. Not only are these conse-
quences extremely unintuitive in themselves, but also they evidently make 
it impossible to represent important "cross-referential" sentences like the 
following: 'x asserted exactly one thing and we have a name for it'. Fur-
thermore, given that the familiar 2-place sense of '=' must be abandoned on 
the present approach in favour of '=4', the prospect of any coherent identity 
theory is seriously threatened. A final problem with these approaches arises 
in connection with multiple embedding. For example, suppose that someone 
u is consciously and explicitly thinking that u is consciously and explicitly 
thinking somethingj that is, T 2u, [(3y)T2u,y]. On the 3-place approach, this 
must be represented along the following lines: T3 U ,U, [(3x)(3y)T3 V ,x,y]v. 
However, this is implausiblej in the example, u is not consciously and ex-
plicitly thinking of u that he has the property of being someone v who is 
consciously and explicitly thinking of something that it has some property. 
This thought-and any other one of its ilk-is intuitively different from the 
thought that u is havingj u's thought is simply that u is consciously and ex-
plicitly thinking something. This subtle difference is just lost on the 3-place 
approach. 
Another approach to 'that'-clauses containing externally quantifiable Vari-
ables is to associate them with certain sequences and to treat 'believe' as 
a 2-place predicate: for example 'u believes that Fu' might be represented 
by 'B2 u, (u, [Fu]u)'. However, this seemingly simple idea seems impossible 
to formulate in a satisfactory general way. Here are some of the problems 
that confront it. 
First, certainly some identities of the following form hold: that Fu = 
that Cu, v. (For example, is it not true that the following identity holds: 
That u is a Moonie = that u is a follower of v. 
where v is Reverend Sun Yen Moon?) However, such identities would be 
impossible ifwe were to represent 'that Fu' with '(u, [Fu]u)' and 'that Cu, v' 
with '((u,v), [Cu,v]uv}' as our sequence theorists would do. For plainly 
(u, [Fu]u) cf- ((u,v), [Cu,v]uv}. 
Second, we find it extremely counterintuitive that what a person per-
ceives, believes, asserts, hopes, decides, etc. is ever reallya sequence. How 
can sequence theorists accept such an implausible theory? (See Section 7 
for further discussion of this sort of intuitive objection.) 
Third, the sequence approach runs into difficulties in connection with 
multiple embeddings. For example, it is intuitively possible for someone 
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u to believe that, for every V, that Fv = that Fv and, nevertheless, not 
believe that, for every v, that Fv = «v), [Fv]v). In our bracket notation: 
B2 u, [(Vv)[Fv] = [Fv]] & -,B2 u, [(Vv) [Fv] = ((v), [Fv]v)]. 
However, on the sequence approach, this would presumably be equivalent 
to the following contradiction: 
B 2 u, [(Vv)((v), [Fv]v) = ((v), [Fv]v}] & 
-,B2u, [(Vv)((v), [Fv]v} = ((v), [Fv]v)]. 
You might try to mitigate this problem by invoking your favourite resolution 
of the paradox of analysis. However, we believe that such ploys will not 
succeed. (For more on the paradox of analysis, see Section 13.) 
Fourth, by attempting their reduction, the sequence theorists prejudge 
certain questions concerning the identity conditions for the items denoted by 
intensional abstracts. For example, on one important traditional conception 
(dubbed "Alternative (2)" by Alonzo Church)15 the following principle of 
identity is valid for any formulas A and B: 
If it is necessary that A and it is necessary thatB, then that A = 
that B. 
(Analogous principles hold for intensional abstracts that are gerundive and 
infinitive in form.) However, for all u and v, it is necessary that u is self-
identical and it is necessary that v is self-identical. This fact and the above 
principle of identity imply: 
That u is self-identical = that v is self-identical. 
for all u and v. However, if u -I- v, the sequences that would be associ-
ated with these 'that'-clauses on the sequence approach would plainly not 
be identical: that is, (u, [x is self-identical]",) -I- (v, [x is self-identical]",). In 
this way, therefore, the sequence approach is incompatible with the above 
traditional conception. A prudent approach to intensional logic would not 
prejudge such questions, for it is quite conceivable that our best overall 
theory of intensionality will invoke this coarse-grained conception perhaps 
in tandem with various fine-grained conceptions. Indeed, it is quite plau-
sible that, unlike the fine-grained objects of the propositional attitudes, 
conditions (or states of affairs) in the world conform to the coarse-grained 
conception. For example, intuitively the glass's being half empty is the same 
condition (state of affairs) in the world as the glass's being half full. And 
this is so despite the fact that someone could be thinking that the glass is 
half empty without thinking that the glass is half full. 
15See Alonzo Church [1951]. 
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Fifth, the sequence approach runs into difficulty concerning a kind of 
type-freedom that is called "self-constituency". This kind of type freedom 
appears to arise in connection with the problem of mutual knowledge. 16 For 
example, suppose that two enemy soldiers x and y suddenly spot each other 
in the bush. Conceivably, a full description of this situation should include 
the following; x sees z and y sees z', where z = [y sees z'] and z' = [x sees z]. 
But what are z and z'? On the sequence approach, z = «y, z'), [u sees v]uv) 
and z' = ((x,z), [u sees v])uv. Now suppose that sequences are identified 
with ordered sets. (If instead sequences are ordered properties, one runs 
into the regress discussed below.) In this case, z and z' would be non-
well-founded sets (Le., z E ... E z' E ... E z). However, according to 
the standard conception of sets, non-well-founded sets are impossible. The 
upshot is this. To represent z and z' on the set-theoretical version of the 
sequence approach, one must revolutionise the standard conception of set. 
However, such a radical move seems quite unjustified merely to deal with the 
simple task at hand. No such radical move is required on the more cautious 
treatment of quantifying-in that we are advocating. (We will return to this 
topic in Section 11.) 
Our sixth objection to the sequence approach is ontological. In Sections 
(5)-(9) we will argue that intensional abstracts that do not contain exter-
nally quantifiable variables denote properties, relations, and propositions. 
This conclusion, together with the premise that intensional logic is indis-
pensable to any acceptable comprehensive theory of the world, leads to the 
conclusion that properties, relations, and propositions are indispensable. In 
view of this, ontological economy demands that we try to replace the more 
complex ontology consisting of both sets and properties with the simpler on-
tology consisting of just properties. In fact, this ontological simplification 
can be easily accomplished within our intensional framework. So on grounds 
of ontological economy, the set-theoretical version of the sequence approach 
to quantifying-in should not be adopted. A related problem with the set-
theoretical version of the sequence approach is that intensional abstracts 
containing externally quantifiable variables are not semantically correlated 
with properties, relations, or propositions; instead, they are semantically 
correlated with items from an entirely distinct ontological category, namely, 
sets. Thus, although intensional abstracts that do not contain externally 
quantifiable variables (e.g., 'that something is red') are semantically corre-
lated with one kind of thing (namely, propositions), intensional abstracts 
that do contain externally quantifiable variables (e.g., 'that x is red') are se-
mantically correlated with an entirely different kind of thing (namely, sets). 
This sort of ad hoc theoretical disunity is quite unjustified. Our approach to 
quantifying-in avoids both the ontological excess and the ad hoc theoretical 
disunity of the set-theoretical version of the sequence approach. The upshot 
16See Sections 1 and 6 of Bealer [1988] for furt her discussion of self-constituency. 
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is that the set-theoretical version of the sequence approach should not be 
adopted. 
Our fifth and sixth objections to the sequence approach depended on 
the identification of sequences with extensional entities (namely, ordered 
sets). What would happen if the sequence theorist tried instead to identify 
sequences with intensional entities (namely, ordered properties)? In set 
theory, sequences are identified with ordered sets; for example, (u, v) might 
be identified with {{u}, {u,v}}. (That is, {x: x = {y: y = u} V x = {y: 
y = u V y = v} }.) By analogy, in a property theory, sequences are identified 
with ordered properties; for example (u, v) might be identified with [x = 
[y = u]y V x = [y = u V y = v]yJx. So far so good. But notice that this 
property is, on the face of it, a de re property; the intensional abstract that 
is semantically correlated with it contains externally quantifiable variables 
(namely, 'u' and 'v'). So advocates of the property-theoretic version of the 
sequence approach to quantifying-in would be committed to identifying this 
property with a sequence such as: 
«u,v), [x = [y = u]y V x = [y = u Vy = v]y]xuv). 
But this outcome is plainly unacceptable because: 
(u, v) f::. «u, v), [x = [y = uJg V x = [y = u V y = v]y]xuv)' 
And this is only the beginning. With which property would the latter se-
quence be identified? On the property-theoretic version of the sequence 
approach, this sequence would have to be identified with still another prop-
erty that, on the face of it, is de re. In this way the property-theoretic 
version of the sequence approach leads to a regress. You cannot eliminate 
de re properties in favour of sequences, for those very sequences must, in 
turn, be identified with further de re properties; and so on ad infinitum. To 
put the point linguistically, suppose that you have a language fitted out with 
just de dicto intensional abstracts and an apparatus for expressing the pred-
ication (instantiation) relation. In this language you could never, even in 
principle, identify the sequences (=properties) with which de re properties 
are supposed to be identicalP 
17This regress could be avoided if a primitive notation r(Vi,Vj)' for sequences were 
adjoined to the language. The problem with this approach is that one should nevertheless 
be able to say, specifically, what sort of entities are semantically correlated with these 
singular terms r(Vi,Vj)'. On the one hand, perhaps these entities are sets. But if so, 
this leads one right back to the ontological excess and theoretical disunity we found in 
the set-theoretical version of the sequence theory of quantifying-in. On the other hand, 
perhaps the singular terms r (Vi, Vj)' are semantically correlated with properties. But 
if so, with what sort of properties? It would be unacceptably mysterious if you could 
not say which. However, if you confine yourself to a language fitted out with just de 
dicta intensional abstracts and an apparatus for expressing the predication relation, you 
get caught in the regress mentioned in the text; you can never complete your answer to 
the question. The only alternative is to admit into your language intensional abstracts 
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Summing up, the overall verdict on the sequence approach to quantifying-
in is that it is fatally flawed. 
There is a final approach to quantifying-in that should be mentioned, 
namely, the selj-ascription theory of externally quantified belief sentences. 
Such an approach has been advocated independently by David Lewis [1979] 
and Roderick Chisholm [1981]. (We will confine our discussion to Chisholm; 
however, our comments will by and large apply to Lewis as weIl.) Chisholm 's 
approach is not intended to be a general treatment of quantifying-inj rather , 
it was developed primarily to help solve certain recalcitrant substitutivity 
puzzles involving indexicals in propositional-attitude sentences. Chisholm 
imposes a special ontological constraint on his solution to these and other 
substitutivity puzzles, namely, that a solution should avoid ontological com-
mitment to de re properties, relations, and propositions; for Chisholm, a 
solution should be ontologically committed to what may be caIled 'pure Pla-
tonic' properties, relations, and propositions. For this reason, if his theory 
is adequate, Chisholm ought to be able to extend it to cover all 'that'-clause 
sentences that on the surface seem to contain externally quantifiable vari-
ables. We will give two criticisms of the self-ascription theory-one aimed 
directly against its treatment of de re belief sentences and the other in-
tended to show that it cannot be generalised to yield a uniform treatment 
of 'that'-clause sentences containing externally quantifiable variables. 
According to Chisholm, a person x directly believes that Fx if and only if 
x self-ascribes the property of being F. 18 (In symbols. A2 X , [Fv]v.) And x 
indirectly believes that Fy if and only if, for some relation R, y is the unique 
item bearing R to x and x self-ascribes the property of being something v 
such that there is a unique item u bearing R to v and Fu. (In symbols, 
(3R)(R!y, x & A 2 x, [(3!u)(Ru, v & Fu)]v).) Finally, x believes that Fy if and 
only if x directly believes that Fy or x indirectly believes that Fy. The first 
problem is that these three biconditionals do not yield the right results for 
the belief sentences they are intended to cover. Specifically, the second 
biconditional (and, in turn, the third biconditional) is far too weak. For 
example, suppose that 'Ry, x' is 'y = the tallest man & x = x'. Suppose x 
self-ascribes the property of being something v such that there is a unique 
that contain externally quantifiable variables (or so me other apparatus with comparable 
expressive power). In this framework, it is then easy to specify the sort of properties 
with which the terms r(Vi,Vj)' are semantically correlated. They are de re properties 
like [x = [y = Vi]y V x = [y = Vi V Y = Vj]y]". 
Incidentally, you might favour treating r (Vi, Vj)' as an indefinite description, perhaps 
introduced by contextual definition in terms of the predication relation. (See p. 83, 
Quality and Concept, for an illustration.) However, this rnove would not entitle you to 
avoid the quest ion of the general sort of entity with which these expressions are semanti-
cally correlated. For property theorists, there seems to be no satisfactory answer to this 
question that does not invoke de re properties as irreducible entities. 
ISIf r B' has no externally quantifiable individual variables, then :1; directly believes 
that B if and only if x self-ascribes the property of being such that R. In symbols: 
A2 x , [pvJv. 
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item u bearing R to v and Fu. That is, x self-ascribes [(3!u) (Au, v & Fu)]v. 
The problem is that in a typical situation this would not be sufficient for 
believing ofthe tallest man that he is F. On the contrary, this self-ascription 
would constitute a run-of-the-mill de dicto belief to the effect that the tallest 
man is F. Without stricter constraints on R, the proposal virtually erases 
the distinction between genuine de re beliefs and run-of-the-mill de dicto 
beliefs. Now there might be ways to impose suitably strict constraints on 
R on a case-by-case basis. However, there seems to be no systematic way 
to impose suitable constraints on R. 
The second problem is that the self-ascription approach does not mesh 
weIl with a general treatment of 'that'-clause sentences. To illustrate the 
problem, consider the following intuitively valid argument form: 
For all y, if x believes y, then ... y .... 
x believes that Fx . 
.. . that Fx .... 
In our notation: 
(Vy) (B2x, y -+ ... y . .. ) 
B 2 x, [Fx] 
... [Fx] ... . 
Suppose that ' ... y ... ' is syntactically simple. For example, suppose it is 
'y is true', 'y is necessary', 'y is logically true', 'y is probable', 'y is explain-
able', etc. Then, presumably, self-ascription theorists would be led to adopt 
the following representations, respectively: 'x has [Fy]y', 'x necessarily-has 
[Fy]y', 'x logically-has [Fy]y', 'x probably-has [Fy]y', 'x explainably-has 
[Fy]y', etc. The idea here is to introduce special new primitive predicates 
('has', 'necessarily-has', 'logically-has', etc.) to represent syntactically sim-
ple cases of ' ... y ... '. However, this pattern of representation breaks down 
when ' ... y ... ' is more complex. For example, suppose ' ... y ... ' is 'y im-
plies that Hxz', 'That Hxz explains y', 'y = that Hxz', 'Given the premise 
that if Hxz then Fx and given the premise that Hxz, then y follows im-
mediately by modus ponens, where y = that Fx', etc. There appears to be 
no systematic way to treat all such cases by straightforward extension of 
the technique used to represent the syntactically simple cases. It appears, 
therefore, that the self-ascription theorist has no alternative but to adopt 
the sequence approach that we discussed a few paragraphs above. (This 
assessment is fortified by the following consideration. Notice that the three 
biconditionals that comprise the self-ascription theory do not constitute a 
general analysis (definition) of belief in terms of self-ascription. That is, 
for an arbitrary w, we are not told merely the conditions under which a 
person could be said to believe Wj we are told merely the conditions under 
which a person could be said to believe W for certain special w. It appears 
that the only way to arrive at a general analysis would be to utilise the 
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sequence approach.) However, if the sequence approach were adopted, the 
self-ascription theory wold then inherit all of the problems inherent in that 
approach. 
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the self-ascription theory is seriously 
flawed. But this does not mean that the problems that the self-ascription 
theory was designed to handle (i.e., the explanation of substitutivity fail-
ures involving co-denoting indexicals) cannot be solved in some other way. 
Indeed, they can be solved within the framework for treating quantifying-in 
that we have advocated. (See Sections 12 and 13 below.) In view of this, it 
would be amistake to abandon our treatment of quantifying-in in favour of 
an alternate treatment inspired by the self-ascription theory.19 
Our primary conclusion, then, is this: 'that'-clauses are best represented 
by means of an intensional abstraction operation (such as the bracket no-
tation '[A]') and these intensional abstracts may contain externally quan-
tifiable variables. Now fully analogous considerations lead to the conclusion 
that gerundive phrases and infinitive phrase likewise are best represented 
by means of an appropriate intensional abstraction operation (such as our 
generalised bracket notation '[A]", ,) and these abstracts mayaIso contain 
externally quantifiable variables. Thus, in the formal language for our in-
tensional logic, '[A]vl ... v= ' will be a well-formed singular term, for any 
m 2: 0, even if the formula A contains free variables that are not among the 
variables VI, ... , Vm ; such free variables are externally quantifiable. 
4 LEARNABILITY 
Donald Davidson has argued persuasively that human beings can learn a 
language only if it contains a finite number of semantical primitives and, 
hence, that a formal language can serve as an idealised representation of 
(a fragment of) a human natural language only if it too contains a finite 
number of semantical primitives.20 
There has been some confusion about what Davidson's learnability re-
quirement comes to. It does not imply that all learnable languages~and 
all idealised representations of them~must have a finite number of syntac-
tically primitive constants. This would be too strong. For we humans are 
19Tn a fully developed solution of the substitutivity problems involving indexicals, we 
would need to mark a distinction between convictions in acquaintance and cognitive 
commitrnents. (See Section 29 of Quality and Goncept for discussion of this distinction.) 
We do not rule out the possibility that the notion of conviction in acquaintance might 
be elucidated in terms of the notion of self-ascription. The point is that such elucidation 
does not help to win the ontological point Chisholm favours, nor does it support a logical 
theory that eliminates externally quantifiable variables from 'that'-clauses, gerundive 
phrases, and infinitive phrases. Although the self-ascription theory might be able to 
rnake a contribution to epistemology and philosophical psychology, it appears to have 
little to contribute to rnetaphysics and logical t heory. 
2oD. Davidson [1964J. 
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able to learn certain specialised languages that have an infinite number of 
syntactically primitive constants; for example, we could learn a language 
for arithmetic in which all the numerals are syntactically primitive. But 
what makes this possible? The explanation, of course, is that each numeral 
following '0' can be defined (e.g., in terms of '0' and '+1') and, hence, is 
not semantically primitive. When we generalise on examples of this sort, 
we arrive at the following highly plausible principle: for any infinitary lan-
guage L that a human could learn, there must be a finitary language D in 
which all the constants in L (besides those that are already in LI) either 
could be defined or could be introduced in some comparable manner (for 
example, by means of Kripkean reference-fixing descriptions). Given this 
principle, we may infer that, if an infinitary language L is to qualify as 
an idealised representation of the logical syntax of natural language, there 
must be an associated finitary language LI that satisfies the condition just 
stated. In view of this, the safest and most direct way to ensure that a can-
didate infinitary language L qualifies as an idealised representation of the 
logical syntax of natural language is just to produce the requisite finitary 
language LI. Notice, however, that in place of L this finitary language D 
should itself be able to serve as an idealised representation of the logical 
syntax of naturallanguage. So, in practice, we are entitled to demand from 
people seeking to construct an idealised representation of the logical syntax 
of natural language that they fill the bill directly with a finitary language 
like LI. (See Section 11 for further elaboration of this argument.) 
The foregoing-or something quite like it-is what Davidson's learnabil-
ity requirement comes to. And it seems basically right to uso Now the formal 
language in which intensionallogic is formulated should be able to serve as 
an idealised representation of the logical syntax of the intensional fragment 
of natural language. Given this fact, together with Davidson's learnabil-
ity requirement, we conclude that this formallanguage should have a finite 
number of primitive constants. 
5 REFERENTIAL SEMANTICS FOR INTENSIONAL LANGUAGE 
We come now to the question of the semantics for sentences containing 
'that'-clauses, gerundive phrases, or infinitive phrases. What, if anything, 
corresponds semantically to these abstract singular terms? In see king the 
ans wer to this question, we may assume that any adequate semantics either 
includes an explicit specification of the truth conditions for the sentences of 
the language or is set up so that these truth conditions can be derived. For 
simplicity, therefore, let us examine what an explicit specification of truth 
conditions would have to be like. The crucial issue for us arises in connection 
with atomic sentences. For example, under what conditions is an atomic 
sentence of the form .-F[A)' true? In a referential semantics, an ordinary 
166 GEORGE REALER AND UWE MÖXXICH 
atomic sentence' Fa' is true on an interpretation :T Hf, according to :T, 
the singular term' a' denotes an item of which the predicate 'F' is true. 
The thesis we will define is that the truth conditions for atomic sentences 
containing intensional abstracts must be specified in the analogous way: 
'F[A]' is true on interpretation :T Hf, according to :T, the singular term 
'[A]' denotes an item of which the predicate 'F' is true. (In our discussion 
we will refer to these atomic sentences as atomic intensional sentences. ) 
Our argument will proceed in two steps. First, we will argue that every-
one who aspires to an acceptable comprehensive theory of the world must 
acknowledge the truth of an infinite variety of atomic intensional sentences. 
Second, we will argue that, besides a referential semantics, there is no viable 
alternative semantics that will account systematically far the truth of these 
atomic intensional sentences. 
To expedite the first step, let us consider the radical theory that no 
atomic intensional sentences are, strictly speaking, true. This theory is 
wildly implausible, for true sentences like the following would have to be 
deemed false: 'It is true that someone has ahand', 'It is true that 7 < 9', 
'It is 10gica11y valid that everything is self-identical', 'It is probable that the 
sun will rise', 'That I have sense experiences has an explanation', and so 
forth. How much more plausible it would be to accept the truth of these 
sentences and to try to devise a semantics for them. At this stage, one need 
not make any assumptions about whether it would have to be a referential 
semantics. 
However, suppose that supporters of the radical theory persist. How 
could they justify their position? Since it is locally so implausible, they 
have no choice but to try to justify it globally, that is, by showing that 
their best comprehensive theory deerns a11 atomic intensional sentences to be 
false. Hut if their theory is truly comprehensive, it must among other things 
be able to account far its own acceptability (justification). We will argue 
that the radical thearists cannot show this without resorting to intensional 
idioms and so their position is essentially self-defeating. As a result, it is 
not acceptable. 
How might the radical theorists try to show that their position is ac-
ceptable? The standard idiom far discussing acceptability (justification) is 
intensional. For example, it is standard to say: 'It is acceptable that A', 
'The theory that A is justified', and so forth. (There is also a meta-
linguistic idiom for discussing acceptability. This will be considered in a 
moment.) So if the radical thearists are to defend the acceptability of their 
theory by this standard means, they will have to make various positive as-
sertions with intensional sentences, sentences which they deem to be not 
true. Specifically, the conclusion of their argument would be (the propo-
sition expressed by) 'It is acceptable that no atomic intensional sentence 
is true'. Hut this sentence is itself an atomic intensional sentence. So the 
radical thesis (i.e., that no atomic intensional sentence is true) implies that 
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this conclusion is not true. But if this conclusion is not true, then it is not 
acceptable that no atomic intensional sentence is true. Thus the radical 
thesis implies that the radical thesis is not acceptable. The radical thesis 
is, in this sense, self-defeating.21 
To avoid this self-defeat, the radical theorists might try to invoke some 
new, nonstandard idiom with which to show that their comprehensive theory 
is acceptable (justified). However, to succeed at this strategy, they must in 
addition be able to show that this new, nonstandard idiom is relevantly like 
the standard idiom, for otherwise there would be no reason to think that 
their argument, which uses a new idiom, has any bearing on acceptability. 
After all, acceptability, or something relevantly like it, is what is at issue. 
There can be many similarities between a standard idiom and a new idiom 
(e.g., length or sound of constituent expressions, etc.); only some of them 
are relevant. Therefore, it is incumbent on the radical theorists to show 
that their new idiom is relevantly like the standard one. 22 
(As we indicated above, there is also a metalinguistic idiom for dis-
cussing acceptability. For example, someone might say, 'The sentence' A' 
is acceptable'. However, to the extent that it is standard, this metalinguis-
tic idiom bears the following systematic relation to the standard intensional 
21 Jndeed, given the radical theory that no atomic intensional sentence is true, it is 
impossible for there to be any sound argument far the radical theorists' conclusion about 
the acceptability of their theory. To see why, consider any argument whose conclusion is 
(the proposition expressed by) 'It is acceptable that no atomic sentence in the standard 
intensional idiom is true'. Since this sentence is itself an atomic sentence in the standard 
intensional idiom, it is not true. Therefore, (the proposition expressed by) the sentence 
cannot follow validly from true premises. 
Another observation is in order. If (a proposition expressed by) a sentence implies 
directly that it is itselfnot true, then (the proposition expressed by) such a sentence is not 
acceptable either. It follows that the radical theorists' conclusion ab out the acceptability 
of their theory is not acceptable. 
22To be relevantly like the standard idiom, the new idiom must have systematic rela-
tions to such matters as: the simplest explanation of the evidence, the simplest coherent 
systematisation of one's beliefs, a reliably caused body of beliefs, and so forth. However, 
the standard idioms far discussing these matters (explanation, evidence, belief, causa-
tion, etc.) are intensional. For example, 'It is evident to me that I am having sense 
experiences', 'That I have sense experiences is explained by physiology and psychology', 
'I believe that so and so', 'That my brain is in such and such state causes me to have 
these sense experiences', 'It is causally necessary that, if my brain is in such and such 
state, I have these sense experiences', etc. (Of course, there are other standard ways of 
talking about explanation, evidence, belief, and causation. But they have systematic re-
lations to these standard intensional idioms. If they did not, they could, for all we know, 
be just some new idiom whose relevance to explanation, evidence, belief, and causation 
would be in question.) Because the standard idioms are intensional, the radical theorist 
must deern our ordinary uses of it as, strictly speaking, false. For this reason, the radical 
theorists have no choice but to introduce some new, nonintensional idioms for discussing 
explanation, evidence, belief, and causation, and they must be able to show that these 
new idioms are relevantly like the standard intensional idioms. But this can be done 
only by showing that the new idioms are relevantly like the standard ones in meaning, 
purpose, or function (or something relevantly like meaning, purpose, or function). 
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idiom: the sentence r A' is acceptable if and only if it is acceptable that 
A. Suppose that this systematic relationship is affirmed by the radical the-
orists. In this case, they are led to the same sort of self-defeat described 
above. On the other hand, suppose that this systematic relationship is not 
affirmed by the radical theorists. In this case, their use of the metalinguistic 
idiom would, for all anyone could tell, be nonstandard. That is, for all any-
one could tell, it might be just some new idiom. Therefore, if the standard 
systematic relationship is not affirmed by the radical theorists, they would 
be obliged to show either that their metalinguistic idiom is, despite this, still 
the standard idiom or that, if it is not the standard idiom, it nevertheless 
has bearing on acceptability. In either case, they would need to show that 
this idiom is relevantly like the standard idiom. So no real progress has yet 
been made.) 
The conclusion so far is this. To avoid self-defeat, the radical theorists 
have no choice but to use an idiom that either appears to be or is non-
standard and then to show that this idiom is relevantly like the standard 
intensional idiom for talking about acceptability. How might the radical 
theorists try to show that their idiom is relevantly like the standard inten-
sional idiom? There are two ways. One would be to show that the meanings 
of express ions in the new idiom and relevantly like the meanings of expres-
sions in the standard idiom. 23 The other way would be to show that the 
purpose or function of the new idiom is relevantly like that of the standard 
idiom. (Or radical theorists might try to show that the two idioms share 
something that is relevantly like meaning, or they might try to show that 
they share something that is relevantly like purpose or function.) But both 
ways inevitably fail. 
Stated briefly, the problem is this. The standard idioms for talking 
about meaning, purpose and nmction are intensional: rr A' means that A'; 
23To show that the meaning of an expression in a new idiom is relevantly like the 
meaning of an expression in a standard idiom, one has four options. First, one can show 
an actual meaning identity. But we have seen that statements of meaning identities 
have systematic relations to statements of intensional identities: the meaning of rA -, = 
the meaning of r B' if and only if that A = that B. So intensionality enters in here. 
Second, one can show that the two expressions are definitionally related. However, the 
standard devices for indicating definitional relationships are intensional, for example: 
'iffdf', '=df', 'It is definitionally true that', and so forth. So this option does not lead 
to the elimination of intensionality. Third, one ean show that the purpose or function 
served by the meanings ofthe two expressions is the same. However, our standard idiom 
for discussing purpose and function is also intensional. For example. rThe purpose of 
F-ing is to G', rThe funetion of F-ing is to G', etc. contain gerundive and infinitive 
phrases, which are intensional abstracts. Fourth, one can show that the two meanings 
are inherently similar. However, to show that two items are inherently similar, one 
must show that they share fundamental qualities and relations. But a general theory of 
fundamental qualities and relations is already a property theoryj indeed such a theory is, 
on its own, sufficient for the construction of intensional logic. (See Chapter 8 of Ql.lality 
and Concept for an elaboration of this argument. See also [Lewis, 1983].) On all four 
options, therefore, intensionality-or a framework that implies it-plays a central role. 
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'The purpose of F-ing is to G', 'The function of F-ing is to G', and so on. 
So if they use these idioms, the radical theorists onee again end up in self-
defeat.24 Moreover, although there are standard extensional idioms for talk-
ing ab out meaning, purpose, and function, they bear systematic relations 
to the standard intensional idioms for talking about meaning, purpose, and 
function. (For example, the standard extensional idiom for talking about 
synonymy bears the following systematic relationship to the standard in-
tensional idiom for talking about meaning: 'A' is synonymous to 'B' iff 
, A' and 'B' mean the same Hf that A = that B.) If the radical theorists 
affirm these systematic reactions, they again end up in self-defeat. If they 
do not affirm these systematie relationships, then they are obliged to show 
either that their use of the extensional idiom is standard or, if it is not stan-
dard, that it has bearing on meaning, purpose, or function. In either ease, 
they must be able to show that their idiom is relevantly like the standard 
intensional idiom. Alternatively, the radical theorists eould invoke some 
new, nonstandard idiom for (allegedly) talking about meaning, purpose, or 
function (or for talking about something that is relevantly like meaning, 
purpose, or funetion). But, then, they would onee again be obliged to show 
that their idiom is relevantly like the standard intensional idiom for talking 
ab out meaning, purpose, or function. Now how is the required relevant sim-
ilarity to be shown? WeH, by demonstrating that the meaning, purpose, or 
function of the questionable idiom is relevantly like the meaning, purpose, 
or function of the standard intensional idiom for talking about meaning, 
purpose, or function. However, if this demonstration is eondueted in the 
standard intensional idiom, self-defeat results onee again. On the other 
hand, if the demonstration is eonducted in the questionable idiom (i.e., an 
idiom whose relevanee to the standard idiom is the very question at issue), 
this demonstration simply begs the question. For at no stage will it have 
24To avoid this self-defeat, the radical theorists might try to define meaning (or some-
thing relevantly like it) in terms of Gricean intentions, or they might try to define 
purpose or function (ar something relevantly like them) in terms of intention ar cau-
sation. However, our standard idioms for giving definitions are intensional, for example: 
'iffdf', '=df', 'It is definitionally true that', and so forth. Moreover, our standard id-
ioms for talking about intention and causation are also intensional: 'x intends to F', 
'x's F -ing caused y to G', 'It is causally necessary that if Fx then Gy', and so forth. 
So intensionality is not avoided. (Of course, there is a standard extensional idiom far 
talking about causation. However, it bears systematic relationships to the standard in-
tensional idiom. If the radical theorists do not affirm these systematic relationships, they 
are obliged to show either that their extensional idiom is still the standard one or that, 
if it is nonstandard, it is relevantly like the standard one.) 
If, to avoid this intensionality, the radical theorists dropped these standard intensional 
idioms for definition, intention, and causation and if they put so me new, nonstandard 
idioms in their place, they would then be obliged to show that the new idioms are 
relevantly like the standard intensional ones. But this can be done only by showing that 
they are relevantly like the standard ones in meaning, purpose, ar function (ar something 
relevantly like meaning, purpose, or function). To do this, the radical theorists are pushed 
right back into the problem. 
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been established that any conclusion stated in the questionable idiom has 
any bearing on meaning, purpose, or function (or anything that is relevantly 
like meaning, purpose, or function). 
The overall pattern, then, is this. In the effort to establish the accept-
ability of their anti-intentionalist theory, the radical theorists get caught 
either in self-defeat or in begging-the-question. The epistemic situation is, 
if you will, hermeneutical: the standard idioms are intensional, and to show 
the relevance of a nonstandard idiom, one must use a standard intensional 
idiom or one must beg the question by using a nonstandard idiom whose 
relevance is equally in question. There is no epistemically acceptable way 
to go from where we are to the radical anti-intentionalist theory. And more 
generally, there is no epistemically acceptable way to make out the possibil-
ity of beings who have an acceptable comprehensive theory (or something 
relevantly like an acceptable comprehensive theory) that includes the radical 
anti-intentionalist theory.25 
We have established that every acceptable comprehensive theory of the 
world must admit a wide variety of atomic intensional sentences as true. In 
this connection, it would be unacceptable to exelude any part of the stan-
dard network of atomic intensional sentences bearing systematic relations 
to one another; specifically, atomic intensional sentences dealing with ac-
ceptability, truth, meaning, purpose, function, definition, intention, belief, 
causation, explanation, probability, evidence, necessity, and so forth. Given 
that such a variety of atomic intensional sentences must be counted as true, 
what semantical theory will account for their truth? As we have indicated, 
a standard referential semantics provides the most straightforward ans wer: 
an atomic intensional sentence' F[A]' is true on an interpretation :1 if and 
only if, according to :1, the singular term '[A]' denotes an item of which 
the predicate 'F' is true. 
250f course, a radical theorist might simply present us with so me novel scheme for 
deterrnining acceptability. (This is pretty much what is done in Paul Churchland [1979] 
and [1981] and in Patricia Churchland [1986].) The problem is that there is no reason to 
pay any attention to claims made within the new scheme unless this scheme can be shown 
to be relevantly similar to the standard scheme for determining acceptability. We have 
seen that, to do this, either the proponents of the new scheme must use some standard 
intensional idiom, or they must use an alternate idiom that can be shown to be relevantly 
similar to a standard one. And we have seen that latter option leads to a vicious regress 
unless at some stage the proponents of the new scheme invoke some standard intensional 
idiom to stop it. If they do not do this and if they persist in holding their position, 
they end up in groundless dogmatism. They would be like people with a magic device 
that purports to tell them when a candidate comprehensive theory is acceptablej the 
device does this by flashing the ward 'acceptable' or 'not acceptable' when (the linguistic 
expression of) various candidate theories are typed in. Regarding tbe acceptability of 
their own comprehensive theory (which includes a theory of acceptability based on the 
device), they declare that their theory is acceptable on the grounds tbat the device has 
flashed the word 'acceptable' when they type in (a linguistic expression of) their theory. 
Plainly, their theory is not acceptable, Bor is it relevantly like an acceptable theory. 
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What alternative is there to a standard referential semantics? Evidently, 
there is only one alternative that is even faintly promising. Namely, the sort 
of non-referential semantics that anti-Meinongian realists often envisage for 
positive sentences containing ordinary vacuous names, sentences like 'Apollo 
is a Greek god' and 'Pegasus is a mythical flying horse'. On this theory, such 
sentences are deemed to be literally true. In this respect, the theory is like 
Meinong's. However, contrary to Meinong's theory, this theory treats terms 
such as 'Apollo' and 'Pegasus' as genuinely vacuous. Since these terms refer 
to nothing, the truth of sentences containing them needs to be explained 
in some new, nonreferential way. The idea is that, in the semantical de-
scription of the truth conditions of these everyday vacuous-name sentences, 
all purported references to nonactual objects (Apollo, Pegasus, etc.) are to 
be replaced by references to actual human beings in relevant actual mental 
states. For example, the truth conditions for 'Apollo is a Greek god' would 
on this nonreferential approach be characterised in terms of actual religious 
beliefs (and other mental states) of the ancient Greeks. Now concerning 
atomic sentences like 'F[A]', the proposal would be to characterise their 
truth conditions along these sort of nonreferential lines. 
It is true that ordinary vacuous-name sentences are standardly 'backed' 
by an identifiable body of actual myths, legends, rumours, works of fiction, 
and so forth. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the truth con-
ditions for ordinary vacuous-name sentences might be specified in terms of 
these. (We need not take any stand on whether this sort of nonreferential 
semantics is really feasible. If it is not feasible even for ordinary vacuous-
name sentences, it certainly is not feasible for atomic intensional sentences. ) 
For example, as a first approximation, a nonreferentialist might hold that 
an ordinary vacuous-name sentence' Fa I is true if and only if it is deriv-
able from a maximal consistent set of sentences extracted from a standard 
linguistic statement of a community's myths, legends, rumours, and works 
of fiction. But there is no comparable proposal for atomic intensional sen-
tences. There are at least two decisive reasons. 
First, unlike the true atomic vacuous-name sentences, the true atomic 
intensional sentences are not even recursively enumerable. (Consider sen-
tences of the form 'It is true that A', ,It is probable that A', 'It is explain-
able that A', 'It is possible that A', etc.) So there is no body of actual 
beliefs (and other actual mental states) that could playa role comparable 
to a community's body of actual myths, legends, rumours and works of fic-
tion. If there is nothing mental to play this role, the semanticist has no 
alternative but to posit actual reference to real things. 
Second, let us suppose per impossible that the true atomic intensional 
sentences can be fixed on the basis of some relevant body of our beliefs. 
Which beliefs would these be? They would not be myths, legends, ru-
mours, or works of fictionj rather, they would be straightforward acceptable 
(justified) theoretical beliefs. For example, as the above argument concern-
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ing acceptability indicates, they would include acceptable (justified) beliefs 
about the acceptability of our overall theory. Such beliefs-unlike myths, 
legends, etc. -would therefore need to be counted as true in our best overall 
theory. Now because certain beliefs (myths, legends, etc.) are not true, the 
nonreferentialist holds that they can 'back' the truth of associated vacuous-
name sentences without implying thereby that these names are semantically 
associated with any relevant entity. By contrast, the beliefs that would 
presumably 'back' the truth of our atomic intensional sentences are true. 
Accordingly, they do imply that there are relevant entities semantically as-
sociated with the intensional abstracts occurring in these atomic sentences. 
After all, the way in which intensional abstracts are used in our acceptable 
(justified) theorising is entirely like the way in which standard nonvacuous 
referring expressions are used in such theorising. So the nonreferentialists' 
strategy of likening intensional abstracts to names whose use is sustained 
by mere myths, legends, rumours and works of fiction breaks down. To 
single out intensional abstracts as vacuous is then nothing but an arbitrary 
attack. If this were acceptable, it would be equally acceptable to single out 
any other family of singular terms (e.g., place names, names of people, etc.) 
as vacuous. And if this were acceptable, it would lead to an absurd form of 
skepticism that not even our nonreferentalists could tolerate. 
Now we submit that, when one surveys alternate ways of characterising 
the truth conditions for atomic sentences of the form r F[A]', one will find 
that they all run into these difficulties or variants of them. If we are right 
about this, there is no reasonable choice but to give a referential semantics 
for such sentences. 
Given this conclusion, how are we to specify the truth conditions for 
atomic sentences containing other intensional abstracts, namely, abstracts 
of the form r[A]Vl ... Vn " for n ~ I? Given the conclusions we have just 
reached, considerations of uniformity support the conclusion that sentences 
of the form r F[A]vl ... V n ' are true on an interpretation :T Hf, according to 
:T, the singular term r[A]Vl ... Vn ' denotes an item of which the predicate 
r F' is true. Attempts to avoid this conclusion by means of a nonreferential 
semantics like that considered above only lead to variants of the problems 
that already undermined that style of semantics. It seems best, therefore, 
to accept the conclusion that sentences of the form r F[A]vl ... vn ' have a 
standard referential semantics. 
6 THE DENOTATIONS OF INTENSIONAL ABSTRACTS 
Let us now turn to the quest ion of what sorts of things are denoted by (or are 
semantically correlated with) the singular terms r[A]' and r[A]Vl ... Vn '. As 
we have al ready indicated, the logically distinctive feature of these terms-
and their counterparts in natural language-is that various expressions oc-
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curring within them do not obey the substitutivity principle that charac-
terises extensional logic. For example, neither of the following argument 
forms is valid: 
G[B] 
(V) B t+ C 
G[C] 
G[B( VI, ... ,Vn)]Vl ... Vn 
(VI) (\lVI, ... , Vn)(B(VI, ... , vn) t+ C(VI, ... , vn)) 
G[C( VI, ... ,Vn)]Vl ... Vn 
That is, in many arguments having form (V) or (VI), the first two lines are 
true and the third line is false. Given the conclusion we have reached about 
the truth conditions for sentences of the form r F[A]' and r F[A]vl ... vn ' 
there is only one way in which this pattern of truth values is possible. 
Consider arguments of form (V). The truth of rG[B]' implies that r[B]' 
denotes an item of which the predicate rG' is true, and the the falsity of 
rG[Cl' implies that r[c], denotes an item of which the predicate rG' is not 
true. From these two conclusions it follows that the item denoted by r [B]' 
and the item denoted by r[C], must be different. This is so despite the fact 
that, given the truth of the second line rB t+ C', the formulas r B' and 
rc, are equivalent (in truth value) and, in turn, the items denoted by the 
terms r[B]' and r[c], are equivalent (in truth value) and, in turn, the items 
denoted by the terms r[B]' and r[c], are equivalent (in truth value). Or 
consider arguments of form (VI). The truth of rG[B(VI' ... ' Vn)]Vl ... Vn ' im-
plies that r[B(VI' ... ' Vn)]Vl ... Vn 'denotes an item of which rG' is true, and 
the falsity of rG[C(vI, ... ,Vn)]Vl ... Vn ' implies that r[C(vI, ... ,Vn)]Vl ... Vn ' 
denotes an item of which rG' is not true. From this it follows that the item 
denoted by r[B(VI' . .. ,Vn)]Vl ... Vn ' must be different from the item denoted 
by r[C(VI, ... ,Vn)]Vl ... Vn '. This is so despite the fact that given the truth 
of the second line r(\lvl, ... , Vn)(B(VI, . .. ,vn) t+ C(VI, ... ,vn))', the for-
mulas r B(VI, . .. ,vn), and rC(VI, ... , vn), are equivalent (in what they are 
true of) and, in turn, the items denoted by the terms r[B(VI' .. . ,Vn)]Vl ... Vn ' 
and r[C(VI, ... , Vn)]Vl ... Vn ' are equivalent (in what they are true of). 
Thus, to do the semantics for the singular terms r[B]' we need a special 
category of objects with the following feature: they can be distinct from one 
another even though in some cases they are equivalent (in truth value). And 
to do the semantics for the singular terms r[B(VI' . .. ,Vn)]Vl ... Vn ',n 2: 1, we 
need a special category of objects with the corresponding feature: they can 
be distinct from one another even though in some cases they are equivalent 
(in what they are true of). 
Now linguistic entities-sentences and n-ary predicates, respectively-
have these special features. And so do certain extralinguistic entities-
propositions and n-ary relations (properties if n = 1). Should we identify 
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the denotations ofthe singular terms '[B]' and '[B(VI' ... ' Vn)]Vl ... Vn 'with 
linguistic entities or with extralinguistic entities? Nominalists favour the 
former; conceptualists and realists, the latter. Let us see which theory is 
bett er. 
7 NOMINALISM 
According to the most straightforward version of nominalistic semantics, in-
tensional abstracts denote linguistic expressions. Specifically, 'that'-clauses 
denote sentences, and infinitive and gerundive phrases denote predicates 
or open-sentences. The first problem with this sort of theory is that it is 
extremely counterintuitive. If I see that it is daytime, am I really seeing a 
sentence? If a prelinguistic child or lower animal knows directly that he is 
in pain, does he know directly a sentence? (If so, how is it possible that he 
should be entirely unfamiliar with the sentence?) If I have an experience 
of being in pain, do I have an experience of a linguistic predicate? If my 
dog likes swimming, does he like a predicate? Of course not. Nominalists 
might reply that this intuitive argument is an instance of the so-called fal-
lacy of incomplete analysis. However, this reply is theoretically weak, for 
it forces nominalists to hold that the present intuitions cannot be taken at 
face value. But other things being equal, a theory is superior if it an take 
relevant intuitions at face value. The traditional realist theory that we ad-
vocate permits one to do just this. So, other things being equal, it comes 
out ahead of the nominalist theory. 
Of course, nominalists believe that other things are not equal; specifi-
cally, they believe that their ontology is simpler than the traditional realist 
ontology of properties, relations, and propositions. This belief might be 
defensible when the debate is restricted to philosophy of mathematics. (An 
advantage of the argument from intensional logic is that it does not oblige 
one to take a stand on this issue.) However, the nominalist's belief about 
the relative simplicity of their ontology is not defensible when the debate 
is over the semantics for intensional abstracts. The problem here concerns 
the ontological status of linguistic express ions themselves. Let us explain. 
Suppose that our nominalists try to identify linguistic expressions, not 
with types (e.g., shapes or sound types), but with linguistic tokens or set-
theoretical constructs whose ultimate elements are linguistic tokens. Con-
sider sentences of the following form: 
It is possible that FIt. 
where ,t' is a singular term. In symbols: pI [FIt]. Now either 't' has wide 
scope, or it does not. If it has wide scope, 'pI [FI t]' is true if and only 
if there is something z that is identical to t and it is possible that there is 
something y such that y is identical to z and F I y. On the other hand, if 
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rt, does not have wide scope, r pI [FIt], is true if and only if it is possible 
that there is something y such that y is identical to t and FIy. Therefore, 
whether or not r t' has wide scope, r pI [FIt], is true only ifit is possible that 
there exists an appropriate item y such that F I y.26 Now for the problem. 
Recall that linguistic tokens are contingent particulars. Indeed, it is possible 
that there are no linguistic tokens at all. (Or it is possible that there are 
no relevant linguistic tokens. The following argument would go through 
mutatis mutandis using this weaker premise.) Accordingly the following 
sentence is true: 
It is possible that there are no linguistic tokens. 
But this sentence is equivalent to the following intuitively true sentence: 
It is possible that it is true that there are no linguistic tokens. 
This sentence has the form r pI [FIt]', where r F I , is the predicate 'is true' 
and rt, is the singular term '[--,(3x)Token(x)]'. So it follows by the above 
considerations that, whether or not this singular term has wide scope, this 
sentence is true only if it is possible that there is an appropriate item y 
such that y is true. But what could this true item y be? According to the 
nominalist semantics for intensional abstracts, this true item y would be 
a linguistic expression (or a set built up somehow from linguistic expres-
sions). However, in the envisaged possible circumstance in which there is 
such an item that is true, there would be no linguistic tokens. So if linguis-
tic expressions were identified with linguistic tokens or sets built somehow 
from linguistic tokens, then in the envisaged circumstance there would not 
be any linguistic expression y. Therefore, given a nominalist semantics for 
intensional abstracts, the sentence 'It is possible that it is true that there 
are no linguistic tokens' would be false. But it is true. Therefore, given the 
nominalist semantics, it follows that linguistic expressions cannot be identi-
fied with linguistic tokens or sets built up somehow from linguistic tokens.27 
26Meinongians might try to avoid this conclusion by invoking their (alleged) distinction 
between being and existence. However, to develop their views formally, Meinongians 
already admit the ontology of PRPs and would therefore have no good reason not to 
accept the natural style of PRP semantics for intensional abstracts that we are defending 
in the text. 
27There is another problem with identifying linguistic expressions with linguistic to-
kens, namely, that it does not provide enough items for a general theory of language. A 
general theory of language must hold for the infinitely many expressions in a language, 
not just for the finitely many expressions that happen actually to be uttered or writ-
ten by speakers. Because there are only finitely many (actual) linguistic tokens, tokens 
cannot play the role of linguistic expressions in a general theory of language. One way 
of trying to overcome this cardinality problem is to identify linguistic expressions with 
regions of physical space. Another way to overcome the problem is to identify linguistic 
expressions with certain set-theoretical constructs whose ultimate elements are (actual) 
linguistic tokens. (Quine, for example, identifies a primitive linguistic expression 'p' with 
the set of actual tokens of 'p', the primitive linguistic expression '-' with the set of actual 
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(In what follows, we will call this the problem 01 necessary existence. There 
is of course an analogous problem of eternal existence.) 
The only way for our nominalists to get out of this problem of necessary 
existence is to refrain from identifying linguistic expressions with (items 
that ontologically depend on contingent) linguistic tokens and, instead, to 
identify them with shapes or sound types, which are entities that exist 
necessarily. But shapes and sound types are properties par excellence. So 
the problem of necessary existence (and the analogous problem of eternal 
existence) is avoided only by invoking the ontology of properties. However, 
if the ontology of properties is admitted to solve this problem, it would be 
uneconomical not to make full, systematic use of this ontology in giving the 
semantics for intensional abstracts. Doing so would lead one simply to drop 
the nominalistic semantics for intensional abstracts and to adopt instead a 
straightforward realist semantics. 
Indeed, the perversity of the nominalistic semantics can now be brought 
out with special poignancy. For nominalists who accept the ontology of 
shapes presumably would hold that the gerund 'being square' denotes, say, 
the complex shape consisting in order of the shapes 's', 'q', 'u', 'a', 'r', 'e' 
(or some set-theoretical construct buHt up from the shapes 's', 'q', 'u', 'a', 
'r', 'e') as opposed to simply the shape square. There is no ontological gain 
in this position, and it is, on its face, incredible. 
Now our nominalists might reject the above argument by denying the 
correctness of the intuitions upon which it is based. However, to press such 
a counterintuitive position is to press a mere bias. Basing one's theories on 
a mere bias cannot be acceptable even to the nominalist, for anyone who 
adopts this way of proceeding loses the ability to refute opponents whose 
biases favour some other arbitrary (perhaps anti-nominalistic) theory. The 
only way out of this difficulty is to honour our intuitions as evidence in such 
controversies. But if intuitions are honoured here, consistency demands 
that they be honoured elsewhere. When they are, the nominalist semantics 
tokens of '-', and the complex expression '-p' with the ordered set consisting of the set 
of actual tokens of '-' and the set of actual tokens of 'p'.) Three observations are in 
order. First, both the regions-of-physical-space treatment and the set-theoretical treat-
ment run into the problem of contingent existence, which we are discussing in the text. 
For neither regions of physical space nor sets that depend on linguistic tokens necessarily 
exist. Second, regions of physical space are particularly implausible candidates for being 
the primary bearers of truth, necessity, logical truth, etc. and the primary objects of 
mental representation, explanation, etc. How, for example do regions of space succeed 
in representing things in the world? CA kindred problem besets the Quinean alternative. 
For more on this problem of explaining representation, see the discussion that foUows 
shortly in the text.) Third, the set-theoretical treatment requires positing two distinct 
ontological categories-particulars and sets. From the point of view of our ontological 
economy, this is no bettel' than positing the two categories of particulars and properties. 
At the same time, the latter ontology has a deal' intuitive advantage: it enables one to 
adopt the intuitive theory that linguistic expressions are just shapes or sound types. For 
shapes and sound types are properties par excellence. 
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is seen to be inferior. For, as we have seen, intuitions support the argu-
ment from necessary existence (or eternal existence). That argument shows 
that nominalist semantics is no more economical than a traditional realist 
semantics. However, the latter semantics, unlike the nominalist semantics, 
permits us to take at face value our intuitions about the identity of the 
primary objects of perception, belief, and so on. So, by comparison with 
the traditional realist theory, the nominalist theory is not acceptable. 
We believe that this argument is decisive. However, our positive view can 
be made more convincing by laying bare the defects in the various specific 
versions of the nominalist semantics. This is the purpose of the remainder 
of this section. 
According to the most common version of nominalist semantics for inten-
sional abstracts, a 'that'-clause is taken to denote the complement sentence 
contained within the 'that'-clause itself: for example, the intensional ab-
stract 'that man is a rational animal' is taken to denote its complement 
sentence 'man is a rational animal'. This nominalist theory has the great-
est intuitive appeal in connection with indirect discourse. On the simplest 
version of the theory, the verb 'say' of indirect discourse is just identified 
with the verb 'say' of direct discourse. Thus, 
(1) Seneca said that man is a rational animal. 
is taken to be equivalent to 
(2) Seneca said 'man is a rational animal'. 
However, this clearly is wrong. Whereas (1) is true, (2) is false: Seneca 
never spoke English. 
This difficulty can be overcome by giving the 'say' of indirect discourse 
a more sophisticated analysis. For example, Carnap28 would have analysed 
(1) as follows: 
(3) There is a language such that Seneca wrote as a sentence of L words 
whose translation from L into English is 'Man is a rational animal'. 
However, sophisticated analyses like this are beset with fatal ßaws of their 
own. Consider, first, Alonzo Church's famous criticism: 
For it is not even possible to infer (1) as a consequence of (3), 
on logical grounds alone-but only by making use of the item of 
factual information, not contained in (3), that 'Man is a rational 
animal' means in English that man is a rational animal. 
Following a suggestion of Langford we may bring out more sharply 
the inadequacy of (3) as an analysis of (1) by translating into an-
other language, say German, and observing that the two trans-
lated statements would obviously convey different meanings to 
28R. Carnap [1947] 
178 GEORGE BEALER AND UWE MÖNNICII 
a German (whom we may suppose to have no knowledge of 
English). The German translation of (1) is (1') Seneca hat 
gesagt, dass der Mensch ein vernünftiges Tier sei. In translating 
(3), of course 'English' must be translated as 'Englisch' (not as 
'Deutsch') and ' "Man is a rational animai" , must be translated 
as ' "Man is a rational animai" , (not as ' "Der Mensch ist ein 
vernünftiges Tier' ').29 
Another difficulty with the more sophisticated nominal ist analysis is that it 
does not carry over to belief sentences in the way Carnap hoped. Carnap 
proposed to analyse belief behaviourally in terms of dispositions to assent. 
However, standard criticisms of behaviourism show that this kind of analysis 
is mistaken. Dispositions to assent are not correlated with beliefs taken 
singly; instead they are correlated with the body of a person's beliefs and 
desires. As a result, they cannot be used to analyse any single belief. 
A related problem with the nominalist analysis is that it fails to mesh 
with a general theory in which 'that'-clauses and other intensional abstracts 
are treated as singular terms and in which 'says', 'believes', 'perceives', 
etc. are treated as standard two-place predicates that take 'that'-clauses 
as arguments and 'is necessary', 'is possible', 'is true', etc. are treated as 
standard one-place predicates that take 'that'-clauses as arguments. This 
problem is dramatised by the fact that the analysis provides no clue about 
how to identify what it is that 'that'-clauses actually denote. 
A final difficulty with this nominalist analysis is hidden in its use of the 
phrase 'as a sentence of L'. This restriction is needed; for, without it, the 
speaker (Seneca in the present example) could utter the sentence without 
any of the relevant linguistic intentions. For example, the speaker might 
utter the sentence merely as a pleasant sound; in this case, the speaker 
would not even have made astatement. Or the speaker might utter the 
sentence as a sentence of some phonologically equivalent but semantically 
different language; in this case, the speaker would not have made the rele-
vant statement (i.e., that man is a rational animai). So the qualifying phrase 
'as a sentence of L' is needed. The problem for our nominalist is that this 
phrase is a covert intensional qualifier with something like the following 
force: x utters A as a sentence of L iff x utters A and x intends to speak 
L when x utters A. However, as we have seen, an infinitive phrase such as 
'to speak L when x utters A' is an intensional abstract. So, by employing 
the phrase 'as a sentence of L', the sophisticated nominalist analysis only 
sweeps this inherent intensional aspect of indirect dis course under the rug. 
Specific difficulties like these speil defeat for all natural versions of the 
nominalist theory. Nevertheless, there are some quite unnatural vers ions of 
29 A. Church [1950). For expository convenience, we have rellumbered the sentences 
mentioned in Church's argument. 
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nominalism that avoid these difficulties. But they all run into special new 
difficulties of their own. 
According to one of these unnatural vers ions of nominalism, the denota-
tion of a 'that'-dause is identified with the equivalence dass of all sentences 
synonymous to the complement sentence contained within the 'that'-dause, 
and the denotation of a gerundive or infinitive phrase is identified with 
the dass of all predicates (or open-sentences) synonymous to the predicate 
(open-sentence) that generates the gerundive or infinitive phrase. (So, for 
example, 'that man is a rational animal' would denote the dass {S: for 
some actual language L, the sentence S in L is synonymous to 'man is a 
rational animal' in English}, and the gerund 'swimming' would denote the 
equivalence class {F : for some actual language L, predicate F in L is syn-
onymous to 'swim' in English}.) On this approach, such equivalence dasses 
of synonyms are then identified as the primary bearers of truth, necessity, 
logical truth, probability, etc. and as primary objects of perception, belief, 
desire, moral obligation, explanation, etc. 
The first problem with this sort of nominalist theory is that it too is 
extremely counterintuitive. If I see that it is daytime, am I really seeing 
a set of sentences? If a prelinguistic child or lower animal knows directly 
that he is in pain, does he know directly a set of sentences? (If so, how 
is it possible that he or she should be entirely unfamiliar with every single 
sentence in the set?) If I have an experience of being in pain, do I have an 
experience of a set of predicates? If my dog likes swimming, does he like a 
set of predicates? 
Another problem with the present nominalist theory is that it does not 
mesh with a satisfactory general explanation of how cognitive states succeed 
in representing things, in being about things. To dramatise this point, let 
us consider a hypothetical situation in which no one ever speaks any of the 
languages that, as a matter of fact, we actually speak. In such a situation, 
however, people still would be able to have a wide range of cognitive states, 
states whose objects in many cases would be the same as objects of our 
cognitive states. For example, in the indicated situation someone could 
believe that someone feels pain. But if the present nominalist theory were 
correct, the object of such a person's belief (namely, the object denoted 
by the 'that'-clause 'that someone feels pain') would be a dass of sentences 
belonging to languages we happen actually to speak. Accordingly, the object 
of such a person's belief would be a dass of shapes and/or sounds having 
nothing to do with the person (or anyone else in the hypothetical situation) 
and having no relevant relation to what the person's belief is about, namely, 
pain. On the present nominalist theory, therefore, it would be completely 
fortuitous that in the hypothetical situation the person's belief is about pain 
rather than some other arbitrary item. 
To avoid this outcome, why not allow 'that'-clauses to denote sets of 
synonyms belonging to possible, as well as actual, languages? That is, why 
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not identify the denotation of r that A' with the dass {5 : for some possible 
language L, the sentence 5 in L is synonymous to A in English}? The 
answer is that alt 'that'-dauses would, wrongly, turn out to be co-denoting. 
After all, for every sentence 5, there is some possible language L such that 
5 in L is synonymous to A in English. A similar problem confronts the 
slightly more sophisticated nominalist semantics in which the denotation 
of r that A' is identified with the dass of all possible synonymjlanguage 
pairs, i.e., the dass {5, L: 5 in L is synonymous with the sentence A in 
English, where 5 is some sentence in some possible language L}. For if one 
follows the standard extensionalist practice of identifying a language L with 
an ordered-pair consisting of a set of well-formed expressions and a function 
that assigns extensional semantical values to those expressions, then on the 
present more sophisticated nominalist semantics, the extensional semantical 
value of various intuitively non-codenoting 'that'-dauses would turn out to 
be the same set of possible synonymjlanguage pairs. 30 Another alternative 
would be to identify the denotation of r that A' with a function that assigns 
to each possible world wadass {5 : 5 in L is synonymous to A in English, 
where L is some language that is spoken in w}. However, this theory would 
not be acceptable to the nominalists inasmuch as it relies on an ontology of 
possible worlds. (For a critique of possible-worlds semantics, see Section 9 
which deals with nontraditional realist semantics.) 
Another problem with the equivalence-dass approach is that it employs 
the predicate 'is synonymous' in the metalanguage. But what is the status 
of this predicate? According to our best theory, synonymy is to be defined in 
a broadly Gricean way in terms of certain complex conventional intentions 
of speakers. In the specification of these intentions, however, we would use 
'that'-clauses. Thus, in the statement of our metatheory, we would identify 
the nominalists' equivalence classes in terms of certain speaker intentions 
that are identified by means of 'that'-dauses. So far, then, one does not end 
up with a purely nominal ist specification of the denotation of intensional 
abstracts: the specification of the denotation of intensional abstracts in the 
object language involves the use of intensional abstracts in the metalan-
guage. But given their view of things, one would think that nominalists 
would be able to state their position without this recourse to explicit in-
tensionality in the metalanguage. For the point of the nominalist semantics 
is to have syntactic entities take the place of traditional intensional enti-
ties (properties, relations, and propositions), and it should be possible to 
give a purely extensional description of these syntactic entities and of the 
key relations (e.g., synonymy) holding among them. Of course, nominalists 
might try to achieve such a description by insisting that 'is synonymous' is 
undefinable. But this claim would contradict our best theory of synonymy. 
30These 'sets' would also be non-well-founded. See Section 11 for a critique of treat-
ments of intensionallogic that posit non-well-founded 'sets'. 
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A way of trying to circumvent this difficulty is to try to define synonymy 
within the framework of a 'language-of-thought' treatment of the proposi-
tional attitudes. The idea would be to define synonymy in a broadly Gricean 
way in terms of the propositional attitudes and then to identify the objects of 
the propositional attitudes with sentences in an ideal language-of-thought. 
But if one adopts this approach to synonymy, one is forced to give up the 
equivalence-class-of-synonyms semantics for intensional abstracts. For, as 
we have seen, the objects of the propositional attitudes are paradigmatic 
examples of the sort of items denoted by intensional abstracts, and on the 
language-of-thought theory these items are sentences in an ideal language-
of-thought, not equivalence classes of synonyms in natural languages. So 
even if the language-of-thought theory were successful, it would be of no 
help to the equivalence-class theory. 
Let us now examine this sort of language-of-thought semantics for inten-
sional abstracts. According to the most straightforward formulation of this 
theory, there is a single universal ideal language that underlies all possi-
ble cognition and all possible natural languages, and intensional abstracts 
denote express ions in this ideal language. We have seen that the deno-
tata of intensional abstracts are the primary bearers of truth, necessity, 
possibility, definition, probability, etc. and are the primary objects of be-
lief, perception, hope, moral obligation, explanation, causation, etc. On 
the language-of-thought theory, therefore, it follows that express ions in this 
ideal language are the primary bearers of truth, necessity, possibility, def-
inition, probability, etc. and are the primary objects of belief, perception, 
hope, moral obligation, explanation, causation, etc. 
Like the previous nominalist semantics, this one is extremely counter-
intuitive. When I see that it is daytime, do I really see a sentence in some 
ideal language? When I have an awareness of being in pain, do I have an 
experience of some hypothetical linguistic shape or sound? Certainly not. 
As with the previous nominalist theories, the present one appears to be 
driven by a mere bias for nominalism. Moreover, as with all nominalist 
approaches, the interface between the sensation of phenomenal qualities 
(e.g., the quality ofbeing in pain) and the cognition ofphenomenal qualities 
is a 'representationalist mystery' on the language-of-thought theory. The 
straightforward way to solve this mystery is with a full-fledged realist theory 
in which the objects of the propositional attitudes (i.e., propositions) are 
built up, by means of fundamentallogical operations, from basic properties 
(including, in particular, phenomenal qualities), basic relations, and perhaps 
subjects of singular predications.31 
A furt her difficulty with this sort of nominalist semantics is that, like the 
previous one, it too fails to mesh with a satisfactory general explanation of 
31This theme is developed in Section 42, 'Realism and Representationalism', in Quality 
and Concept. 
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how cognitive states succeed in representing things, in being about things. 
The problem here is that the radicallanguage-of-thought hypothesis suffers 
from the following form of radical arbitrariness: for any candidate universal 
ideal language L, there are an infinite number of alternative languages L' 
that could serve the same theoretical roles attributed to L. Which is the right 
one? Which one provides the genuine primary bearers of truth, necessity, 
etc. and the genuine objects of belief, perception, hope, etc.? The choice is 
in principle utterly arbitrary. Accordingly, there is no general philosophical 
explanation of why some linguistic shape or sound S should be taken to 
represent-or to be about-one thing rather than another. No satisfactory 
theory can tolerate this degree of arbitrariness. 
To avoid this problem of arbitrariness, the language-of-thought theorist 
could adopt an analysis reminiscent of Carnap's: x believes that A iff x be-
lieves a sentence that plays a causal role for x that is analogous to the causal 
role that the English sentence ' A' plays for English speakers. However, 
this analysis falls prey to difficulties rather like those confronting Carnap's. 
First, it fails to pass the Langford-Church translation test. Second, because 
of the phenomenon of fine-grained intensionality, belief cannot be analyzed 
functionally in terms of the notion of causal role; causal role is simply too 
coarse a criterion for the identity of belief. (See [Bealer, 1997].) Finally, 
this analysis fails to mesh with a general theory in which 'that'-clauses and 
other intensional abstracts are treated as singular terms and in which 'says', 
'believes', 'perceives', etc. are treated as standard two-place predicates that 
take 'that'-clauses as arguments and 'is necessary', 'is possible', 'is true', 
etc. are treated as standard one-place predicates that take 'that'-clauses as 
arguments. This problem is dramatised by the fact that the analysis pro-
vi des no clue about how to say systematically what it is that 'that'-clauses 
actually denote. As a result, this analysis suggests no general treatment 
of sentences in which non-psychological predicates take 'that'-clauses as ar-
guments, for example: ,It is true that A', ,It is possible that A', ,It is 
probable that A', ,It is explainable that A', and so forth. 
Indeed, a common failing of language-of-thought theories is that they 
usually disregard the role of intensional abstracts in non-psychological con-
texts. (For example, many language-of-thought theorists believe that fine-
grained intensionality arises only in connection with the propositional atti-
tudes. But in fact this phenomenon also arises in connection with familiar 
logical relations such as following-by-modus-ponens. Witness the sentence 
'Given the premise that if Athen Band given the premise that A, the 
conclusion that B follows by modus ponens'.) What is needed is a unified 
theory of intensional language, not just a theory that treats intensional-
ity in propositional-attitude sentences. Some language-of-thought theorists 
might try to respond by claiming that all intensionality (truth, necessity, 
logical truth, probability, counterfactuality, explainability, etc.) that is not 
psychological is somehow derivative. However, this kind of metaphysical 
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idealism is a well-known dead-end. (For some of the problems with this 
kind of metaphysical idealism, see the next section, which deals with con-
ceptualism. ) 
Another way language-of-thought theorists might try to avoid the prob-
lem of arbitrariness is to adopt a theory that is reminiscent ofthe equivalence-
class-of-synonyms theory. Specifically, the intensional abstract '[A]' would 
denote the class {S, x : S is a sentence that has a causal role far an actual 
cognitive agent x that is analogous to the causal role the sentence' A I has 
for us}. But this theory runs into the same sort of difficulty that origi-
nally plagued the equivalence-class-of-synonyms theory. Namely, it makes 
it a mystery how, in hypothetical circumstances with altogether different 
cognitive agents, the mental states of those cognitive agents succeed in rep-
resenting, or in being about, anything. For if these cognitive agents believe, 
say, that someone feels pain, the object of the belief would be a set of items 
having no relevant relation to these cognitive agents. Moreover, modifica-
tions of the present proposal that invoke possibility in one way or another 
fall prey to difficulties quite like those that beset analogous modifications 
of the equivalence-class-of-synonyms approach. 
Before we proceed to a final version of nominalistic semantics, aremark 
about the merits of the language-of-thought hypothesis in cognitive science 
is in order. We have seen that a language-of-thought semantics for inten-
sional abstracts is not viable, and we shall soon see that only a traditional 
realist semantics is defensible. Moreover, relative to the algebraic style of 
realist semantics that we will present, intensionallogic can be given a highly 
fine-grained formulation, a farmulation in which propositions may be treated 
as entities upon which computations are performed directly,without any lin-
guistic mediation. At the same time, the problem of representationalism, 
which causes so much trouble far the language-of-thought hypothesis, is 
solved automatically by our traditional realist theory.32 In view of these 
results, why invoke any form of the language-of-thought hypothesis in cog-
nitive science? (For example, some cognitive scientists now advocate treat-
ing 'believes' as a three-place relation holding among a cognitive agent, a 
proposition, and a sentence. ) The answer is that there is no good reason 
whatsoever. On a suitable formulation of fine-grained intensionallogic, this 
residual nominalistic element is entirely extraneous, a mere throw-back to 
a defunct nominalistic semantics. 
There is a final kind of nominalist approach to intensional abstracts that 
we should mention, namely, the approach of Israel SchefHer [1954]. Accord-
ing to this approach, a singular term '[A]' would be contextually analysed 
as follows: 
... [A] ... iffdf(3vk)(vk is-an-A-inscription & ... Vk ... ) 
32For more on this, see Section 42, Quality and Concept. 
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where ris-an-A-inscription' is an undefined primitive predicate. On the in-
tended interpretation, this predicate is satisfied by all and only inscriptions 
synonymous to r A'. However, given that, for an infinite number of sen-
tences r A', the sentence r[A] = [Al' is logically valid, this theory implies 
the actual existence of inscriptions (tokens) of every sentence. But, in fact, 
there are infinitely many sentences rA' of which there are no actual in-
scriptions (tokens). Moreover, since there are an infinite number of distinct 
'that'-clauses in natural language, SchefHer's approach requires an infinite 
number of undefined primitive predicates ris-an-A-inscription '. This fact 
amounts to a violation of Davidson's learnability requirement. Furthermore, 
it seems to block the systematisation of the internallogic of 'that'-clauses. 
Finally, as we explained earlier, the need to use the predicate 'is synonymous 
to' in the metalanguage is inconsistent with the nominalistic point of view. 
For these reasons, SchefHer's approach does not help to save nominalism. 
The above considerations, together with a number of others, lead us to 
conclude that linguistic expressions, whether types or tokens, are not the 
sort of entity denoted by intensional abstracts r[A]' and r[A]Vl ... Vn '. And 
the same conclusion goes for sequences or sets of linguistic entities, or indeed 
any other kind of object that is linguistic in character. 
So what sort of entities are denoted by r[A]' and r[A]Vl"'V", ,? Given the 
failure of nominalism, we are left with realism and conceptualism. 
8 CONCEPTUALISM 
According to both realism and conceptualism, when we use 'that'-clauses 
and gerundive and infinitive phrases, we denote extralinguistic intensional 
entities. The difference between realism and conceptualism concerns the 
ontologieal character of these entities. Realists hold that they are mind-
independent entities, whereas conceptualists hold that they are mind-
dependent. Mind-dependent in the sense that they depend for their ex-
istence on minds or mental activity; they would not exist if there were 
no minds or mental activity. Contemporary realists tend to call these in-
tensional entities 'properties', 'relations', and 'propositions' (depending on 
their degree). By contrast, conceptualists usually call them 'concepts' and 
'thoughts' (depending on their degree). But this difference is largely ter-
minological. The real difference between conceptualism and realism lies in 
the alleged ontological status of these intensional entities. Are they mind-
dependent or mind-independent? 
In our discussion of conceptualism we will confine ourselves to the version 
that ascribes to intensions an ontological dependence on contingent, finite 
minds like ours. There is another version of conceptualism, however. On 
this version, even though intensions are ontologically dependent on mind, 
they nonetheless exist necessarilYi for they exist necessarily in the infinite, 
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necessary mind of God. We will take no stand on this version of conceptu-
alism. Our reason is that, like realism, it implies that intensional entities 
exist necessarily, and this is what matters most to contemporary realists. 
On the most plausible version of conceptualism, there are certain basic 
intensions (much like Locke's simple ideas) that are simply 'given' in or-
dinary mental activity, and all other intensions are somehow 'formed' or 
'constructed' out of these nonconstructed intensions. At relevant points in 
our critical assessment, we will focus on this version of conceptualism. 
The first difficulty with conceptualism is this. Evidently, there are in-
tensions that have never been 'given' in anyone's mental activity and that 
could not, even in principle, be 'formed' or 'constructed' from intensions 
that have been 'given'. For example, various fundamental physical proper-
ties (e.g., quark-theoretic properties such as the property denoted by the 
intensional abstract 'having spin up') seem to be like this: they appear not 
to be 'constructible' in any way from 'given' intensions; rather, they appear 
to be mere theoretical posits that we can at best describe.33 Indeed, many 
physicists believe that there still exist fundamental physical properties and 
relations (e.g., sub-quark properties, sub-sub-quark properties, etc.) that 
remain to be described theoretically. 
In a related vein, there are no doubt primitive phenomenal qualities that 
no one has ever experienced (e.g., new shades, fragrances, or tastes) and 
that, in principle, could not be 'constructed' from intensions that have al-
ready been 'given'. Indeed, the taste of pineapple (Le., the familiar phe-
nomenal quality we know in sensation) once had this ontological status, for 
there was a time when no one had ever tasted it. 
This last example gives rise to a general defect in conceptualism that 
should have been predictable; namely, conceptualism falls prey to the ar-
gument from necessary existence (and also to the analogous argument from 
eternal existence). (This style of argument was used in the previous section 
to refute nominalist semantics for intensional abstracts.) Consider sentences 
of the following form: 
It is possible that FIt. 
where 't' is a singular term. In symbols: pl[FIt]. We saw earlier that, 
whether or not' t' has has wide scope, 'pI [FIt], is true only if it is possible 
that there is an appropriate item y such that FIy. Now, intuitively, the 
following sentence is true: 
It is possible that it is true that there are no finite minds. 
330n the Kripke-Putnam view, names of natural kinds are introduced by means of 
'reference-fixing descriptions' that apply only contingently to their bearers. Such descrip-
tions therefore do not qualify as definitions and, hence, cannot double as 'constructions' 
of these fundamental properties from intensions that are 'given' in our earlier mental 
activity. 
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This sentence has the form' pI [FI tl' , where 'FI, is the predicate 'is 
true' and 't' is the singular term '[,(3x) Finite-mind (x)l'. It follows that, 
whether or not this singular term has wide scope, this sentence is true only 
if it is possible that there is an appropriate item y such that y is true. But 
what could this true item y be? According to conceptualists, y would be an 
intensional entity that is ontologically dependent on finite minds. However, 
in the envisaged circumstance in which there is an intension y that is true, 
there would be no finite minds. Therefore, in the envisaged circumstance 
there would not be any intensions, and so the sentence 'It is possible that 
it is true that there are no finite minds' would be false. But it is true. So 
conceptualism must be mistaken: it cannot overcome the problem of neces-
saryexistence. (Some conceptualists might try to escape this conclusion by 
a 'modalising strategy'. We will consider this strategy in amoment.) 
We believe that the foregoing intuitive considerations tell decisively against 
conceptualism. However, to remove lingering doubts, we move on to a more 
theoreticalline of argument. The problem concerns the infinite. Intuitively, 
there are infinitely many distinct fine-grained intensions. For example, there 
are infinitely many nontriviallogical truths: that Al, that A2 , that A3 , •... 
(To see this, suppose that the sentence' Ai I expresses the nontrivial log-
ical truth that Ai' Suppose that 'Ai I is not in prenex normal form, and 
suppose that ' A j I is the result of converting 'Ai I to prenex normal form. 
Let x = that Ai, and y = that A j • Intuitively, it is possible that someone 
is consciously and explicitly thinking x and not consciously and explicitly 
thinking y. If so, that Ai f=. that A j .) The problem facing conceptualists is 
to explain why there seem to be infinitely many intensions. They are not 
'given' in anyone's actual mental activity, and we do not actually 'construct' 
them. For doing so would require infinitely many acts of 'construction', and 
our finiteness excludes this. Conceptualists have two ways of trying to solve 
this problem. The first is to grant that there actually exist infinitely many 
intensions and to identify intensions that are not 'given' in actual mental 
activity with a certain kind of 'extensional complex' (e.g., finite sequences, 
orderecl sets, or abstract trees) whose ultimate elements are intensions that 
are 'given' in actual mental activity. The other strategy is to deny that there 
actually exist infinitely many intensions and to explain why there seem to 
be by exploiting the clistinction between intensions that have actually been 
'constructed' and possible acts of 'construction'. The latter strategy is the 
modalising strategy. 
The first strategy is defeated by considerations of ontological economy. 
For, on this treatment of intensional entities, conceptualists would have to 
posit two fundamentally dissimilar ontological categories--extensional com-
plexes (finite sequences, ordered sets, abstract trees) and primitive inten-
sional entities (namely those 'given' in actual mental activity). Realists, by 
contrast need only one ontological category, namely, that of intensions. One 
ontological category suffices for realists because the theoretical work that 
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can be accomplished with the conceptualists' extensional complexes can be 
accomplished by appropriate realist intensions. For example, the theory of 
finite sequences, finite ordered sets, and finite abstract trees can be rep-
resented within first-order logic with identity and intensional abstraction. 
(e.g., the jobs done by the finite sequence (VI, ... , Vn ) can be done by the 
realists' intension [UI = VI & ... & U n = Vnlul ... Un.) And if the conceptual-
ists' theory of extensional complexes is supplemented with a set-membership 
relation, the realists' theory of intensions may be supplemented with a pred-
ication (instantiation) relation. Any theoretical task that can be performed 
by the conceptualists' theory of membership can then be performed by this 
realist theory of predication. The upshot is that the conceptualist theory 
can perform no theoretical task that the realist theory cannot perform. At 
the same time, the conceptualist theory is in principle ontologically more 
complex than the realist theory, for it requires two fundamentally dissimilar 
ontological categories whereas the realist theory requires only one. So the 
conceptualist theory should be rejected on ontological grounds. 
In response, someone might wonder whether the conceptualists' two cate-
gories (extensional complexes and actually 'given' primitive mind-dependent 
intensions) really are fundamentally dissimilar. To dramatise the fact that 
they are, recall that on such a theory there would need to be extensional 
complexes whose elements would not even be intensions (for example, or-
dered sets whose elements are physical objects). 
Another response to our argument would be to hold that the present 
version of conceptualism is not really ontologically excessive, for the posited 
extensional complexes can be eliminated in favour of items that everybody 
(including realists) already accepts. But which items could they possibly 
be? In debates about foundations of mathematics the usual candidates put 
forward at this juncture are linguistic entities. But here we encounter the 
power of the argument from intensionallogic. Perhaps linguistic entities can 
play the role of sets or other extensional complexes in certain formulations 
of the foundations of mathematics. However, in the present context, the 
conceptualists' purpose for introducing extensional complexes is to provide a 
realm of entities to serve as the denotata of intensional abstracts. But in our 
critique of nominalism we saw that linguistic entities are wholly inadequate 
for this purpose. So this escape route is not available to conceptualists. 
We will mention three other defects in the present version of conceptual-
ism. First, it is highly unintuitive that ordered sets, sequences, or abstract 
trees are really the sort of thing that are perceived, believed, etc. or that 
are true, necessary, probable, explainable, etc. Advocates of this theory 
certainly have lost the 'naive eye'. Second, it is prima facie implausible 
that some intensional abstracts should denote one category of entity (i.e., 
primitive intensions 'given' in our actual mental activity) and that other 
intensional abstracts should denote ontologically very different sorts of en-
tities (i.e., ordered sets or sequences). Third, by identifying the denotata 
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of infinitely many intensional abstracts with extensional eomplexes, eon-
eeptualists might run into a potentially fatal diffieulty in eonnection with 
'self-embeddable' intensions. (This general issue sha11 be discussed three 
sections below.) 
Our overall eonclusion, then, is that the first strategy is of no help to 
eoneeptualists. This outeome leaves them with no alternative but to try the 
'modalising' strategy. The idea behind this strategy is to deny that there 
are really an infinite number of aetual intensions (e.g., the nontriviallogical 
truths that Al, that A2 , that A3 , ... ) and to hold instead that there are 
merely an infinite number of possi ble ways of thinking (which, if actualised, 
would generate the intensions that Al, that A2 , that A3 , •• . ). Our reply 
to the modalising strategy will be that it does not really avoid ontological 
eommitment to an infinity of actual intensions. To explain this reply, we 
must speIl out the modalising strategy more fully. 
Consider intuitively true sentenees of the form ,It is logically true that 
Ai I. We have argued that each such sentenee is ontologicaIly eommitted to 
an intensional entity (Le., the intension that Ai)' According to the modal-
ising strategy, however, the sentenee 'It is logically true that Ai I is in most 
cases not strictly speaking true; what is true is an associated modal sentence 
something like the following: 'It is possible that someone should form the 
thought that Ai and the resulting thought would be logically true I. (On a 
somewhat related form of the modalising strategy, although ,It is logically 
true that Ai I would be counted as true, it would be treated as a mere ab-
breviation of the modal sentence ,It is possible that someone should form 
the thought that Ai and the resulting thought would be logically true I.) 
The fundamental shortcoming of the modalising strategy is that it does 
not really address the problem it was supposed to solve. The problem was to 
find a way to avoid eommitment to an actual infinity of intensional entities. 
However, the proposal still leaves us with an actual infinitude of such enti-
ties, namely, those denoted by the 'that'-clause oeeurring in the proposed 
modal sentenee ,It is possible that someone fONns the thought that Ai and 
this thought is logically true' . (In symbols, ,pI [(3x)(F2x, [Ail & LT1 [Ai])] I.) 
After all, as we showed in earlier seetions, the best systematic treatment of 
intensionality is by means of intensional abstracts and accompanying aux-
iliary predicates. Just as 'x believes that B' is represented as 'B2x, [B]', 
,It is possible that B' is represented as 'pI [Bl'. The modalising strat-
egy would require a systematie way of eapturing the relevant possibilities 
of forming thoughts. The way to do this is by means of further intensional 
abstracts, ones that generate their own eommitment to an actual infinitude 
of intensional entities. So the modalising strategy does not work. 
One way of trying to avoid this conclusion is by resorting to primitive op-
erators that are designed to avoid use of the offending intensional abstracts. 
For example, instead of putting forward the above intensional-abstract sen-
tence, modalisers would put forward the following primitive-operator sen-
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tence: rpossibly someone forms the thought that Ai and this thought is 
logically true'. (In symbols, rO(3x)(F2 x, [Ai] & LTI[Ai ])'.) The alleged 
gain is that the offending intensional abstract does not explicitly occur in 
this new primitive-operator sentence. But the argument from intensional 
logic undercuts this move.34 
There are two sorts of reasons. First, we have already established that 
rIt is possible that B' is to be represented as rpI[B]'. However, it is 
intuitively obvious that it is possible that B iff possibly B. It would be 
entirely ad hoc to deny this obvious equivalence just to save conceptualism. 
So, on intuitive grounds, the primitive-operator move cannot be used to side-
step the ontological commitment to the implicit intensional entity (Le., that 
B). Second, we have seen that great theoretical economy can be gained by 
treating commonplace operator sentences as derived forms of intensional-
abstract sentences. For example, by treating r OB' as a derived form of 
r pI [Bl'. Since the latter form is already required by an acceptable geneml 
formulation of intensionallogic (e.g., one that can represent general relations 
between belief and possibility), it would be highly unjustified theoretically 
to insist on representing r OB' as a primitive-operator sentence, rat her than 
to bring it within a unified, general theory of intensional logic.35 
N ow conceptualists might try to avoid our critique of the modalising 
strategy by resorting to other primitive operators (e.g., constructibility op-
erators, constructibility quantifiers, etc.). However, these alternate linguis-
tic forms create the same problems for conceptualism. First, they are in-
tuitively equivalent to linguistic forms involving intensional abstract and 
accompanying predicates. Second, these primitive-operator sentences typi-
cally generate intensional contexts. Therefore, the canonical representation 
of them is provided by means of intensional abstracts and accompanying 
predicates. This way these intensional contexts can be dealt with within 
a unified, general theory. It is inevitable, therefore, that the modalising 
strategy does not successfully avoid the commitment to an actual infinity 
of intensional entities. 
Notice that the foregoing critique of conceptualism did not get us involved 
in many of the usual worries that characterise contemporary discussions of 
conceptualism and realism, for example, worries about the law of the ex-
34 Another problem with this move concerns quantifying-in. Suppose, for 
the sake of argument, that rpossiblyB' is not equivalent to rlt is pos-
sible that B'. Nevertheless, rO(3x)(F2 x, [Ai] & LTI [Ai])' intuitively entails 
r(3u)(u = [Ai] & O(3x)(F2x, u& LT1u))'. If this is right, the primitive-operator modal-
ising strategy does not even begin to avoid the ontological commitment to the intensional 
entity that Ai. 
35This sort of unified intensionallogic is needed to formulate a general epistemological 
account of why we are justified in our modal beliefs. For example, an account of what 
would make a person justified in believing that possibly A would go by way of an account 
of what makes a person justified in believing that a proposition is possible and then it 
would show that the proposition that A has these features. 
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cluded middle, impredicativity, and so forth. This is a significant advantage 
of the argument from intensional logic. Considerations in intensional logic 
(notably, the treatment of generality and intensional abstraction) just on 
their own force one to posit an actual infinitude of intensions. When con-
ceptualists try to give an alternate explanation, either they end up posit-
ing two fundamentally dissimilar ontological categories (mind-independent 
extensional complexes and mind-dependent intensions) whereas one onto-
logical category (mind-independent intensions) suffices for realism. Or they 
offer a modalising strategy that, upon closer examination, implies the very 
sort of infinite intensional ontology that it is designed to avoid. 
For these and the other reasons we listed, our overall conclusion is that, 
in comparison with realism, conceptualism is not acceptable. 
9 REALISM 
Given the failure of nominalism and conceptualism, we are left with real-
ism. According to traditional realism, r[Al' would denote the proposition 
that A; r[A]Vl I would denote the property of being something VI such that 
A; and r[A]Vl"'V", I would denote the relation holding among VI ••• V rn such 
that A. There are, however, non-traditional forms of realism according to 
which PRPs are replaced by or reduced to other sorts of mind-independent 
extralinguistic entities. For example, according to the possible-worlds ap-
proach, propositions are reduced to functions from possible worlds to truth 
values; properties are reduced to functions from possible worlds to sets 
of possible individuals; and m-ary relations are reduced to functions from 
possible worlds to sets of ordered m-tuples of possible individuals. And 
according to the original version of the Perry-Barwise situation semantics, 
although properties and relations are taken as primitive traditional realist 
entities, propositions (or situations) are reduced to ordered sets of primitive 
properties, primitive relations, and actual indivieluals, or they are reduceel 
to set-theoretical compounds of such ordered sets. (On another version of 
situation semantics, propositions (situations) are not reduced to such set-
theoretical constructs. Instead, these constructs are used only for model 
propositions (situations). In the final analysis, propositions (situations) are 
to be taken as primitive, irreducible entities. In this vein, Barwise and Perry 
now seem attracted to a traditional realist theory of properties, relations, 
and propositions much like that we have defended here anel in previous work. 
At this stage in the history of the subject, calling such a theory 'situation 
theory' risks terminological confusion; it is so similar to traditional PRP 
theory. In the ensuing remarks, we address ourselves only to the earlier, re-
ductionistic version of situation semantics. We wish to emphasise that Perry 
and Barwise no longer hold this theory.) Scott Soames anel Nathan Salmon 
have recently advocated reducing propositions to ordered sets of primitive 
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properties, primitive relations, and real individuals.36 Finally, the theory 
developed by Max: Cresswell in Structured Meanings is a special hybrid re-
ductionistic approach that combines a sequence treatment of propositions 
and possible-worlds reductionism regarding properties and relations. 
These non-traditional forms of realism, however, have several defects not 
found in our traditional realism. For example, some of them often identify 
the denotations of intensional abstracts with items whose identity conditions 
are not right. Possible-worlds semantics provides the most notorious case 
of this, for on this approach necessarily equivalent PRPs turn out to be 
identical. The original formulation of situation semantics has a number of 
equally damaging consequences.37 Although consequences like this can be 
tolerated in some parts of intensional logic such as modal logic, they are 
quite unacceptable in other parts, notably, those dealing with intentional 
matters. To compensate for this defect, some people (e.g., David Lewis 
and Max: Cresswell) propose to reduce only 'coarse-grained' PRPs to sets 
of possibilia and, then, to reduce 'fine-grained' PRPs to sequences of these 
reduced coarse-grained PRPs. But this revised semantics turns out to be 
quite ßawed (see below)j moreover, it turns out to be more complicated 
technically than our realist semantics which treats coarse-grained and fine-
grained PRPs as irreducible primitive entities. 
Another difficulty with the reductionistic approaches concerns 'self-
embeddable' PRPs. For example, both the original possible-worlds seman-
tics and Cresswell's hybrid theory are inconsistent with the plain fact that 
a person can contemplate the contemplating relation, and they are incon-
sistent with the plain fact that the relation of being distinct is distinct 
from the relation of being identical. Other difficulties concerning 'self-
constituency' threaten the other non-traditional realist semantics, including 
the reductionistic version of situation semantics and the theories articulated 
by Soames and Salmon. (See the section after next for a detailed discussion 
of self-embeddability and self-constituency.) A traditional PRP semantics, 
by contrast, can easily deal with these phenomena, as we will show later on. 
Another critical point is that many of the non-traditional realist ap-
proaches are extremely counterintuitive. For example, it is incredible, in-
tuitively, that sets or sequences can ever strictly and literally be the sort 
of thing that are perceived, believed, and so forth or that are true, neces-
sary, valid, probable, and so forth. People who hold otherwise have lost 
their 'semantic innocence'j they are under the spell of set-theoretical reduc-
tionism. Although set-theoretical constructs might in the short run have 
heuristic value in the model theory for intensional abstracts, in the long 
run we should like a semantical theory that provides a natural and intuitive 
semantics for these important expressions. A semantics that takes PRPs at 
36Soames [1985], Salmon [1986]. 
37Soames, ibid., discusses some of these. 
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face value as primitive entities does this; possible-worlds semantics, the orig-
inal version of situation semantics, and the theories of Cresswell, of Soames 
and of Salrnon plainly do not. 
In a related vein, it is doubtful that possible-worlds semantics (and 
Cresswell's semantics) can be made to mesh with a plausible epistemology. 
For example, in sense experience we can be directly aware of phenomenal 
properties-say, the aroma of cofIee. But in sense experience can we be 
directly aware of the function that assigns to each possible world the set 
of possible individuals that smell like cofIee in that world? This is hardly 
plausible. Here are some related questions. (1) Suppose that the taste of 
pineapple is a function from possible worlds to sets of possible individuals. 
Could a person have a sense experience of a function that is identical to this 
one except for the presence (or absence) of a few possible individuals in one 
of the sets in the range of this function? Presumably not, for there is noth-
ing such a sense experience could be like. But how are we to explain this? 
(2) Consider two visibly similar but distinct shades of blue bl and b2 • Sup-
pose that b1 is the function from possible worlds to sets of things that are 
shaded bl in those worlds and, likewise, that b2 is the function from possi-
ble worlds to sets of things that are shaded b2 in those worlds. Given that 
functions are sets of ordered pairs, bl and b2 would then be sets that have 
no members in common. What makes bl and b2 look so similar? (3) Let 
the arguments and values of a possible-worlds function b~ difIer from those 
of the shade bl at no points except for the presence (or absence) of one 
non-actual individual in one of the values. On the possible-worlds theory, 
b~ is a property. Does the shade bl resemble this property as much as the 
two shades b1 and b2 resemble each other? Presumably, we would answer 
no. Why? (4) Why does the shade of blue bl resemble the other shade 
of blue b2 more than it resembles a shade of red r? Perhaps the possible-
worlds ans wer to this question is that the individuals in the ranges of bl 
and b2 resemble each other more than the individuals in the ranges of bl 
and of r resemble each other. But if this is the ans wer , a vicious regress 
results. What is it about the individuals in the ranges of bl and b2 that 
makes them resemble one another more than the individuals in the ranges 
of bl and r? The answer, of course, is that the shades (bI and b2 ) of the 
former individuals resemble each other more than the shades (bl and r) of 
the latter individuals resemble each other. But why? This is the question 
with which we started. Now, all these questions can be answered satisfac-
torily, but only with a traditional realist theory that takes properties and 
relations as primitive, irreducible entities.38 
Moreover, possible-worlds theories (and Cresswell's theory) are beset with 
insurmountable epistemological problems concerning the individuation of 
38Specifically, ane needs the nations of quality and cannectian (i.e., the nations of 
'natural property' and 'natural relation'). See Chapter 8 Quality and Concept, and 
[Lewis, 1983]. More will be said about this topic at the elose of this section. 
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'nonactual individuals'. For example, suppose that I form a thought that 
is (allegedly) about a particular 'nonactual individual'. (If one cannot form 
such a thought about any item in the category of 'nonactual individual', 
that is itself a count against the ontologYi for no other ontological category 
is like this.) Suppose that years later, after forgetting all about this earlier 
episode, I form a thought that is qualitatively indistinguishable from my 
earlier one. Is the 'nonactual individual' I first thought about identical to 
the one I thought about on the second occasion, or are they nonidentical 
items that are only qualitatively alike? There is in principle no way to 
tell! For another example, suppose that two causally separated people from 
thoughts that are (allegedly) about 'nonactual individuals', and suppose 
that their thoughts are qualitatively indistinguishable. Are they thinking 
about the same 'nonactual individual', or are they thinking ab out distinct 
'nonactual individuals' that are only qualitatively alike? Again, there is 
in principle no way to tell. A theory with this kind of epistemological 
indeterminacy is, other things being equal, unacceptable. 
And then there is the problem of ontological economy. According to the 
reductionistic version of situation semantics and the positions advocated by 
Soames and by Salmon, propositions (situations) are to be reduced to set-
theoretical constructs whose ultimate elements are actual individuals, prim-
itive properties, and primitive relations. However, these reductionistic the-
ories are guilty of an ontological excess. For they must posit, in addition to 
individuals, two fundamentally dissimilar ontological categories-intensions 
and sets. (Relatedly, they must hold that some intensional abstracts denote 
intensions whereas others denote setsl This kind of ad hoc disunity is un-
acceptable.) On a traditional, nonreductionistic realist theory, by contrast, 
there is instead only one corresponding ontological category, namely, that 
of intensions. Sets (i.e., extensions) are just dropped in favour of inten-
sions. Now the main reason these reductionists have resorted to their more 
complex ontology of both sets and intensions is that it permits them to 
treat propositions (situations) and other 'complex' intensions. However, we 
will show that this can be accomplished far more simply without resorting 
to set-theoretical constructs but rather by treating such intensions simply 
as the result of applying fundamentallogical operations (e.g., conjunction, 
negation, existential generalisation, predication, etc.) to other intensions. 
The result is that the identification of propositions (and other 'complex' 
intensions) with sets is ontologically superfluous. 
It might be replied that these reductionistic theories are not ontologically 
excessive because sets are needed for independent reasons. But this is simply 
false. As we have already seen in our discussion of conceptualism, the 
theoretical work done by finite sets and finite sequences can be accomplished 
within the first-order logic for identity and intensional abstraction. And the 
theoretical work done by a set theory with a membership relation can be 
done by a property theory with the predication (instantiation) relation. In 
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foundational matters such as those we are concerned with here, there can 
be no justification for positing the two fundamentally dissimilar ontological 
categories of intensions and sets (extensions). Intensions alone suffice: sets 
are ontologically superfluous, mere hold-overs from the days when it was 
unknown how to formulate a theory of intensions. It is high time that 
property theorists acknowledge that they have a thoroughgoing alternative 
to set theory. From this perspective, it is plain that reductionistic theories 
that posit both intensions and sets are ontologically unjustified. 
The question also arises whether the possible-worlds reduction is guilty 
of a similar ontological excessiveness. In addition to actual individuals, it 
posits both sets and nonactual possible individuals. Do the latter constitute 
a new fundamental ontological category? Many possible-worlds theorists 
would answer in the negative on the grounds that, ontologically, 'nonac-
tual individuals' are just like ordinary actual individuals except that they 
are nonactual. But this is a very odd statement. For it seems that there 
could not be a greater difference between two sorts of items, one actual 
and the other 'nonactual'. Indeed, a sign that 'nonactual individuals' are 
fundamentally unlike actual individuals is that the former, unlike the latter, 
present insurmountable epistemological problems of individuation not pre-
sented by actual things (whether actual individuals or actual intensions). 
We have in mind the problem of individuation mentioned a moment aga: 
there is no way in principle to tell whether, from occasion to occasion or 
from person to person, you are thinking ab out the same 'nonactual individ-
ual'. By contrast, actual things (actual individuals and actual intensions) 
are not by nature like this. (Alternatively, if items in the category of 'non-
actual individual' cannot be objects of your thought, that would be grounds 
for deeming them to have a different ontological status than that of actual 
individuals. For you can typically think of particular actual individuals.) 
Suppose that this, and other considerations, show that 'nonactual indi-
viduals' constitute a fundamentally new ontological category. And suppose 
that the traditional realist theory has no need to posit nonactual things. In 
this case, the possible-worlds theory would be guilty of ontological excess. 
For, in addition to actual individuals, it would posit two fundamentally dis-
similar categories, namely, sets and 'nonactual individuals'. By contrast, the 
traditional realist theory would posit in addition to actual individuals, only 
one furt her ontological category, namely, intensions. In this case, the lat-
ter theory would be ontologically more economical than the possible-worlds 
theory. 
On the other hand, suppose that 'nonactual individuals' do not consti-
tute a new ontological category above and beyond actual individuals. Then, 
ontologically, the two theories would be on a par: the possible-worlels theory 
woulel posit inelividuals anel sets; the realist theory woulel posit inelividuals 
and intensions. But in this case the possible-worlels theory woulel still be 
confronted with the insurmountable epistemological problems of identifying 
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'nonactual individuals'. Moreover, it would be confronted with all the log-
ical and intuitive problems cited earlier. So, even if the two theories were 
ontologicallyon a par, the possible-worlds theory would have to be counted 
as deficient. 
The possible-worlds theory is deficient on one further count. There is a 
compelling list of reasons for thinking that only certain properties are gen-
uine qualities. (These reasons are spelled out in Quality and Concept [1982] 
and again by David Lewis, who is perhaps the leading possible-worlds the-
orist, in 'New Work for a Theory of Universals' [1983].) On the traditional 
realist picture, genuine qualities can be combined, by means of fine-grained 
logical operations, to form properties that are not genuine qualities (e.g., 
the property of being grue); but properties that are not genuine qualities 
cannot be combined, by means of fine-grained logical operations, to form 
genuine qualities. So, on the traditional realist picture, qualities are logically 
distinctive. Indeed, this logically distinctive feature can be used as the basis 
of adefinition of the notion of a genuine quality. By contrast, qualities (or 
'natural properties', as David Lewis calls them) are not logically distinctive 
on the possible-worlds theory even though they are ontologically distinctive. 
To deal with them, therefore, Lewis is forced simply to introduce a new un-
defined primitive predicate 'natural property'. Accordingly, what it is to 
be a quality (natural property) remains an unanswerable mystery on the 
possible-worlds theory. So on this score, too, the traditional realist theory 
comes out ahead of the possible-worlds theory. 
Our overall conclusion is that the various nontraditional (reductionist) 
versions of realism do not compare with traditional realism. The best se-
mantics for intensional abstracts is that based on the traditional realism. 
10 TRANSCENDENTAL PREDICATES AND TYPE-FREE 
LANGUAGES 
There are in natural language a great many 'transcendental' predicates, 
that is, predicates that we apply freely across ontological categories. The 2-
place predicate 'contemplate' is an example, for items from any ontological 
category can be contemplated by someone or other. The 2-place predicate 
'distinct' (or 'f::') is another example because items belonging to any two 
distinct ontological categories are themselves distinct. (For example, for 
any universal x and particular y, x f:: y.) It turns out that the existence of 
transcendental predicates provides compelling evidence for the thesis that, 
syntactically, the formallanguage for intensionallogic should not be a type-
restricted (or categorial) language. 
Consider first the matter of predicates. Suppose that all the predicates 
in this formal language were syntactically type-restricted. Then for every 
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transcendental predicate in naturallanguage--Iet us take 'contemplate' as 
our example--there would in the formallanguage need to be infinitely many 
distinct primitives r contemplate(o~)o< .." one for each distinct syntactic type 
(or category) Cl in the formallanguage. But this outcome conflicts with our 
previous conclusion concerning Davidson's learnability requirement. There-
fore, there is no choke but to allow the transcendental predicates to be 
syntactically unrestricted in the formal language. 
Consider next the issue of variables. If all the variables in the formallan-
guage were syntactically restricted according to ontological type, then the 
formal language would not be equipped to express various general propo-
sitions that are expressible in the natural language. (For example, the 
proposition that, for any item, it is possible that someone contemplates it; 
the proposition that, for any item, there is something that is distinct from 
it; etc. In our notation: 
[(V'x)Possible[(3y)y contemplates x]] 
[(V'x)(3y)y 1= x] 
etc.) This implies that the formallanguage should contain a sort of variable 
that ranges over all items regardless of ontological type. 
Now suppose that certain type-restricted variables or certain type-
restricted predicates (Le., predicates whose argument expressions must be-
long to some preferred syntactic type) are needed for some purpose or other 
in an idealised representation of natural language. We have determined 
that transcendental predicates-and general statements we can make with 
them-force us to include in our formal language various type-free predi-
cates and a syntactically unrestricted sort of variable. However, once we 
have adopted a syntax with such devices, the simplest and most economical 
way to deal with type-restricted variables and type-restricted predicates is 
to define them contextually by standard techniques using the unrestricted 
sort of variable and appropriate syntactically type-free predicates. In view 
of this, it would seem that the simplest and most economical construction 
of intensionallogic would be formulated in a one-sorted, syntactically type-
free language, that is, a language in which there is only one sort of variable, 
which ranges freely over all ontological categories, and in which all predi-
cates are free of syntactical type-restrictions inasmuch as they all may take 
this single sort of variable as arguments. 
11 SELF-EMBEDDING AND SELF-CONSTITUENCY 
As we have seen, transcendental predicates express properties and relations 
that apply freely across ontological categories. An important special case of 
this occurs in connection with self-embeddable predicates, that is, predicates 
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that take as arguments intensional abstracts in which the very same predi-
cate occurs. Consider an example: x contemplates contemplating. (In our 
notation, C 2 x, [C2 u, vl uv .) Does the occurrence of the verb 'contemplates' 
express the very relation of contemplating that is denoted by the gerund 
'contemplating'? Intuitively, the answer is that it does: one of the things 
you can contemplate is the relation of contemplating. 
Self-embedding arises in connection, not just with transcendental predi-
cates, but with many others as weIl. For example, in a sentence like 'It is 
necessary that something is necessary', 'necessary' hardly seems to occur 
ambiguously. Intuitively, its two occurrences express the very same prop-
erty, necessity. Thus when we assert this sentence, we are ascribing this 
property to a proposition that 'involves' this very property. Similarly, in 
the sentence 'someone believes that someone believes something', the verb 
'believes' certainly does seem not to occur ambiguously; intuitively, both 
occurrences of 'believe' express the same relation, namely, believing. The 
sentence is true if and only if someone stands in this relation to the proposi-
tion that someone believes something, a proposition that 'involves' the very 
same relation of believing. 
With these observations in mind, let us extend our use of 'self-embeddable' 
from predicates-e.g., 'contemplate', 'necessary', 'believe', 'identical', 'dis-
tinct', etc.-to the corresponding properties and relations that they express. 
Accordingly, we will say that a property or relation is self-embeddable if and 
only if it applies either to itself or to a PRP that 'involves' it. (We should 
emphasise that this talk of PRPs 'involving' one another is heuristic only-
on the algebraic semantics we advocate this heuristic talk gives way to fully 
literal talk of fundamentallogical operations such as conjunction, negation, 
existential generalisation, and predication.) 
Of course, ramified type theorists such as Russell, Whitehead, and Church 
would hold that there really are no self-embeddable properties or relations 
and that our ordinary uses of self-embeddable predicates are instead to be 
explained in terms of 'typical ambiguity'. However, there are two sorts of 
considerations that count decisively against these type theorists. 
First, since in ordinary English a predicate like 'believe' can be embedded 
any finite number of times within its own scope-e.g., 'Someone believes 
that someone believes something', 'Someone believes that someone believes 
that someone believes something', etc.-ramified type theorists like Russell, 
Whitehead, and Church must hold that 'believe' and kindred predicates 
actually are infinitely ambiguous. But such infinite ambiguity entails a 
violation of Davidson's learnability requirement. The natural, intuitive way 
around this difficulty is to admit that in belief sentences, like those above, 
'believe' does not occur ambiguously and, hence, that the familiar belief 
relation is in fact self-embeddable. Of course, type theorists could posit a 
relation R2 that holds between the infinitely many alleged belief relations 
Bo,B1 ,B2 , •.. ; that is, they could hold that R 2 (Ba ,Ba+1)' for ordinals 
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0:. The problem is that R 2 would fall outside the hierarchies with which 
type theory deals. As a result, type theory would not provide a theory for 
this logically fundamental relation that presumably holds among the very 
entities type theory is designed to treat, a relation that is needed simply 
to explain how ordinary people learn to use the predicate 'believe'. H, to 
deal with this problem, type theorists try to explicitly incorporate 'R2 , 
into their logical theory they face a fatal dilemma. Either they subject 
'R2 , itselfto infinite typical ambiguity and non-self-embeddability, thereby 
violating the learnability requirement once again. Or they treat 'R2 , as a 
type-free, self-embeddable predicate. In the latter case, however, they have 
just come around to our way of doing things except that they do so in an 
ad hoc, disunified wayj for they would still treat familiar predicates like 
'believe', 'necessary', 'identical', etc. as infinitely ambiguous and non-self-
embeddable. On either horn of the dilemma, therefore, the 'R2 '-approach 
is unacceptable. 
Second, ramified type theorists seem unable to explain satisfactorily little 
dialogues like the following: 
A: I believe many things. 
B: So do Ij in fact, what you have just asserted is one of them. 
In this dialogue A asserts a proposition 'involving' the relation of believing, 
namely, the proposition that he believes many things. Then B affirms the 
corresponding proposition about hirnself, namely that he [Le., B] believes 
many things, too. And then B goes on to provide an example of one of the 
things to which he stands in the relation of believing, namely, the original 
proposition A asserted, which, as we saw, is a proposition 'involving' this 
very relation of believing. Or consider the following little dialogue: 
A: Some things are necessary. 
B: I agreej in fact, what you have just asserted is an example of one of 
them. 
Here A asserts a proposition 'involving' the property of being necessary, 
namely, the proposition that some things are necessary. B affirms the 
proposition and then goes on to indicate a proposition having this prop-
erty, namely, A's original proposition, which 'involves' this very property. 
Now these little examples are not at all exceptional; they are entirely typi-
cal of our everyday thought and discourse about belief, necessity, possibility, 
epistemic justification, etc. Yet they would make no sense if these properties 
and relations were not self-embeddable. To rule out the self-embeddability 
of these central properties and relations would be to undermine one of the 
primary functions of intensional language. Indeed, we sub mit that it is 
impossible to formulate an acceptable comprehensive theory of the world 
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unless one makes liberal use of self-embeddable properties and relations. 
Such a theory must include, among other things, an epistemology (and a 
methodology and philosophy of science) that can account for its own accept-
ability. Here self-embeddability is inevitable.39 Any intensionallogic that 
does not deal with this phenomenon cannot be deemed acceptable, even 
provisionally.40 
We have seen that self-embeddability causes trouble for type-theoretical 
intensionallogics like those of Russell and Whitehead and of Church. But it 
caused equally serious trouble for many other approaches to intensionality. 
The possible-worlds approach is a case in point. (Related problems involv-
ing propositions that are 'constituents' of themselves confront the original 
version of the Perry-Barwise situation semantics and also the theories of 
Cresswell, Soames and Salmon; see below.) According to the possible-worlds 
approach, all PRPs are identified (at least in the semantical model) with 
sets constituted or formed ultimately from actual individuals and 'nonac-
tual individuals' (and the real world and 'nonactual possible worlds'). For 
example, a property is identified with a function (Le., a set of ordered pairs) 
from possible worlds to sets of possible individuals (intuitively, the possible 
individuals that have the property in that possible world). And an m-ary 
relation is identified with a ftlllction from possible worlds to sets of ordered 
m-tuples of possible individuals (intuitively, the possible individuals that 
stand in the relation to one another in that possible world). 
Most possible-worlds theorists seem unaware that this theory implies a 
rigid type theory. To see why, consider the transcendental predicate 'is 
self-identical'. (Any other transcendental predicate would do, e.g., 'contem-
plate', 'think of', 'identical', 'distinct', etc.) On the possible-worlds theory, 
the property of being self-identical is the Dmction from possible worlds to 
the domain of individuals existing in those worlds. As a result, the intu-
itively true sentence 'Being self-identical is self-identical' could be counted 
as true, but only at the price of treating 'self-identical' as typically ambigu-
ous. All the fatal difficulties associated with this kind of type theory follow 
in train. 
Now possible-worlds theorists might try to escape these fatal problems 
by admitting properties and relations right into the domains of things exist-
ing in possible worlds. So, for example, the property of being self-identical 
would then be the function from possible worlds to the set of things, includ-
ing the property of being self-identical itself, that exist in the possible world. 
But since on the possible-worlds theory a function is a set of ordered pairs, 
this move would imply the foUowing: being self-identical E ... E being self-
identical. An ill-founded set, which is an impossibility on the standard con-
39This argument is developed in Section 7 of [Bealer, 1988]. 
4°Further support for the existence of self-embeddable properties and relations can 
be extrapolated from the arguments Kripke gives against Tarski's infinite hierarchy of 
distinct truth concepts for English (Sections 1 and 2, [Kripke, 1975]). 
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ception of a set. In amoment, we will elaborate reasons why possible-worlds 
theorists should be unwilling to posit ill-founded sets. However, before da-
ing so, it would be good to show that the problem of self-embeddability in 
possible-worlds semantics is even more pervasive than one would initially 
think. 
On the original formulations of possible-worlds theory, propositions were 
identified with functions from possible worlds to truth values (intuitively, 
the truth value that the proposition has in that possible world). However, 
this treatment of propositions has the disastrous consequence of making all 
necessarily equivalent propositions identical. This is plainly wrong. (For 
example, most uneducated people believe that 2 + 2 = 4 and fail to believe 
that arithmetic is essentially incomplete, even though it is necessary that 
2 + 2 = 4 Hf arithmetic is essentially incomplete, even though it is necessary 
that 2 + 2 = 4 Hf arithmetic is essentially incomplete.) It follows that 
the objects of belief-the semantical correlates of the kind of 'that'-elauses 
occurring in ordinary belief sentences-cannot be identified with functions 
from possible worlds to truth values; they must be identified with another 
sort of O-ary intension, which we call jine-grained propositions. 
If you were a possible-worlds theorist, with what possible-worlds set-
theoretical construct would you identify fine-grained propositions? The 
most popular answer among sophisticated possible-worlds theorists (Max 
Cresswell, David Lewis, etc.) is that fine-grained propositions should be 
identified with certain ordered sets or abstract trees whose elements or nodes 
are either possible individuals or sets constructed ultimately from possible 
individuals. So, for example, when someone believes that F 2 x,y, the fine-
grained proposition believed would be the ordered set (f, x, y), where f is 
a function from possible worlds to sets of ordered pairs of possible indi-
vi duals (intuitively, the possible individuals that stand in the relation F 2 
to one another in that world). Or when someone believes that (3y)F2 x, y, 
the fine-grained proposition would be (EG, (f,x», where EG is some set-
theoretical item selected to play the role of the operation of existential 
generalisation. (Wh ich item should play this role? The choice seems ut-
terly arbitrary unless the real logical operation of existential generalisation 
is chosen. But in this case the possible-worlds theory would have drifted 
very elose to the traditional realist algebraic semantics we advocate. The 
same problem of choosing the fundamental logical operations confronts the 
theories of Soames and of Salmon: the choice is arbitrary unless it buys into 
our traditional realist algebraic semantics. But, then, why not just adopt 
the traditional realist algebraic semantics?) 
Now, as we have already noted, it is hardly plausible that, strictly and 
literally, people believe, hope, or perceive ordered sets such as (f, x, y) or 
(EG, (f, x)). (See Section 9 above.) But this problem, although severe, is 
not the one we are concerned with here. The problem, rather, concerns self-
embeddability. With which set-theoretical construct is the ordinary belief 
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relation to be identified according to the present sophisticated possible-
worlds theory? The answer is that it must be some function b (i.e., a 
set of ordered pairs) from possible worlds to sets of ordered pairs each of 
which consists of (i) a possible believer and (ii) a fine-grained proposition 
(intuitively, a fine-grained proposition that the believer believes in that 
world). However, on the standard conception of set, there exists no such 
function b that behaves in anything like the way that the ordinary belief 
relation behaves. 
To see why, recall that, on the standard conception of set, all sets are con-
stituted (or formed) ultimately from ontologically primitive entities that are 
not sets. At the lowest ontologicallevel, there are just the primitive non-sets 
(both actual individuals and 'nonactual individuals', if the possible worlds 
theory is right). At the next level come sets of these non-sets. (The null 
set is the degenerate case of the set of non-sets that are not self-identical.) 
Following that, there are sets whose elements are non-sets andjor sets of 
non-sets. And so on. That is, at any given level, we find sets whose elements 
are either sets constituted at some lower level or the non-sets given at the 
lowest level. Thus, on the standard conception of set, every set 'has its be-
ing in' ontologically prior entities---either entities constituted at some lower 
level or primitive entities given at the lowest level. Consequently, nowhere 
in the hierarchy of sets is there a set that contains itself as an element; nor 
is there a set that contains a second set that contains the first set as an 
element, and so on. That is, the following pattern never holds: u E ... E u. 
It is now easy to see why, on the standard conception of set, the or-
dinary belief relation cannot be identified with any of the set-theoretical 
constructs postulated in the sophisticated possible-worlds theory. Consider 
the little dialogue discussed earlier: A asserts a fine-grained proposition 
'involving' the belief relation, namely, the fine-grained proposition that he 
[Le., A] believes something, and then B affirms that he [i.e., B] believes this 
very proposition. Given B's remark, B stands in the belief relation to a 
fine-grained proposition that 'involves' the belief relation itself. Belief is a 
self-embeddable relation. On the sophisticated possible-worlds theory we 
are discussing, this fine-grained proposition is identified with an ordered 
set, say, (EG, (b, A», where b is the possible-worlds function with which 
the belief relation is to be identified. But this function b is itself only a set 
of ordered pairs one of whose elements would have to be the ordered pair 
(the actual world, (B,(EG, (b,A»». This would imply that b E ... E b. 
An impossibility on the standard conception of set. Therefore, on this 
conception-indeed, on any conception according to which sets have their 
being in ontologically prior elements-the possible-worlds theory is incom-
patible with the existence of self-embeddable PRPs. 
The problem sterns from the fact that the possible-worlds theory is re-
ductionistic. It tries to reduce all PRPs to sets constituted (or formed) ul-
timately from actual individuals and 'nonactual individuals'. Although this 
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reductionism is formally feasible for some cases, it is not for self-embeddable 
PRPs, which are so central to thought and speech. At this juncture unre-
lenting possible-worlds theorists have two choices. Either they can assert 
that self-embeddable PRPs are not sets at all but rather than they belong to 
an entirely new fundamental ontological category. Or they can abandon the 
standard conception of set and advocate instead a nonstandard conception 
that permits non-well-founded 'sets'. 
One problem with the first alternative is that it is disunified. How odd 
that some PRPs (non-self-embeddable PRPs) should be sets and that others 
(self-embeddable PRPs) should belong to an entirely different, irreducible 
ontological category. To avoid this problem of disunity, possible-worlds the-
orists could identify all PRPs with items in this new ontological category. 
But the resulting theory would have a problem of ontological economy, for it 
would posit two new categories of entities, namely, the new, irreducible ones 
that have replaced sets and the highly questionable category of 'nonactual 
individuals'. In view of this, why not just drop these questionable new cat-
egories and take PRPs at face value as primitive, irreducible entities? The 
resulting theory would be more unified, more economical, and more intu-
itive. Furthermore, it would be free of the insurmountable epistemological 
problems confronting the possible-worlds theory. (How, from occasion to 
occasion or from person to person, can one ever tell whether one is thinking 
about the same 'nonactual individual' as opposed to a numerically distinct 
one that is qualitatively like it?) 
The second alternative available to the unrelenting possible-worlds the-
orist is to abandon the standard conception of set and to adopt instead a 
nonstandard conception that permits non-well-founded 'sets', that is 'sets' 
displaying the pattern u E ... E u. However, there are three considerations 
that weigh heavily against this alternative. 
First, the original possible-worlds program sought to reduce PRPs to 
items that are constituted (or formed) ultimately from actual individuals 
and 'nonactual individuals'. A primary goal of this reduction was to provide 
a metaphysical explanation of PRPs by showing that they 'had their being 
in' ontologically prior entities (namely, actual individuals and 'nonactual 
individuals'). However, the new possible-worlds proposal undermines the 
prospect of this sort of metaphysical explanation. For on the new proposal 
self-embeddable PRPs would be identified with non-well-founded 'sets', but 
such 'sets' are not constituted (or formed) ultimately from actual individ-
uals and 'nonactual individuals'. Unlike standard sets, non-well-founded 
'sets' do not have their being in ontologically prior entities; on the contrary, 
inasmuch as they have their being 'in themselves', they are virtually on 
a par with individuals. Because such 'sets' are ontologically primitive in 
this way, identifying PRPs with them cannot yield the kind of metaphysi-
cal explanation of the being of PRPs that was originally promised by the 
possible-worlds program. So on this score, we are just as weil off taking 
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PRPs at face value rather than as a queer kind of 'set'. 
Second, it is not clear that talk of non-well-founded sets is really coherent 
to begin with. Many people believe that, as a conceptual or metaphysical 
necessity, all sets must have their being in ontologically prior entities; this 
is just the kind of thing sets are. According to these people, non-well-
founded 'sets' are not strictly and literally sets at all; rather, they belong 
to an entirely new primitive ontological category above and beyond sets. If 
this is right, people who are favourably inclined toward set theory would 
have no reason-either ontological or epistemological-to prefer this new 
'set' theory to a theory that takes PRPs at face value as a basic category 
of entities. First, there would be no ontological gain, for both alternatives 
must posit a new primitive ontological category. And let us not forget that 
the possible-worlds theorist has already posited the additional primitive on-
tological category of 'nonactual individuals'. Second, there would be no 
epistemological gain. The usual Quinean argument is that sets are episte-
mologically superior to properties and relations (-in-intension) because sets 
can be individuated simply by considering their elements. Let u be one 
of the new non-well-founded 'sets' that is an element of itself. If, follow-
ing Quine's procedure, we try to individuate u by considering its elements, 
we only get caught in a vicious circle: to individuate u by these means 
requires that we must already have individuated u. And much the same 
sort of epistemological difficulty infects all the new 'sets' displaying the pat-
tern u E ... E u. (Of course, one could adopt Peter Aczel's bold decision 
to permit exactly one 'set' displaying the pattern u E u and exactly one 
'set' displaying the pattern u E v E u (where u f::- v) and so on. But how 
could one know that there is exactly one 'set' displaying the pattern u E u? 
This is just Quine's worry all over again.) To overcome this sort of diffi-
culty, some other epistemological procedure will be needed. But it would 
seem that, whatever this further procedure is (for example, systematisation 
of one's first-person introspective reports and/or systematisation of one's 
apriori intuitions), it would work at least as successfully on PRPs as it 
would on the new non-well-founded 'sets'. Indeed, if this further procedure 
is available (as of course it is), PRPs are fully as respectable epistemically 
as ordinary well-founded sets are commonly thought to be. And finally 
let us not forget that the possible-worlds theory is beset with a number 
of absolutely intractable epistemological problems preceded by its peculiar 
ontology of 'nonactual individuals'. 
Methodology provides the third reason not to accept the possible-worlds 
reduction of PRPs to non-well-founded 'sets'. The standard view of sets-
according to which, sets have their being in their instances-provides an 
intuitive diagnosis and resolution of the set-theoretical paradoxes. Advo-
cates of set theory should demand a very good reason to give up this se-
cure position. However, Russell-style antinomies are derivable in the naive 
version of non-well-founded 'set' theory. How should these antinomies be 
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resolved? This becomes an absolutely urgent question if PRPs are identified 
with non-well-founded 'sets', for in that case the semantics of intensional 
logic cannot even be stated without first formulating a non-well-founded 
'set' theory and thereby taking a strong stand on how to resolve this new 
family of antinomies. But this situation is methodologically very unsatis-
factory. If at all possible, one should find a way to do the semantics for 
intensional logic without taking a stand on these highly problematic issues. 
However, we can do just that if we drop the attempt to reduce PRPs to 
'sets' and instead take PRPs at face value as unreduced entities. By any-
one's standard, this is a far wiser way to proceed. To do otherwise is just 
asking for trouble, and it is doing so with no gain whatsoever. 
Our conclusion, therefore, is that one should not invoke a non-well-
founded 'set' theory to save possible-worlds semantics from the difficulties 
posed by self-embeddable PRPs. Rather, one should just abandon possible-
worlds semantics and, instead, develop a traditional nonreductionist PRP 
semantics. On this alternative, the above problems simply do not arise. 
We have shown how self-embeddable properties and relations produce 
grave difficulties for possible-worlds semantics (and for Cresswell's seman-
tics). These difficulties can be avoided if one adopts the traditional realist 
theory that properties and relations are primitive, irreducible entities. Like 
our own nonreductionist semantics, situation semantics and the proposals of 
Soames and Salmon follow this path.41 However, the original version of sit-
uation semantics and the proposals of Soames and of Salmon are still reduc-
tionistic in character, for like possible-worlds semantics, they attempt to re-
duce O-ary intensions (what we call propositions and Perry and Barwise call 
situations) to certain kinds of sets. Predictably, then, propositions (situa-
tions) that are 'constituents' ofthemselves produce grave problems for these 
theories. (It go es without saying that these problems of self-constituency 
also beset possible-worlds semantics. We should also emphasise again that 
our remarks apply primarily to the original theory of Perry and Barwise. 
In their more recent theory, they attempt to deal with self-constituency by 
adopting a non-well-founded 'set' theory.) 
The phenomenon of self-constituency seems to arise in connection with 
such matters as public information, mutual knowledge, reflexive perception, 
and so on. For example, suppose two opposing soldiers x and y are tracking 
41 This is not quite accurate. In situation semantics a distinction is made between basic 
properties and relations, on the one hand, and comp/ex properties and relations, on the 
other hand. Basic properties and relations are treated as unreduced entities. However, 
complex properties and relations are reduced to certain kinds of sets (dubbed "event 
types"). As a result, self-embeddable complex properties and relations create a diffi-
culty far situation semantics that is fully analogous to the self-embeddability problem in 
possible-worlds semantics that we have been discussing. Furthermore, isn't it odd that in 
situation semantics sorne properties and relations are supposed to be sets whereas others 
belong to an entirely different ontological category? This sort of disunity is undesirable 
even in reductionistic theories. 
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one another down, and suppose that simultaneously each spots the other 
and each perceives fully what has happened. There are reasons to think that 
a complete specification of what has gone on may include the following (and 
Barwise now seems to agree):42 x perceives 81 and y perceives 82, where 
81 is that y perceives 82 and 82 is that x perceives 81. If this is correct, 81 
is a proposition (situation) that is a 'constituent' of 82, which in turn, is a 
proposition (situation) that is a 'constituent' of 81. So 81 is a proposition 
(situation) that is a 'constituent' of itself. The question is how to develop 
a semantics to deal with such apparent self-constituency. 
(One response is to deny that there is really such a phenomenon as self-
constituency. This response might be correct. However, because it is con-
troversial, one would be much better off having a theory that is equipped to 
handle self-constituency in case it turns out to be a genuine phenomenon. 
Our traditional realist semantics is like this. The original version of situ-
ation semantics and the proposals of Soames and Salmon are not. This is 
the point.) 
The central idea of the original version of situation semantics and the 
proposals of Soames and Salmon is to reduce propositions (situations) to 
sets-for example, to ordered sets of properties, relations, and other items.43 
Therefore, in these theories one had no choice but to try to identify 81 with 
an ordered set such as (y, perceiving, 82) and 82 with an ordered set such as 
(x, perceiving, 81). But this implies that 81 E ... E 81, and this contradicts 
classical set theory. 
Our traditional realist semantics does not fall into the trap of trying to 
reduce propositions (situations) to sets. Instead, it just takes them at face 
value. Consequently, it is able to deal with self-constituency in a direct and 
intuitive fashion without having to contradict classical set theory. Rather 
than following this natural course, Barwise now advocates abandoning the 
standard conception of set and adopting instead a nonstandard conception 
that permits non-well-founded 'sets'. However, in the preceding discussion 
of possible-worlds semantics, we found convincing reasons for not following 
this kind of radical course, reasons that apply equally to Barwise's pro-
posal. A traditional realist theory is plainly superior. Indeed, it would be 
unreasonable to decide to revolutionise classical set theory just to save a 
certain style of semantics (possible-worlds semantics, situation semantics, 
etc.) when there is a simple and natural alternative that requires no such 
revolution and that, for the purpose of modelling intensional logic, makes 
use of a relatively weak, uncontroversial standard set theory. 
Our overall conclusion, therefore, is that the phenomena of self-embedding 
and self-constituency cause serious difficulties for all reductionistic seman-
42See Jon Barwise [1985]. 
43Strictly speaking, the reduction is more complicated in situation semanties. But the 
complications do not affect the philosophical issue we are discussing, so it is convenient 
to suppress them. 
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tics and, hence, that a traditional nonreductionistic semantics is the best 
one to adopt. 
12 THE FIRST-ORDERjHIGHER-ORDER CONTROVERSY 
From a linguistic point of view, the upshot of the previous two sections 
was that the formal language for intensional logic should be a one-sorted 
type-free language that may contain unambiguous transcendental and self-
embeddable predicates. Even though this formal language should be one-
sorted-that is, even though it should contain only one sort of variable-that 
does not tell us whether, syntacticaIly, this language should be first-order 
or higher-order. For it is possible-though quite unusual-for a one-sorted 
language to be syntactically higher-order. In such a language strings like 
'x(x)' would be counted as well-formed. (In a syntactically higher-order lan-
guage, predicates-and perhaps sentences, as weIl-are counted as singular 
terms for which quantifiable variables may be substituted. So in a one-
sorted higher-order language strings like 'x(x)' would be well-formed. In a 
syntactically first-order language, by contrast, neither predicates nor sen-
tences are counted as singular terms, and variables may not be substituted 
for them. Accordingly, strings like 'x(x)' would not be weIl-formed.) 
In this section we turn to the quest ion of whether we should adopt this 
style of higher-order syntax or whether we should instead adopt a standard 
first-order syntax. We believe that the considerations favouring the first-
order syntax decisively outweigh those favouring the higher-order syntax. 
The arguments are too lengthy to give in fuIl detail here. However, we will 
touch on two issues, one methodological and one grammatical. 
First, the methodological issue. In Part H, we shall see that first-order 
intensional logic-that is, first-order logic with identity and intensional 
abstraction-is complete: there is a recursive axiomatisation of the logi-
cally valid sentences of the language. 44 Kevertheless, by a straightforward 
adaptation ofthe proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, we can show that 
first-order logic with identity and a copula is essentially incomplete, and this 
is so whether this logic is intensional or extensional, that is, whether or not 
the operation of intensional abstraction is adjoined to the language. What 
explains these results? From a semantical point of view, a copula ('is', 'has', 
'stand in', etc.) is a distinguished logical predicate that permits one to talk 
in a general way about what items have what properties and what items 
stand in what relations. That is, a copula is a distinguished logical predicate 
that expresses a predication ( or instantiation) relation. This suggests the 
44Nino Cocchiarella [1985J has claimed that this kind of first-order intensional logic 
ean be shown to be incomplete if the semantics is modified only slightly. However, his 
argument is based on an elementary technical error. When the semantics is modified in 
the way Cocchiarella suggests, completeness still can be shown. For a discussion of this 
issue, see Part 11, Section 4 of this chapter. 
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following explanation. Intensionality-the failure of substitutivity-is not 
responsible for incompleteness in logic. Rather, the responsibility lies with 
those devices that permit us to talk in a general way about what has what 
properties or about what stands in what relations, that is, with devices that 
permit us to talk generally about predication. This explanation is borne out 
by the fact that both higher-order intensional logic and higher-order exten-
sionallogic are essentially incomplete, and each is equipped with devices for 
tal king generally about these matters. (Specifically, each is equipped with 
linguistic forms like 'u(x)', 'u(x, y)', 'u(x, y,z)', ... , where 'u' is a variable.) 
For terminological convenience, let us call any logic (whether first-order 
or higher-order) that treats such matters a logic 0/ predication. Our goal 
is to formalise intensional logic, which is the logic for contexts in which 
the substitutivity principles of extensional logic do not hold. Our goal is 
not to develop the logic of predication. In view of the fact that the logic of 
predication is essentially incomplete, our goal of formalising intensionallogic 
is best served if, initially, we separate it from the formalisation of the logic 
of predication. In a first-order setting, this separation is possible. For in a 
first-order setting intensionallogic is just the logic for intensional abstracts, 
and these terms may be adjoined to first-order quantifier logic with identity 
prior to singling out the copula as a distinguished logical predicate. When 
we do this, the result is a complete intensional logic. However, this sort 
of separation of goals is not feasible in a higher-order setting. For on the 
intended interpretation of a higher-order language, devices for dealing with 
the predication relation are present in the syntactic forms 'u(x)', 'u(x,y)', 
'u(x,y,z)', etc. right from the start. For this methodological reason, then, 
it is desirable to develop intensional logic in a first-order setting. (This 
completeness issue will be discussed further in Section 4 of Part 11.) 
There is a closely related, but much more important, methodological 
point that we touched on in our introduction. Not only do devices for deal-
ing with the relation of predication produce incompleteness in logic, but 
also they invite logical paradoxes. For example, naive predication (or com-
prehension) principles-both higher-order principles like (3u)(Vx)(u(x) B 
A(x)) and first-order principles like (3z)(Vy(yßz B A(y))-lead directly 
to Russell-style paradoxes. ('ß' is our symbol for the copula.) On the 
first-order approach to intensionallogic, however, the device that generates 
intensional contexts (namely, intensional abstraction) and the device for 
dealing with the predication relation (namely, the copula) are independent 
of one another. Therefore, on the first-order approach, these paradoxes 
can be avoided simply by not singling out a distinguished logical predicate 
(e.g., 'ß') for the predication relation. On the higher-order approach, by 
contrast, a device for dealing with the predication relation is built into the 
very syntax of the language on its intended interpretation. As a result, the 
paradoxes must be confronted from the very start. 
Faced with this demand to resolve the paradoxes, higher-order theorists 
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usually adopt a type-theoretical resolution, and often they actually encode 
this resolution into the syntax of their language by dividing the variables 
into sorts, one sort for each distinct ontological type (e.g., one sort of vari-
able for individuals, another for properties of individuals, a third for prop-
erties of properties of individuals, etc.). However, these type theories have 
extremely counterintuitive features. For example, they rule out the possi-
bility of transcendental properties and relations-e.g., contemplating, non-
identity, etc.-which we discussed earlier. Moreover, a many-sorted syntax 
rules out the associated possibility of a sort of variable that ranges freely 
across all ontological types. We conclude, therefore, that this way of re-
sponding to the paradoxes is unsatisfactory. 
It is safe to say that, as yet, no one really understands the paradoxes. 
Despite the elegance and ingenuity of the known resolutions, every one of 
them is unsatisfactory in one crucial way or another, and it seems unlikely 
that this situation will change anytime soon. In view of this, the breakdown 
in type-theoretical higher-order intensionallogic should not be viewed as an 
isolated phenomenon. Since every system of higher-order intensional logic 
is forced to include aresolution of the paradoxes, it is highly likely that 
every higher-order system of intensional logic developed in the foreseeable 
future will be unsatisfactory in one crucial way or another. The only real-
istic strategy for developing a satisfactory system of intensional logic is to 
use a framework that does not force us to include aresolution of the para-
doxes. First-order logic is the only framework like this. For in first-order 
logic, unlike higher-order logic, we can include a device for representing 
intensionality-namely, intensional abstraction-without also including a 
device or devices that threaten to generate the paradoxes. At the same 
time, the first-order strategy of treating intensionality independently of the 
paradoxes is not at all ad hoc. For, as we shall see in amoment, there are 
independent grammatical considerations that support a first-order logical 
syntax. Without any hidden costs, the first-order strategy allows us to keep 
our options open with respect to the paradoxes: we have a strong chance of 
being able to incorporate an ideal resolution if ever one is discovered, and, in 
the meantime, we have a wide variety of interim resolutions to choose from 
depending on the theoretical task at hand. From a methodological point 
of view, therefore, the first-order approach to intensional logic is vastly su-
perior to the higher-order approach. There is no good reason not to adopt 
it. 
Now for the grammatical considerations. We wish to emphasise at the 
outset that these considerations do not carry the same weight as the forego-
ing methodological considerations we have been discussing. Until one has a 
satisfactory general syntax of natural language, surface syntactical consid-
erations like those we will discuss are only provisional. N evertheless, they 
do suffice to show that the first-order approach is not ad hoc. This is all 
that is needed for our overall argument. 
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The first-order approach honours the traditionallinguistic distinction be-
tween subject and predicate, between noun phrase and verb phrase; the 
higher-order approach does not. That is, on the first-order approach an 
absolute distinction is made between linguistic subjects and linguistic pred-
icates such that a linguistic subject (noun phrase) cannot, except in cases 
of equivocation, be used as a linguistic predicate (verb) and conversely. 
The higher-order approach does not recognise this distinction.45 On the 
contrary, it treats linguistic predicates (verb phrases) as substituends for 
variables and, hence, as a sort of subject expression. Accordingly, strings 
like '(3u)u = R', where 'R' is a linguistic predicate, are treated as well-
formed and valid. But these linguistic forms do not match the surface 
syntax of anything in natural language, for in natural language linguistic 
predicates may not (without equivocation) be used as linguistic subjects. 
For example, 'There is something such that it is identical to runs' makes no 
sense at all. Of course, we can say 'There exists something such that it is 
identical to running'. But here the linguistic predicate 'runs' is replaced by 
the linguistic subject 'running', which is a nominalisation of the linguistic 
predicate, namely, a gerund. Gerundive phrases have exact counterparts in 
a first-order language with intensional abstraction. Accordingly, the above 
sentence would be represented by '(3u)u = [Rx] x '. In this way, the sur-
face syntax of the above natural-language sentence is directly and faithfully 
represented in a first-order language. 
Many higher-order languages also treat sentences as linguistic subjects. 
For example, strings like '(38)8 = A', where 'A' is a sentence (open or 
closed), are often treated as well-formed and valid. But these linguistic 
forms do not match anything in naturallanguage: in naturallanguage, sen-
tences do not qualify as linguistic subjects. Strings like 'There is something 
such that it is identical to everyone loves someone' makes no sense at all. 
Of course, nominalisations of sentences may be used as linguistic subjects. 
For example, 'there is something such that it is identical to the proposi-
tion that everyone loves someone' is meaningful. But he re the sentence 
'Everyone loves someone' is replaced by a legitimate linguistic subject 'the 
proposition that everyone loves someone'. This linguistic subject has an ex-
act counterpart in the sort of first-order language we advocate, namely, the 
intensional abstract '[(V'x) (3y)Lxy]'. Accordingly, the above sentence would 
be represented in our first-order language by '(38)8 = [(V'x) (3y)Lxyl'. So 
once again the surface syntax of the natural language is directly and faith-
fully represented in first-order language but not in higher-order language. 
And this is the general pattern: in naturallanguage no linguistic predicate 
or (open or closed) sentence is used (without equivocation) as a linguistic 
subject. Instead, an appropriate nominalisation of the linguistic predicate 
45We use 'linguistic subject' and 'linguistic predicate' to contrast with 'ontological 
subject' and 'ontological predicate'. Our use comes elose to Strawson's use of 'logical 
subject' and 'logical predicate'j see Chapter 8 of his Individuals, for example. 
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or sentence plays this role, and such nominalisations are none other than 
the intensional abstracts we have been discussing in earlier sections. 
The next issue concerns higher-order uses of names. First, consider names 
of propositions. For example, let 'c' name some proposition, say Church's 
thesis. In a higher-order language, such a name may just on its own be used 
as a sentence: c. But nothing in naturallanguage corresponds to this. The 
dosest we can come is 'Church's thesis holds' which can be represented in 
first-order language by 'He'. So the naked higher-order use of a name as a 
sentence gives way to the use of the name as a subject together with the 
predicative use of an appropriate verb. 
A rather similar pattern emerges for names of properties and relations. 
For example, let 'b' and 'g' name the colours blue and green, respectively. In 
a higher-order language, such names may be used both as linguistic subjects 
and as linguistic predicates. Accordingly, astring like 'g(a) & 9 f. b' is 
counted as well-formed. However, as in the previous examples, there is no 
naturallanguage sentence corresponding directly to this higher-order string. 
The dosest we can come is 'a is green and green f. blue'. But he re we have 
an occurrence of averb, namely, the copula 'iS'.46 Now the most direct 
way to represent the copula is by means of a corresponding primitive 2-
place predicate, say 'ß' or simply 'is' itself. With this predicate available, 
'a is green and green f. blue' would be represented by 'a is 9 & 9 f. b' 
rather than by 'g(a) & 9 = b', and hence the intuitively ungrammatical 
predicative use ofthe linguistic subject 'g' drops out ofthe picture. And this 
pattern generalises: once a primitive copula is available, all predicative uses 
of property and relation names drop out; such names are used exdusively 
as linguistic subjects, as in first-order formulas like 'a is g' and 'g f. b'. 
Much the same verdict holds for higher-order uses of variables. In a 
higher-order language, a variable, say, 'u' may be used as a linguistic pred-
icate; however, a higher-order string like '(3u)u(x)' corresponds directly to 
no natural-language sentence. The dosest we can come is 'There is some-
thing that xis'. But here again we have an occurrence of the copula 'is', 
a verb which we may represent by a primitive 2-place linguistic predicate. 
With this primitive predicate available, the natural-language sentence would 
be represented by '(3u)x is u' rather than by '(3u)u(x)', and, thus, the pred-
icative use of the variable 'u' drops out of the picture. (Indeed, when people 
introduce novices to higher-order languages, they usually say that 'f(x)' is 
to be read as 'x is 1'. Presumably, then, this is what people actually un-
derstand when they grasp a higher-order formula. Is there any reason to 
think otherwise?) As before, the pattern generalises: onee a primitive eop-
ula is available, all predicative uses of variables become gratuitous; the use 
of variables is confined to their use as linguistic subjects, as in first-order 
46Linguists have assembled independent syntactic evidence for the existence of a prim-
itive co pu la in English. See, for example, [Williarns, 1983] and [IIigginbotham, 1985]. 
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formulas like 'X is u'. Finally, consider the higher-order use of variables as 
sentences. For example, astring like '(\18)(8 -+ 8)' is weIl-formed in higher-
order languages. But, as in previous examples, this string corresponds to 
no sentence in natural language. The dosest we can come in English is 
something like 'whatever holds holds' or 'whatever is true is true', which 
can easily be represented in a first-order language by '(\Ix) (H x -+ H x)' and 
'(\lx)(x is t -+ xis t)', respectively. So the higher-order use of a variable 
as a sentence gives way to the use of the variable as a linguistic subject in 
tandem with a predicative use of an appropriate predicative expression. 
Our overall condusion is this. First, there are decisive methodologi-
cal grounds for favouring a syntactically first-order approach to intensional 
logic. Second, there is grammatical evidence that a first-order language with 
intensional abstraction and the copula (and perhaps other auxiliary logical 
predicates) more directly and faithfully represents the syntax of natural 
language. In view of these considerations, there seems to be no reasonable 
choice but to take the first-order option. 
13 NAMES AND INDEXICALS 
There are many varieties of substitutivity failures. Not only are there the 
standard substitutivity failures involving materially equivalent formulas, 
but also there are ones involving necessarily equivalent formulas. There 
even seem to be substitutivity failures involving synonymous formulas; we 
have in mind those associated with the paradox of analysis and Mates' 
puzzle.47 (See the next section for a discussion of these puzzles.) Finally, 
there are puzzles involving, not only co-referring definite descriptions, but 
also co-referring proper names and co-referring indexicals-expressions that 
may weIl be lacking in descriptive content, at least if the 'direct reference' 
theory is right. 
At this stage of research it is desirable to have a general technique for 
constructing a spectrum of intensional logics ranging from systems that 
treat PRPs as relatively coarse-grained to systems that treat them as ex-
tremely fine-grained. After all, it is plausible that different kinds of PRPs 
are responsible for different kinds of intensional phenomena. (In Part II we 
will develop this sort of general technique and then use it to construct in 
detail both a coarse-grained intensional logic and a fine-grained intensional 
logic.) At the same time, we should not commit ourselves to the strategy 
of always explaining new substitutivity puzzles in terms of ever more fine-
grained distinctions among PRPs. In this connection, we should not rule 
out the possibility that some of these puzzles (perhaps Mates' puzzle or 
puzzles involving co-referring proper names or indexicals) are a special kind 
of pragmatic phenomenon to be explained, not in terms of ultra-fine-grained 
47See p. 215 in [Mates, 1950]. 
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distinctions among PRPs, but rather in terms of subtle shifts of interest in 
the conversational context. 
For a case in point, consider the substitutivity pU~7,les involving co-
referring proper names. (Co-referring indexicals would be handled anal-
ogously.) There are at bottom two theories about the content of ordinary 
proper names, Frege's theory and Mill's theory. According to Frege's theory, 
each name has associated with it a descriptive content that determines the 
name's nominatum; according to Mill's theory, names lack such a content. 
Let us suppose that the Fregean theory is right. In this case, we would 
treat each ordinary proper name' a' as an abbreviation for adefinite de-
scription: a =df (1V)F(v). Here 'F' is a new predicate interpreted so 
as to capture the descriptive property Fregeans would associate with the 
name 'a'. Substitutivity faHures involving co-referring definite descrip-
tions can be explained by the fact that the associated descriptive properties 
are distinct. Therefore, given that ordinary proper names can be treated as 
abbreviated definite descriptions, substitutivity failures involving ordinary 
proper names can be explained by the fact that the underlying descriptive 
properties are distinct. 
But how are definite descriptions to be treated'? One way would be to 
treat them as contextually defined expressions much as Russell does, A 
standard objection to this treatment is that there are several candidate 
Russellian analyses, and there seems to be no way to decide which one is 
'the' correct one. This problem brings us elose to the paradox of analysis. 
Consider an analogy. There are several candidate definitions of circular-
ity (e.g" locus of coplanar points equidistant from a common point, elosed 
plane figure every segment of which is equally curved, etc.), and there seems 
to be no way to decide which one is 'the' correct one. However, it seems 
mistaken to say that circularity is simply not definable because of this. A 
more reasonable response would be to say that there are several correct 
definitions. Indeed it is easy to develop an algebraic semantics that accom-
modates this view and that, at the same time, provides the sort of highly 
fine-grained distinctions needed for the treatment of the propositional at-
titudes. (This solution is sketched at the end of Chapter 3 of Quality and 
Concept.) It turns out that this kind of semantics can also be adapted to 
solve the multiple-analyses problem that arises in connection with definite 
descriptions. Thus, a Russellian approach to definite descriptions can be 
saved after all. 
Another way to deal with the multiple-analyses problem is just to treat 
'1' as a primitive, undefinable operator. This can be done in various ways. 
One way is to treat it as a primitive binary quantifier. Evans [1977) and 
[1982) gives persuasive linguistic evidence for this treatment. Moreover, 
this approach is extremely easy to implement within the algebraic semantic 
method we will present in Part 11. (We simply add to our model structures 
a logical operation the that corresponds to the primitive binary operator 
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'1'. The action of the is just what one would expect: 
and 
the([Fu]u, [Gu]u) = [G(1U)Fu] 
H(the(x, y)) T iff (3!u)(u E H(x)) & 
(Yu)(u E H(x) -+ u E H(y)) 
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for all H E K.)48 Other syntactical treatments of definite descriptions can 
also be accommodated by the algebraic semantic method. For example, a 
treatment that counts 'the F' as arestricted unary quantifier (on a par 
with 'an F', 'no F', 'every F', etc.), and also a treatment, like Frege's, that 
counts 'the F' as an ordinary singular term. 
For the present purposes, we need not make a choice about which of these 
treatments of definite descriptions is best. The point is that one of them is 
bound to be acceptable. Given this and given the Fregean supposition that 
ordinary proper names have descriptive contents, substitutivity problems 
involving co-denoting names can be solved within our general framework. 
On the other hand, suppose with Mill that ordinary proper names do not 
have descriptive contents. In this case, we would treat them as primitive 
singular terms whose semantical behaviour (namely, 'rigid designation') is 
like that of free variables with fixed assignments. So, if the Millian theory 
is right, names can easily be incorporated as long as we have a theory that 
permits free variables with fixed assignments to occur in any context, in-
cluding contexts that are otherwise intensional. However, on our approach 
to intensional logic, this condition will be met automatically, for our in-
tensionallanguage is expressly designed to permit this kind of unrestricted 
quantifying-in. 
But how on this Millian approach do we explain prima facie substitutiv-
ity failures involving co-referring proper names? On this approach, names 
behave semantically like free variables with fixed assignments. Therefore, 
strictly and literally, co-referring names may always be substituted for one 
another salva veritate. Consequently, prima facie substitutivity failures 
involving these expressions cannot be semantic phenomena. They must, 
48In the general case, 
and 
the([Fm(Ul,"" Um)]Ul"'U=, [Gn(Vi,'" vn)]Vl"'Vn ) = 
[Gn( Vi, ... , Vn-!), (1U!)(Fm(Ui,' .. , Um))]Vl ",vnu2 ... U= 
(Vi, ... ,Vn-i,U2, ... ,Um) E H(the(x,y)) iff 
(:J!Ui)((Ui,U2, ... ,Um ) E H(x))& 
(VU!)((Ui,U2,""Um) E H(x) -t (Vi, ... ,Vn-i,Ui) E H(y)). 
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therefore, be pragmatic phenomena. That is, in actual contexts of conver-
sation, what one means by uttering sentences that arise from one another by 
replacement of co-referring names can be quite different things, and prima 
fade substitutivity failmes may be traced to such differences in pragmatic 
meaning. More specifically, in certain conversational contexts the use of 
one name will (by Gricean mechanisms) implicate a descriptive content not 
implicated by the use of a co-referring name, and prima fade substitutivity 
failmes in such contexts may be traced to these differences in implicated 
descriptive content.49 (For further discussion of pragmatic solutions to sub-
stitutivity puzzles, see the next section.) So on Mill's theory we are also un-
able to explain prima fade substitutivity failmes involving ordinary proper 
names. 
Until we have a final resolution of the Mill/Frege controversy, the best 
strategy for us is to set up an intensional logic that is neutral with respect 
to the two theories and yet that can be easily extended to accommodate 
either theory. The way to do this is as follows. First, we should construct 
a neutrallanguage to which names (and indexicals) can be adjoined either 
as abbreviated definite descriptions or as primitive rigid designators lacking 
descriptive content. Second, within this language we should construct a 
general intensionallogic that can accommodate both the sort of intensional 
entities posited in a Fregean semantics and the sort posited in a Millian 
semantics (and the pragmatics that accompanies it). Om algebraic semantic 
technique permits this two-step approach. 
14 MATES' PUZZLE, PARADOX OF ANALYSIS AND THE NEED 
FOR FINE-GRAINED INTENSIONAL DISTINCTIONS 
In Part 11 we will present a general technique for constructing a spectrum 
of intensional logics ranging from coarse-grained to extremely fine-grained, 
and we will illustrate this technique by presenting in detail a representative 
coarse-grained theory and a representative fine-grained theory. However, 
there are certain outstanding substitutivity puzzles that seem initially to 
call for intensional distinctions that are even more fine-grained than those 
treated in this fine-grained theory. 
The original formulation of Mates' puzzle is a case in point.50 Mates 
holds that, for any distinct sentences D and D' , 
(1) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that D believes that D. 
and 
49This general approach to substitutivity failures is discussed in §39 'Pragmatics' in 
Quality and Concept, alld a concrete example of the conversational pragmatics is traced 
out on pp. 172-4. For an alternative to this pragmatic explanation, see [Bealer, 1993] 
and [Bealer, 1988]. 
50p. 215 [Mates, 1950]. 
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(2) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that D believes that D'. 
can always diverge in truth value. However, let D be 'Somebody chews' and 
D' be 'Somebody masticates'. Then, given that the property of chewing and 
the property of masticating are identical, it will follow in our fine-grained 
theory that (1) and (2) must be equivalent, contradicting Mates. 
There are two reasonable responses to this outcome. The first is to accept 
this outcome and to explain Mates' intuition pragmatically. Accordingly, 
sentences (1) and (2) would be deemed semantically equivalent. Neverthe-
less, utterances of (1) and (2) in an appropriate conversational context could 
express non-equivalent propositions. To determine exactly which proposi-
tions, we would appeal, not only to the semantics of the language, but also 
to Gricean pragmatic rules of conversation.51 
The second response to the problem would be to construct a new theory 
that admits even more fine-grained intensional distinctions than our fine-
grained theory. In particular, even though the propositions denoted by 
'[(3x)Cxl' and '[(3x)Mxl' would still be identical according to the new 
theory, the propositions denoted by the following more complex intensional 
abstracts would not: 
[(Vu)(B2u, [(3x)Cx] -+ B 2u, [(3x)Cx])] 
and 
[(Vu) (B2u, [(3x)Cx] -+ B 2u, [(3x)Mx])]. 
How can this be? The idea (once suggested by Putnam)52 is to exploit the 
differences in syntactic form between these two complex abstracts. Specifi-
cally, the predicate 'C' is repeated in the former abstract but not in the latter; 
so the former has the form r[(vu)( ... 1 ... -+ ... 1 ... )]' whereas the latter 
has the form r[(vu)( ... 1 ... -+ ... 2 ... )]'. The new theory, then, is built 
around the following general principle: two abstracts are to be codenoting 
only if they have exactly the same syntactic form. It turns out that such a 
theory is easy to formulate within our general algebraic approach. 53 
How are we to choose between these two responses to Mates? The second 
response is initially very appealing because it is systematic. But there is 
reason to question it. True, this response solves the original puzzle given 
by Mates. But, ironically, there are simpler versions of the puzzle that can-
not be solved no matter how fine-grained we allow PRPs to be. Consider 
51 See Section 39 in Quality and Concept for further discussion of this sort of pragmatic 
explanation. 
52[Putnam, 1954]. 
531n the semanties, for example, we need only define a new type of model structure 
in which there is a primitive logical operation for each different syntactic form. These 
operations will be 1-1; their ranges will be disjoint, and their behaviour with respect to 
the extension functions H in 1C will be just what one would expect. 
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any two predicates that express the same property, für example, 'chew' and 
'masticate'. (ar choose some predicate 'C' and then just stipulate that 
a new predicate 'M' expresses the same property as the one expressed by 
'C'.) Consider someone 'half-way' along in the process of picking up the use 
of 'masticate' by hearing others use it. There are conversational contexts 
in which such a person could assert something true by saying, 'I am sure 
that whatever mastieates chews, but I am not sure that whatever chews 
masticates'. In this example, the two intensional abstracts have the same 
syntactie form: '[(Vx)(Mx -+ Cx)]' and '[(Vx)(Cx -+ Mx)]' are perfectly 
isomorphie syntactieally. Thus, the second response to Mates will not allow 
us to hold that these two abstracts denote distinct propositions, and, there-
fore, it cannot be used to solve this instance of the puzzle. Consequently, 
there is no choice but to invoke the first response, that is, to solve the puz-
zle pragmatically. (See below for details.) However, if we must resort to 
a pragmatic solution of this simple version of Mates' puzzle, why not use 
it to solve the original, more complex version? If the pragmatic solution 
is adequate, the second response, which involves positing ultra-fine-grained 
intensional distinctions, would then appear to be extraneous. 
This prospect raises a general methodological question. How are we to 
decide whieh types of fine-grained distinctions to admit in intensionallogic? 
Principles of ontological economy would seem to suggest that we should ad-
mit those distinctions that are needed to explain substitutivity failures. Eut 
we have just seen that a pragmatie solution to at least some substitutivity 
puzzles is inevitable and that, once this style of explanation is available, 
ultra-fine-grained intensional distinctions might not be needed to explain 
the versions of Mates' puzzle for which they were designed. If so, ontologi-
cal economy would lead us to reject such distinctions. 
Let us suppose for a moment that this is right. One wonders how far this 
sort of elimination can go. What types of fine-grained intensional distinc-
tions, if any, survive a systematic attempt to explain substitutivity failures 
pragmatically? A transcendental argument yields a partial answer to this 
question: the fine-grained distinctions that survive must include at least 
those that are needed to speIl out satisfactory pragmatie explanations; it 
turns out that very fine-grained intensional distinctions are needed for this 
purpose. Here is the argument. 
Consider the person 'half-way' along in the process of learning to use the 
predicate 'mastieate'; he says, 'I am sure that whatever masticates chews, 
but I am not sure that whatever chews masticates'. In an actual conver-
sational context the person certainly would assert something true. The 
problem is to identify what true proposition it is that the person would as-
sert. The ultra-fine-grained theory, developed in response to Mates' original 
puzzle, is forced to identify the proposition that whatever masticates chews 
and the proposition that whatever chews mastieates, for the two abstracts 
'that whatever mastieates chews' and 'that whatever chews mastieates' have 
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exactly the same syntactic form: [(\lx)(l(x) ~ 2(x)]. So this theory implies 
that the sentence uttered by our person expresses sornething that is strictly 
and literally false (indeed, something that is formally contradictory). Since 
on the ultra-fine-grained theory the sentence expresses something that is 
strictly and literally false and since our person has asserted something that 
is true, what he has asserted must be something other than what the sen-
tence strictly and literally expresses. Therefore, the problem of identifying 
what he has asserted cannot be solved semanticallYj it must be solved prag-
matically. In pragmatics, we rnay take into account not only the syntactic 
and semantic features, but also features of the conversational context and 
the Gricean rules of conversation. Given all this information, one might 
identify the person's true assertion with something like the following: 
I arn sure that whatever satisfies the predicate 'masticate' also 
chews, but I arn not sure that whatever chews also satisfies the 
predicate 'masticate'. 
This pragmatic solution is a good first try, but there is a problem with it.54 
Suppose that the person who utters the sentence is a child (or a slow-
learning adult) who appears to have no command of the rnetalinguistic 
concepts we take for granted. In particular, he appears to be unfamiliar with 
any device (e.g., quotation names) for naming expressions, and he appears 
to have no articulated concepts from linguistic theory such as the syntactic 
concept of a linguistic predicate or the semantical concept of satisfaction 
(-in-English). Furtherrnore, when we try to teach hirn these bits oflinguistic 
theory, he has great difficulty learning them. (He learns the new predicate 
'masticate' much more readily.) However, a few years later when we try 
again to teach hirn these things, he learns them quickly. This shows, so the 
worry goes, that the above pragmatic analysis of his assertion represents 
hirn as having reached a stage of conceptual development beyond what we 
can plausibly attribute to hirn. If so, the pragmatic analysis is mistakenj 
the fellow's assertion could not have involved the specific metalinguistic 
concepts attributed to hirn by this analysis. 
There appears to be only one successful way out of this problem, and that 
is to treat our fellow's apparent ignorance of rnetalinguistic concepts as a 
species of the kind of ignorance involved in the paradox of analysis. Consider 
two analogies. First, suppose a child can sort variously shaped objects 
so well that it becomes plain that he recognises, say, the circular objects 
as circular and, therefore, that he has comrnand of the concept of circle. 
However, suppose that the child displays no particular behaviour to indicate 
that he has command of the concept of a (mathematical or physical) point, 
the concept of a locus of points, the concept of a (rnathematical or physical) 
54Tyler Burge expresses a closely related worry; see [Burge, 1978, pp. 127ff], [Burge, 
1979, p. 97], and [Burge, 1975]. The issue here dramatises the fact that any adequate 
theory of language learning must incorporate aresolution of the paradox of analysis. 
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plane, the concept of degree of curvature, etc. When we try to teach hirn 
geometric theory-with its definition of a circle as a locus of points in the 
same plane equidistant from a common point-we get nowhere. (lf he were 
a few years older, he would be able to leam this readily.) In this situation it 
is natural to characterise the child as foIlows: he has an unanalysed concept 
of circle (i.e., an unanalysed concept of being-a-locus-of-points-in-the-same-
plane-equidistant-from-a-common-point); however, he lacks the theoretical 
concepts (points, locus, plane, etc.) that someone might use to analyse this 
unanalysed concept. Second, consider someone who can reliably tell whether 
a middle-sized object comes to a halt smoothly. But this person seems to 
have no grasp of the sophisticated concepts of calculus that would be used 
to speIl out what it is for an object to come to a halt smoothly; indeed, if 
the person has limited mathematical aptitude, he might never be able to 
grasp these theoretical concepts. It would be natural to say of this person 
that he has an unanalysed concept of coming-to-a-halt-smoothly but that 
he lacks the specific theoretical concepts needed to unpack this unanalysed 
concept.55 
With these geometry and calculus examples in mind, let us consider a 
linguistics example. Suppose that a child is not yet in command of vari-
ous theoretical concepts from linguistics, concepts such as satisfaction-in-
English, linguistic predicate, and quotation. Despite this it should still 
be possible for the child to have an unanalysed concept whose analysis 
involves such theoretical concepts from linguistics. This would be quite 
analogous to the child's having an unanalysed concept of circle (i.e., an un-
analysed concept of being-a-Iocus-of-points-in-the-same-plane-equidistant-
from-a-common-point) and yet not being in command of the theoretical 
concepts from geometry (point, locus, plane, etc.) that someone would use 
to analyse this concept. And it would also be analogous to the child's having 
an unanalysed concept of coming-to-a-halt-smoothly and yet not being in 
command of the theoretical concepts from calculus that someone would use 
to analyse this concept. Surely nothing can prevent this sort of thing from 
happening in linguistics examples, too. We submit that this is exactly what 
is going on in the case of the child who is 'half-way' along in the process of 
leaming to use the predicate 'masticate': he has an unanalysed concept of 
satisfying-the-predicate-'masticate', but he is not in command of the theo-
retical concepts (satisfaction, predicate, quotation) that someone would use 
to analyse this unanalysed concept. lf this is right, then we have the mak-
ings of a solution to the problem confronting the pragmatic analysis of what 
the child asserted when he said, 'I am sure that whatever masticates chews, 
but I am not sure that whatever chews masticates'. The child's assertion 
comes to something like this: 
55 A formal semantics that deals with fine-grained distinctions like this may be devel-
oped along the lines suggested in Quality and Concept, p. 257, n. 17. 
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I am sure that whatever satisfies-the-predicate-'masticate' also 
chews, but I am not sure that whatever chews also satisfies-the-
predicate- 'masticate' . 
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Since this analysis attributes to the child the unanalysed concept of satisfying-
the-predicate-'masticate', it avoids the problem of mistakenly attributing to 
the child theoretical concepts that he will acquire only at a more advanced 
developmental stage. And this is what we need. 
Notice, however, that this way of salvaging the pragmatic solution of our 
'chew' j'masticate' substitutivity puzzle is based on a very fine-grained inten-
sional distinction, namely, the distinction between the unanalysed concept 
of satisfying-the-predicate-'masticate' and the analysed concept of satisfying 
the predicate 'masticate' . 
Now, as far as we can tell, this outcome is unavoidable. That is, there 
is no satisfactory way of salvaging the pragmatic solution of the original 
substitutivity puzzle that does not somehow invoke antecedently given in-
tensional distinctions that are very fine-grained. Here, then, is a place where 
very fine-grained intensional distinctions cannot, even in principle, be elim-
inated by the technique of pragmatic explanation. If this is right, a very 
fine-grained intensional logic is inevitable.56 
II: The Formulation of Intensional Logic 
Using the above guidelines, we are finally ready to present our formal 
intensional logic. We proceed in three standard stages: (1) syntax, (2) 
semantics, (3) axiomatic theory. Following this, we will dose with some 
remarks about the significance of completeness results in first-order inten-
sional logic. 
1 SYNTAX 
We now construct our first-order intensional language Lw. 
Primitive symbols: 
Logicaloperators: &",3, 
Predicate letters: FI, Fi, ... ,FJ, ... (for r, 8 ~ 1), 
Variables: x, y, Z, Xl, YI, ZI, .•• , 
Punctuation: (,), [,). 
56The only other known way of trying to solve this sort of substitutivity puzzle is 
by treating the standard propositional attitudes as three-place relations holding among a 
person, a proposition, and a 'mode of presentation'. However, there are a host of problems 
with this proposal. For example, it runs into trouble with iterated propositional attitudes, 
quantifying-in, and general sentences that mix intentional and nonintensional predicates. 
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Simultaneous inductive definition of term and formula of Lw: 
(1) All variables are terms. 
(2) If tl, ... , tj are terms, then F! (tl, ... , tj) is a formula. 
(3) If A and B are formulas and Vk is a variable, then (A & B), -,A and 
(3Vk)A are formulas. 
(4) If A is a formula and VI, . .. ,Vm (for m ~ 0) are distinct variables, 
then [A]Vl."V", is a term. 
In the limiting case where m = 0, [AJ is a term. On the intended informal 
interpretation of Lw, [A]Vl ... V", denotes a proposition if m = 0, a property if 
m = 1, and an m-ary relation-in-intension if m ~ 2. 
The following are auxiliary syntactic notions. FormlIlas and terms are 
well-formed express ions. An occurrence of a variable Vi in a well-formed 
expression is bound (free) if and only if the expression is (is not) a formula 
of the form (3Vi)A or a term of the form [A]Vl ... Vi ... V",. A term t is said to 
be free for Vi in A if and only if for all Vk, if Vk is free in t, then no free 
occurrence of Vi in A occurs either in a subcontext of the form (3Vk)( ... ) 
or in a subcontext of the form [ .. . ]avkß, where a and ß are sequences of 
variables. If Vi has a free occurrence in A and is not one of the variables in 
the sequence of variables a, then Vi is an exiernally quantifiable variable in 
the term [A]a. Let <5 be the sequence of externally quantifiable variables in 
[AJa displayed in order oftheir first free occurrencei [A]a will sometimes be 
rewritten as [A]~. Let A( VI, ... , Vp ) be any formula; VI, ... ,Vp may or may 
not occur free in A. Then we write A(tl, ... ,tp ) to indicate the formula 
that results when, for each k,l ::s; k ::s; p, the term tk replaces each free 
occurrenceofvk inA. Terms [A(Ul, ... ,Up)]~l ... VP and [A(Vl, ... ,Vp)]~l ... Vp 
are said to be alphabetic variants if and only if for each k,l ::s; k ::s; p, Uk 
is free for Vk in A and conversely. Terms ofthe form [F!(Vl, ... ,Vj)]Vl ... V; 
are called elementary. A term [A]a is called normalised if and only if all 
variables in a occur free in A exactly once and a displays the order in 
which these variable occur free in A. The logical operators V, J, =, =Vl ... V; 
are defined in terms of 3, & and --, in the usual way. Finally, F'f is singled 
out as a distinguished logical predicate, and formulas of the form F'f (tl, t2) 
are rewritten as tl = t2. 
Note that Lw is just like a standard first-order language except for its 
singular terms [AJV1 ... V m ' which are intended to be intensional abstracts 
that denote propositions, properties, or relations, depending on the value 
ofm. 
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2 SEMANTICS 
Since the aim is to simply characterise the logically valid formulas of Lw, 
it will suffice to construct a Tarski-style definition of validity for Lw. Such 
definition will be built on Tarski-style definitions of the truth for Lw. These 
definitions will in turn depend in part on specifications of the denotations 
of the singular terms in Lw. As already indicated, every formula for Lw 
is just like a formula in a standard first-order extensional language except 
perhaps for the singular terms occurring in it. Therefore, once we have 
found a method for specifying the denotations of the singular terms of Lw, 
the Tarski-style definitions of truth and validity for Lw may be given in 
the customary way. What we are looking for specifically is a method for 
characterising the denotations of the singular terms of Lw in such a way 
that a given singular term [A]vl"'v= will denote an appropriate property, 
relation, or proposition, depending on the value of m. 
Since Lw has infinitely many singular terms [A]a, what is called for is 
a recursive specification of the denotation relation for Lw. To do this, we 
will arrange these singular terms into an order according to their syntac-
tic kind and complexity. So, for example, just as the complex formula 
((3x)Fx& (3y)Gy) is the conjunction of the simpler formulas (3x)Fx and 
(3y)Gy, we will say that the complex term [((3x)Fx& (3y)Gy)] is the con-
junction of the simpler terms [(3x)Fx] and [(3y)Gy]. Similarly, just as the 
complex formula -,(3x)Fx is the negation of the simpler formula (3x)Fx, 
we will say that the complex term [-,(3x)Fx] is the negation ofthe simpler 
term [(3x)Fx]. The following are other examples: [(3x)Fx] is the existen-
tial generalisation of [Fx]z; [Fy]Y is the predication of [Fx]z of y; [F[Gy]y] 
is the predication of [Fx]z of [Gy]y; [F[Gy]Y]y is the relativised predication 
of [Fx]z and [Gy]y; [Rxy]yz is the conversion of [Rxy]zy; [Sxyz]ZZY is the 
inversion of [Sxyz]ZYZ; [Rxx]z is the rejlexivisation of [Rxy]zy; [Fx]zy is the 
expansion of [Fx]z. 
The complex singular terms of Lw that are syntactically simpler than all 
other complex singular terms are those whoseform is [Fm(Vl"" ,Vm)]Vl ... V=' 
These are called elementary. The denotation of such an elementary complex 
term is just the property or relation expressed by the primitive predicate 
Fm. The denotation of a more complex term [A]a is determined by the 
denotation(s) of the relevant syntactically simpler term(s). But how in de-
tail does this work? The answer is that the new denotation is determined 
algebraically. That is, the new denotation is determined by the application 
of the relevant fundamental logical operation to the denotation(s) of the 
relevant syntactically simpler term(s). Let us explain. 
Consider the following three propositions: [(3x)Fx], [(3y)Gy] , [(3x)Fx& 
(3y)Gy]. (Note: in this paragraph we will be using-not mentioning-terms 
from Lw.) What is the most obvious relation holding among these propo-
sitions? Answer: the third proposition is the conjunction of the first two. 
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And what is the most obvious relation holding between the propositions 
[(3x)Fx] and [-{3x)Fx]'? Answer: the seeond is the negation of the first. 
Similarly, what is the most obvious relation holding between the properties 
[Fx)x and [---,Fx) x ? As before, the second is the negation of the first. In a 
similar manner we arrive at the following similar relationships: [(3x)Fx) is 
the existential generalisation of [Fx)x; [Fy)Y is the result of predicating [Fx)x 
of y; [F[Gy)y) is the result of predicating [Fx)x of [Gy)y; [F[Gy)Y)y is the 
result of a relativised predication of [FxJx of [Gy)y; [Rxy)yx is the converse 
of [Rxy)xy; [Sxyz)XZY is the inverse of [Sxyz)XYZ; [Rxx)x is the reftexivisa-
tion of [Rxy)xy; and [Fx)xy is the expansion of [Fx)x. These fundamental 
logical operations, of course, eorrespond to the syntactie operations listed 
earlier. 
Now ehoose any eomplex term t in Lw that is not elementary. If t is ob-
tained from 8 via the syntaetic operation of negation (conversion, inversion, 
reflexivisation, expansion, existential generalisation), then the denotation 
of t is the result of applying the logical operation of negation (conversion, 
inversion, reflexivisation, expansion, existential generalisation) to the deno-
tation of s. The same thing holds mutatis mutandis for eomplex terms that, 
syntactically, are conjunctions, predications, or relativised predieations. In 
this way, therefore, these fundamentallogical operations make it possible to 
define reeursively the denotation relation for all of the complex intensional 
terms t in Lw. 
The algebraic semantics far Lw is thus to be specified in stages. (1) An 
algebra of properties, relations, and propositions-or an algebraic model 
structure-is posited. (2) Relative to this, an intensional interpretation of 
the primitive predicates is given. (3) Relative to this the denotation relation 
for the terms of Lw is recursively defined. (4) Relative to this, the notion 
of truth for formulas is defined. (5) In the eustomary Tarski fashion, the 
notion of logical validity for formulas of Lw is defined in terms of the notion 
oftruth. 
Omitting eertain details for heuristic purposes, we may characterise an 
algebraic model structure as a strueture eontaining (i) a domain V eom-
prised of (items playing the role of) individuals, propositions, properties, 
and relations, (ii) a set K of functions that tell us the actual and possible 
extensions ofthe items in V, and (iii) various fundamentallogical operations 
on the items in D. (All items in D are treated on a par as primitive entities; 
none is constructed from the others by means of set-theoretical operations.) 
Onee the general not ion of an algebraie model strueture is precisely defined, 
we may then go on to define a speetrum of different types of algebraic model 
strueture; these types are distinguished one from another by the strictness 
of the identity eonditions imposed on the PRPs in the domain of the various 
model structures. It is in this way that the algebraic method is able to pro-
vide a general technique for modelling any type of PRP, from coarse-grained 
to very fine-grained. 
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Our algebraic method also allows us to model transcendental and self-
embeddable PRPs. To see what makes this possible let us consider the 
differences between algebraic model structures, on the one hand, and the 
usual possible-worlds model structures on the other. Algebraic model struc-
tures contain (i) a domain consisting of individuals, properties, relations, 
and propositions, (ii) a set of functions that tell us the actual and possible 
extensions of items in the domain, and (iii) various fundamentallogical oper-
ations on the items in the domain. In a possible-worlds model structure, on 
the other hand, (i) is typically replaced by a domain consisting of actual in-
dividuals and 'nonactual individuals'; then PRP-surrogates are constructed 
from these items by means of set-theoretical operations; and (ii) and (iii) 
are omitted. The reason that (ii) can be omitted in a possible-worlds model 
structure is that each PRP-surrogate is a set that, in effect, encodes its 
own actual and possible extensions. The reason (iii) can be omitted is that 
the sets that play the role of 'complex' PRPs are formed from other PRP-
surrogates by wholly standard set-theoretical operations (like intersection, 
complementation, etc.), so there is no need to build these operations into the 
model structure itself. But notice that, if the set-theoretical construction 
of these PRP-surrogates is done in a standard non-well-founded set theory, 
these PRP-surrogates must form an hierarchy of well-founded sets; conse-
quently, there are no sets in the construction that can serve as surrogates 
for transcendental or self-embeddable properties and relations. 
In an algebraic model structure, by contrast, there can be such PRPs. 
The reason there can be transcendental properties and relations is that 
properties and relations are included in the domain as primitive entities that 
do not encode their own extensions; their extensions are instead specified 
by independent extension functions. Consequently, these functions can map 
items in the domain to any subset of the domain, even subsets that happen 
to contain the original items. For example, let s be (the element in the 
domain V that plays the role of) the transcendental property self-identity. 
Then each extension function H just maps s to the domain itself; that 
is, H (s) = {x E V : x = x} = V. After all , everything in the domain, 
including s, is self-identical. No ill-founded set theory is involved here: s 
is just a primitive entity in V on a par with an individual, and H is just a 
standard well-founded function that maps s to a set that contains s. 
The reason that algebraic model structures can model self-embedded 
PRPs is that the (items in the domain that play the role of) PRPs are 
not set-theoretical constructs but rather are primitive entities. So if a given 
PRP is self-embedded, this will be exhibited exclusively through its be-
haviour with respect to the fundamental logical operations, in particular, 
the predication operations. Consider, for example the proposition [F[Fx]x]. 
This proposition is the result of applying the 2-place logical operation of 
singular predication to the property [Fx]x taken as both first and second 
argument. That is, [F[Fx]x] = Predo ([Fx]x, [Fx]x). No ill-founded set 
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theory is involved here; on the contrary, this pattern is fu11y analogous to 
an application of a standard (set-theoretica11y we11-founded) substitution 
operation from formal syntax:'F('Fx')' = sub('Fx','Fx').57 
Having made these heuristic points, we are ready to state the semantics 
for Lw. We begin by defining the general not ion of an algebraic model struc-
ture. An algebraic model structure is any structure (V, P, K, g, Id, T, Conj, 
Neg, Exist, Predo, Pred1 , Pred2 , ... , Predk, .. ') whose elements satisfy the 
fo11owing conditions. V is a nonempty domain. P is aprelinear ordering on 
V that induces a partition ofV into the subdomains V-I, Vo, VI, V 2 , V 3 , .... 
The elements of V-I are to be thought of as particulars; the elements of 
Vo as propositions; the elements of VI as properties, and the elements of 
Vi, for i ~ 2, as i-ary relations-in-intension. Although Vi, i ~ 0, must not 
be empty, we do permit V-I to be empty. K is a set of functions on V. 
For a11 H E K, if x E D_1 , then H(x) = x; if x E V o, then H(x) = T or 
H(x) = F; if x E VI, then H(x) ~ V; if, for i > 1, x E Vi, then H(x) ~ Vi. 
These functions H E Kare to be thought of as telling us the alternate or 
possible extensions of the elements of V. 9 is a distinguished element of K 
and is to be thought of as the function that determines the actual extensions 
of the elements of D. Id is a distinguished element of D2 and is thought 
of as the fundamentallogical relation-in-intension identity. Id must satisfy 
the following condition: (V H E K) (H (I d) = {xy E V : x = y}). In order 
to eharacterise the next element T, consider the following partial functions 
on V: EXPi, defined on Vi, i ~ 0; Refi , defined on Vi, i ~ 2; Convi, de-
fined on D i , i ~ 2; Invi, defined on Vi, i ~ 3.58 For all H E K and all 
Xl, ... , XHI E V, these functions satisfy the following conditions: 
a. Xl E H(Expi(U» iff H(u) = T (for u E V o). 
(Xl,"" Xi, XHr) E H(Expi(u» iff (Xl, ... , Xi) E H(u) 
b. (XI, ... ,Xi-2,Xi-l) E H(Refi(u» iff 
(Xl, ... ,Xi-2,Xi-I,Xi-l) E H(u) 
(for u E Di,i ~ 1). 
(for u E Di,i ~ 2). 
57The self-embedded propositions 81 and 82 involving the two soldiers we diseussed at 
the dose of Section 11 are dealt with as folIows: 
81 = Predo (Predo (pereeiving, 82), y) 
82 = Predo(Predo(pereeiving,8J),x). 
Onee again, no ill-founded sets are involved; indeed, this pattern is comparable to: 
2 = (0 + 3) + -1 
3 = (0 + 2) + 1 
where + corresponds to Predo; 2 to 81; 0 to perceiving; 3 to 82; -1 to y; 1 to x. 
58 These functions-along with Conj, Neg, and Exist-are closely related to the oper-
ations Quine introduees in [Quine, 1966]. See also [Quine, 1981]. 
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c. (Xi,XI, ... ,Xi-l) E H(COnvi(U)) iff 
(Xl, ... ,Xi-l,Xi) E H(u) 
d. (Xl, ... ,Xi-2,Xi,Xi-l) EH(Invi(u)) iff 
(Xl, ... ,Xi-2,Xi-l,Xi) EH(u) 
225 
(for u E Vi,i ~ 2). 
(for u E Vi,i ~ 3). 
A proto-transformation is defined to be a function that arises from compos-
ing a finite number ofthese functions in some order (repetitions permitted). 
A proto-transformation T is said to be degenerate if and only if T(X) = x 
for all x E V for which T is defined. A function T is said to be equivalent to 
a proto-transformation T' if and only if, for all H E K and for all x E V for 
which T' is defined, H(T(X)) = H(T' (x). Now 7 is a set of partial functions 
on V: for every nondegenerate proto-transformation, there is exactly one 
equivalent function in 7, and nothing but such functions are in 7. The func-
tions in 7 are called transformations. The remaining elements in a model 
structure are partial functions on V. Conj is defined on each Vi X Vi, i ~ 0; 
Neg, on each Vi, i ~ 0; Exist, on each Vi, i ~ 1; Predo, on each Vi X Vi ~ 1; 
Predk, on each Vi X Vj, i ~ 1 and j ~ k ~ 1. These functions satisfy the 
following, for all H E K and all Xl, ... , Xi, Yl , ... , Yk E V: 
1. H(Conj(u, v)) = T iff (H(u) = T & H(v) = T) (for u, v E '00 ). 
(Xl, ... ,Xi) E H(Conj(u,v)) iff(Xl, ... ,Xi) E H(u)& 
(Xl, ... , Xi) E H(v)) (for u, v E Vi, i ~ 1). 
2. H(Neg(u)) = T iff H(u) = F (for u E '00 ). 
(Xl, ... ,Xi) E H(Neg(u)) iff(Xl, ... ,Xi) f/- H(u) (for u E Vi,i ~ 1). 
3. H(Exist(u)) = T iff (3xd(Xl E H(u)) (for u E VI). 
(Xl, ... ' Xi-I) E H(Exist(u)) iff 
4.0 H(Predo(u, Yd) = T iff Yl E H(u) 
(Xl, ... Xi-l) E H(Predo(u,Yd) iff 
(Xl, ... ,Xi-l,Yl) E H(u) 
4.1 (Xl, ... ,Xi-l,Yl) E H(Predl(u,v)) iff 
(Xl, ... , Xi-I, Predo(v, Yd) E H(u) 
(for u E Vi,i ~ 2). 
(for u E Vd. 
(for u E Vi,i ~ 2). 
(for u E Vi,i ~ 1, and v E Vj,j ~ 1). 
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4.2 (XI, ... , Xi-I, Yl, Y2) E H(Pred2 (u, v)) iff 
(Xl, ... , Xi-I' Predo(Predo(v, Y2), Yd) E H(u) 
(for u E Vi,i ~ 1, and v E Dj,j ~ 2). 
59 
These functions, together with the transformations in T, are to be thought 
of as fundamentallogical operations on intensional entities. This completes 
the characterisation of what a model structure iso 
Now in the history of logic and philosophy there have been two com-
peting conceptions of intensional entities, which we call conception 1 and 
conception 2. Conception 1 is suited to the logic for modal matters (ne-
cessity, possibility, etc.), and conception 2 appears to be relevant to the 
logic for psychological matters (belief, desire, decision, etc.)Yo Accord-
59In general, 
(XI,oo.,Xi_I,YI,oo.,Yk) E H(Predk(U,V)) iff 
(XI,.oo,Xi-l, Predo( ... Predo(Predo(v,Yk),Yk-J),oo.,yJ) E H(u) 
where u E Vi, i ~ 1 and v E Vj,j ~ k ~ 1. The following examples help to explain the 
predication functions Predo, Predl, Pred2, Pred3,"': 
Predo([Fxyz]",yz, [Guvw]uvw) = [Fxy[Guvw]uvw]",y, 
Predo([Fx]",,[Guvw]uvw) = [F[Guvw]uvw], 
Predl([Fx]",,[Guvw].uvw) = [F[Guvw]::'v]w, 
Pred2([Fx]"" [Guvw]uvw) = [F[Guvw]~W]vw, 
Pred3([F:r]x, [Gu'Uw]uvw) = [F[Guvw]uvw].uvw, 
Predk([Fx:]x, [A]VIVm Ul"'''k) = [F[A]~{::::!]Ul",Uk' 
(Note that we have just used, not mentioned intensional abstracts from Lw.) For furt her 
clarification of the predication functions Predo, ... , see the definition of the associated 
syntactic operations given on page 228-228. 
600n conception 1, PRPs are thought of as the actual qualities, connections, and 
conditions of things; on conception 2, PRPs are thought of as concepts and thoughts. 
(See §2 in [BealeI', 1979] and §§4o-41 in Quality and Concept for discussion of these 
distinctions.) Conception 1 and conception 2 correspond very closely to what Alonzo 
Church calls, respectively, Alternative 2 and Alternative 0 ([Church, 1951, pp. 4ff.] 
and [Church, 1973 & 1974, pp. 143ff.l). Church states that he " ... attaches greater 
importance to Alternative 0 because it would seem that it is in this direction tImt a 
satisfactory analysis is to be sought of statements regarding assertion and belief" [Church, 
1951, P. 7n.]. A fuller defence of his approach to the logic for psychological matters is 
given in [Church, 1951], where he develops the criterion of strict synonymy upon which 
he bases Alternative O. The importance of conception 2 is discussed at length in Quality 
and Concept, §§2, 4, 6-tl, 18-20,39. 
For the present purposes, we advocate developing both conception land conception 2 
side by side without attaching greater importance to one over the other. An advantage of 
such a dual approach is that, once those two conceptions are weil developed, it is relatively 
straightforward to adapt our methods to handle intermediate conceptions in the event 
that they should prove relevant. Consider two examples. First, according to the construc-
tion of conception 2 presented in the text, the proposition Predo(Predo([LxY]",y,a), b) is 
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ing to conception 1, (i-ary) intensions are taken to be identical if they 
are necessarily equivalent. This leads to the following definition. A 
model structure is type 1 iffdf it satisfies the following auxiliary condition: 
(Vx,y E Di)((VH E K)(H(x) = H(y)) -+ x = y), for all i 2': -1. This 
auxiliary condition provides a precise characterisation of conception 1. In 
contrast to conception 1, conception 2 places far stricter conditions on the 
identity of intensional entities. According to conception 2, when an inten-
sion is defined completely, it has a unique, noncircular definition. (The 
possibility that such complete definitions might in some or even all cases 
be infinite need not be mIed out.) This leads to the following definition. A 
model structure is type 2 iffdf the transformations in T and the functions 
Conj, Neg, Exist, Predo, Pred1 , Pred2 , ... are all (i) one-one, (ii) disjoint in 
their ranges, and (iii) noncycling. Auxiliary conditions (i)-(iii) provide us 
with a precise formulation of conception 2.61 
In order to state the semantics for Lw, we must define some preliminary 
syntactic notions. First, we define certain syntactic operations on complex 
terms of Lw. These operations have a natural correspondence to the logical 
operations Conj, Neg, Exist, Predo, ... in a model stmcture. If [(A&B)]a: 
is normalised, it is the conjunction of [A]a: and [B]a:. If [--,A]a: is normalised, 
treated as distinct from the proposition Predo(Predo([Lxy]y""b),a). If this distinction 
seems artificial, then along the lines of p. 54, Quality and Concept, one can relax the 
identity conditions on PRPs within a type 2 model structure so that these two propo-
sitions are treated as identical. Second, there are instances of the paradox of analysis 
involving analyses of the logical operations themselves. (E.g., despite the usual definition 
of conditionalisation in terms of negation and conjunction, someone might doubt that 
(A --t B) == o(A & oB) and yet not doubt that (A --t B) == (A --t B).) Such puzzles can 
be easily resolved along the lines of Chapter 3 in Quality and Concept once one enriches 
model structures with appropriate additional logical operations (including a primitive 
operation for conditionalisation): e.g., far each nondegenerate finite composition of the 
present logical operations, one might add a primitive operation that is equivalent to it in 
H-values. The broader philosophical point is that, ifthere is artificiality in the construc-
tion given in the text, it appears not to be inherent in the general algebraic approach; 
evidently it can be removed by so me combination of the above methods. It does not 
follow, of course, that these methods can be used to rid other approaches to intensional 
logic of their forms of artificiality. 
61Taken together, (i) and (ii) guarantee that the action of the inverses of the T-
transformations and Conj, Neg, ... in a type 2 model structure is to decompose each 
element of D into a unique (possibly infinite) complete tree. (A decomposition tree is 
complete if it contains no terminal node that could be decomposed further under the 
inverses of the T-transformations and Conj, Neg, ... ). Notice that without condition 
(iii) unwanted identities such as [Fx]" = [A & Fxl", could arise. For, as far as conditions 
(i) and (ii) are concerned, the property [Fx]" can have a unique complete decomposition 
tree in which [Fxl", occurs (denumerably many successive times) on a path descending 
from [Fx]". Condition (iii) rules out such a tree. 
Examples of type 1 and 2 model structures are easily constructed. E.g., a type 1 model 
structure can be constructed relative to a model for first-order logic with identity and 
extensional abstraction, and a type 2 model structure can be constructed relative to a 
model for first-order logic with identity, extensional abstraction, and Quine's device of 
corner quotation. 
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it is the negation of [A]O!. If [(3Vk)A]0! is normalised, it is the existential 
generalisation of [A]O!Vk. Suppose that [F!(VI, ... ,Vm-I, tm, tm+I, ... , tj)]O! 
is normalised and that no variable oeeurring free in t m oeeurs in et. Then 
this normalised term is the predicationo of 
[F! (VI, ... ,Vm-I, Vm, tm+! , ... ,tj )]O!V= 
of tm. (Vm is the alphabetically earliest variable not oeeurring in the nor-
malised term.) Finally, suppose that, for k ~ 1, 
. J [FI (VI, ... ,Vm-I, [B]'Y' tm+! , ... ,tj )]Vl ... V=-l Ul ... UkO! 
is normalised, that UI, ... ,Uk oeeur in 15, and that no variable in 15 oeeurs 
in et. Then 
is the predicationk of 
of [B]~Ul'" Um· (15' is the result of deleting UI, ... ,Um from (\.) 
Consider the following auxiliary operations on eomplex terms: 
(where i ~ 0 and Vi+1 is the alphabetically earliest variable not oeeurring 
in [A]Vl ... Vi). 
(b) refi([A( VI, ... ,Vi-I, Vi )]v, ... Vi-l Vi) =df 
[A(VI' ... ' Vi-I, Vi-I)]Vl ... Vi_l 
(where i ~ 2 and Vi-I is free for Vi in A). 
(e) eonvi([A]Vl ... Vi_lvJ =df [A]ViVl ... Vi_l 
(where i ~ 2). 
(d) invi([A]Vl ... Vi-2Vi-l vJ =df [A]Vl ... Vi_2ViVi_l 
(where i ~ 3). 
Consider the operations a that arise from eomposing a finite number of 
these operations in some order (repetitions permitted). A relation Ru is a 
term-transforming relation if it is associated with one of these operations 
a as follows: Ru (r, s) iff a(r') = s', where r' is an alphabetie variant of 
r, s' is an alphabetic variant of s, r is either an elementary eomplex term, 
a negation, a eonjunetion, any existential generalisation, or a predieationk, 
k ~ 0, and s is none of these. Now for any model strueture, a term-
transforming relation Ru is associated with a transformation T in the set 
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T in the model structure iffdf (a) for some al, ... , am seleeted from eXPi, 
refi, eonVi, infi , a is the eomposition of al, ... , ami (b) for some Tl, ... , Tm 
selected from EXPi, Refi , eOnVi, Invi, T is the transformation in T equivalent 
to the eomposition of Tl, ... ,Tm; (e) for all k,l ::; k ::; m,ak = eXPi Hf 
Tk = EXPi; ak = refi Hf Tk = Refi; ak = Convi Hf Tk = Convi; ak invi 
Hf Tk = Inv i. With these preliminary notions in hand we are finally ready 
to state the semantics for Lw. 
Denotation, truth and validity. An interpretation I for Lw relative to 
model structure M is a function that assigns to the predicate letter Fr (i.e., 
=) the element Id E M and, for each predicate letter F! in Lw, assigns to 
F! some element of the subdomain V j CD E M. An assignment A for Lw 
relative to model structure M is a function that maps the variables of Lw 
into the domain DEM. Relative to interpretation I, assignment A, and 
model strueture M, the denotation relation for terms of Lw is induetively 
defined as follows: 
Variables. Vi denotes A( Vi). 
Elementary complex terms. [F! (VI, ... , Vj )]Vl ... Vj denotes I(F!). 
N onelementary complex terms. If t is the eonjunetion-or predicationk-
of rand s, and r denotes u, and s denotes V, then t denotes Conj(u, v)-or 
Predk (u, v). If t is the negation-or existential generalisation-of r, and r 
denotes u, then t denotes Neg(u)---or Exist(u). If Ru is a term-transforming 
relation associated with a transformation T E T and Ru(r, t) and r denotes 
u, then t denotes T(U). 
The denotation relation is clearly a funetion. We heneeforth represent 
it with Diam . Truth is then defined in terms of D iam as follows: Tiam(A) 
iffdf Q(Diam([A])) = T.62 And finally two notions of validity are defined. A 
formula A is validl iffdf for every type 1 model structure M and for every 
interpretation I and every assignment A relative to M, Tiam(A). A formula 
A is valifl.;. iffdf for every type 2 model strueture M and for every interpre-
tation I and every assignment A relative to M, Tiam(A). This eompletes 
the semantics for Lw. 
3 AXIOMATIC THEORY 
The logic for P RPs on conception 1. On eoneeption 1 intensional entities 
are identical if and only if neeessarily equivalent. Thus, on eoneeption 1 
the following abbreviation eaptures the properties usually attributed to the 
modal operator D : DA iffdf[A] = [[A] = [All. (That is, necessarily A iffthe 
proposition that A is identical to any trivial necessary truth.) The modal 
operator 0 is then defined in terms of D in the usual way: OA iffdf-,o-,A.63 
62Meaning mayaiso be defined: Miam(A) =df Diam([A]). 
63These notational conventions are adopted for convenience only. We are not reversing 
Our earlier position on the correct parsing of natural language sentences such as rIt is 
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The logic Tl for Lw on conception I consists of the axiom schemas and 
rules for the modal logic S5 with quantifiers and identity and three addi-
tional axiom schemas far intensional abstracts. 
Axiom schemas and rules of Tl. 
Al. Truth functional tautologies. 
(where t is free far Vi in A). 
(where Vi is not free in A). 
A5. Vi = Vj ~ (A(Vi, Vi) == A(Vi,Vj)) (where A(Vi,Vj) is a formula that 
arises from A(Vi, Vi) by replacing some (but not necessarily all) free 
occurrences of Vi by Vj and Vj is free for the occurrences of Vi that it 
replaces). 
(where p f:- q). 
A 7. [A( Ul, ... ,Up)]Ul ... Up = [A( VI, • •• ,Vp )]Vl ... v q 
alphabetic variants). 
A8. [A]a = [B]a == D(A ==a B). 
Ag. DA ~ A. 
AlO. D(A ~ B) ~ (DA ~ OB). 
All. OA ~ DOA. 
Rl. If f- A and f- A ~ B, then f- B. 
R2. If f- A, then f- (Vvi)A. 
R3. If f- A, then f- DA. 
(where these terms are 
THEOREM. (Soundness and Completeness). For alt formulas A in Lw,A 
is validl if and only if A is a theorem of Tl (i.e., FI A iff f-Tl A).64 
The logic for P RPs on conception 2. On conception 2 each definable in-
tensional entity is such that, when it is defined completely, it has a unique, 
noncircular definition. The logic T2 far Lw on conception 2 consists of (a) 
necessary that A'. We would represent this sentence as 'NI [A]'. The I-place predicate 
'1'1' may on conception I be defined as folIows: NIX iffdfX = [x = x]. 
64Proofs of this and the succeeding theorems are given in [Bealer, 1983]. A corollary 
of the present theorem is that first-order logic with identity and extensional abstraction 
(i.e., dass abstraction) is complete. Notice also that, in view of the definitions of 0 and 
<> in terms of identity and intensional abstraction, modal logic may be thought of as part 
of the identity theory far intensional abstracts. 
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axioms AI-A7 and rules RI-R2 from Tl, (b) five additional axiom schemas 
for intensional abstracts, and (c) one additional rule. In stating the addi-
tional principles, we will write t(Fi) to indicate that t is a complex term of 
Lw in which the primitive predicate F3 occurs. Additional axiom schemas 
and rules for T2. 
A8. [AJa = [BJa :J (A == B). 
Ag. t f::- r (where t and rare nonelementary complex terms of 
different syntactic kinds). 65 
AlO. t = r == t' = r' (where R(t',t) and R(r',r) for some term-
transforming relation R, or t is the negation of t' and r is the 
negation of r', or t is the existential generalisation of t' and r is 
the existential generalisation of r'). 
All. t = r == (t' = r' & t" = r") (where t is the conjunction of t' and 
tU and r is the conjunction of r' and r" or t is the predicationk 
of t' of t" and r is the predicationk of r' of r" for some k 2: 0). 
A12. t(F!) = r(Fln :J q(F!) f::- s(Fln (where t an s are elementary 
and rand q are not). 
R3. Let Fr be a nonlogical predicate that does not occur in A(Vi); let 
t(Ff) be an elementary complex term, and let t' be any complex 
term of degree p that is free for Vi in A(Vi). If f- A(t), then 
f- A(t').66 
THEOREM. (Soundness and Completeness). For all formulas A in Lw, A 
is valirh if and only if Ais a theorem ofT2 (i.e., F2 A ifjf-T2 A). 
The logic for PRPs and necessary equivalence on conception 2. Let the 2-
place logical predicate :::::; N be adjoined to Lw. :::::; N is intended to express 
the logical relation of necessary equivalence. A type 2' model structure is 
defined to be just like a type 2 model structure except that it contains an 
65That is, t and r are not in the range of the same term-transforming relation, nar 
are they in the range of the same syntactic operation-conjunction, negation, existential 
generalisation, predicationo, predicationl, .... 
66 A8 affirms the equivalence of identical intensional entities. Schemas A9-All capture 
the principle that a complete definition of an intensional entity is unique. And schema 
A12 captures the principle that adefinition of an intensional entity must be noncircular. 
The following two instances of A12 should help to illustrate how it works: 
[Fxy]"y = [Gxy]yx --t [Fxy]yx i- [Gxy]xy 
[Fx]" = [,Gx]" --t [,Fx]", i- [Gx]". 
Finally, R3 says roughly that, if A(t) is valid2 for any arbitrary elementary p-ary term 
t, then A(t') is valid2 far any p-ary term t'. 
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additional constituent EqN which is a distinguished element of '02 satisfying 
the following condition: 
{xy: (3i ~ -l)(x,y E 'Oi ) & 
('t/H' E K)(H'(x) = H'(y))}). 
Thus, EqN is to be thought of as the distinguished logical relation-in-
intension necessary equivalence. Now an interpretation I relative to a type 
2' model structure is just like an interpretation relative to a type I or type 
2 model structure except that we require I(~N) = E~. Then type 2' 
denotation, truth, and validity are defined mutatis mutandis as before. The 
following abbreviations are introduced for notational convenience; 
DA iffdf [A] ~N [[A] ~N [All 
OA iffdf -ü,A. 
The intensional logic T2' consists of the axioms and rules for T2 plus the 
following additional axioms and rules for ~N: 
A13. X~NX. 
A14. x ~N Y :J Y ~N x. 
A15. x ~ N Y :J (y ~ N Z :J x ~ N z). 
A16. X ~N y:J Dx ~N y. 
A17. D(A =a B) = [A]a ~N [B]a. 
AlB. DA:J A. 
A19. D(A :J B) :J (DA :J OB). 
A20. OA:J DOA. 
R4. If r A, then r DA. 
Notice that these axioms and rules for ~ N are just analogues of the special 
Tl axioms and rules for =. Finally, the soundness and completeness of T2' 
can be shown by applying the methods of proof used for Tl and T2. 
4 THE COMPLETENESS OF FIRST-ORDER IKTEKSIONAL LOGIC 
We have indicated that first-order logic with identity and intensional ab-
straction is complete relative to certain technical notions of validity that are 
defined by means of intensional algebraic semanties. Consider the philosoph-
ical thesis that these technical notions of validity are in fact the standard 
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notions of validity (or at least that they resemble the standard notions in 
all respects relevant to genuine completeness results). From the technical 
result and the philosophical thesis it follows that first-order intensionallogic 
is genuinely complete. This argument is parallel to that used to show that 
elementary first-order logic with identity is genuinely complete: the logic 
is proved complete relative to a certain defined notion of validity, and this 
technical result is then combined with the philosophical thesis that this de-
fined notion is the same as (or resembles in philosophically relevant respects) 
the standard notion. In the case of elementary first-order logic with iden-
tity, the philosophical thesis has been subjected to much critical scrutiny, 
and something like a consensus has emerged in support of it. In the case 
of first-order intensional logic, the philosophical thesis strikes many people 
as highly intuitive. Nevertheless, some commentators (for example, Nino 
Cocchiarella [1985] and I. G. McFetridge [1984]) have expressed doubts. 
According to such doubts, the technical completeness result might be a 
mere artifact of a mistakenly narrow definition of validity that results from 
using an overly liberal definition of a model (in much the same way that 
Henkin's quasi-completeness result for higher-order extensional logic is a 
consequence of the liberal notion of a general model). Specifically, if certain 
plausible auxiliary dosure conditions were imposed on the models, perhaps 
completeness would no longer follow; indeed, perhaps incompleteness could 
be derived. So go the doubts. However, these doubts are unfounded as we 
will now explain. 
Consider two plausible dosure conditions on models (described by Coc-
chiarella [1985] and McFetridge [1984], respectively). First, the set K of 
alternate extension functions must always be maximal, that is, it should 
not be possible to add further extension functions H to K without contra-
dicting one of the original conditions in the definition of model. Second, for 
every subset 8 of 1) and every extension function H in K, there must be 
an item x in the subdomain 1)1 of properties such that H(x) = 8. (Notice 
that, if a model satisfies this dosure condition, 1) must be a proper dass. 
For the dosure condition implies that there are as many properties in 1) 
as there are subsets of V. So, if 1) were a set, the dosure condition would 
contradict Cantor's power-set theorem.) 
THEOREM. First-order intensional logic is complete even if the strong clo-
sure conditions are imposed on models. 
In broad outline the proof goes as follows. We follow the Henkin-style proof 
given in Quality and Concept except that a proper dass of individual con-
stants are adjoined to the language, and for all distinct individual constants 
c and d, the sentence c "# d is adjoined to the theory. In the Henkin model 
that results, these individual constants will comprise the subdomain of in-
dividuals. To obtain a model meeting the second dosure condition, we 
massage this model in appropriate ways. First, partition this subdomain 
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into denumerably many proper classes d_1 , do, d,d2 , • ••• The first of these 
proper classes d_ 1 will be the subdomain of individuals in our new model. 
Then the ith proper class (i 2:: 0) will be adjoined to the old subdomain Vi 
to form the new subdomain of i-ary intensions, and the functions H E K and 
the fundamentallogical operations will be adjusted accordingly. When done 
properly, the result is a model of the theory that meets the second closure 
condition. What makes this construction possible is the fact that our models 
have a single, unified domain V in which individuals, propositions, prop-
erties, and relations are take as primitive entities. Finally, concerning the 
first closure condition, it is straightforward to show that every K-maximal 
extension of the new model is also a model of the theory. The key to the 
proof is the fact that, for any algebraic intensional model, the values of all 
identity and necessity sentences must be the same in any K-extension of a 
model as they are in the model itself. 
This provides strong evidence that doubts about the genuine complete-
ness of first-order intensional logics are unfounded and that the two-stage 
methodology (according to which intensional logic is treated prior to treat-
ing the logic for the predication relation) is vindicated. 
Incidentally, Cocchiarella [1985] claims that incompleteness can be proven 
when the first closure condition is imposed. He begins with the premise 
that every first-order necessity sentence' N[A(F1 , ••• ,Fn)]'-where 'A' 
is a standard first-order extensional sentence and 'F1 " ••• , 'Fn ' are the 
predicates occurring in ' A '-is true in a model if and only if the second-
order sentence '(VF1 •.. Fn)A' is true in the model. Then he claims that 
this implicit second-order element in first-order intensionallogic is enough to 
prove incompleteness. But his premise rests on a straightforward error. To 
see why, choose any model in which interpretation I assigns the property of 
being self-identical to the primitive predicate 'F'. That is I('F') = [x = x]",. 
On this interpretation, the intensional abstract '[(:3x)Fx]' would denote 
[(:3x)x = x], i.e., the necessary proposition that something is self-identical. 
So on this interpretation the first-order intensional sentence 'N[(3x)Fx)' is 
true. However, according to Cocchiarella's premise, this sentence is true on 
an interpretation if and only if the second-order sentence '(VF)(:3x)Fx' is 
true on the interpretation. But this second-order sentence is false, indeed, 
it is logically false. So Cocchiarella's premise does not hold, and his alleged 
incompleteness proof fails. 
The source of Cocchiarella's error is something like this. In PRP se-
mantics, propositions are the primary bearers of necessity; the me re fact 
that a syntactically simple sentence like '(:3x)Fx' is not true by virtue of 
its syntactic form tells us nothing about whether the proposition expressed 
by the sentence (i.e., the proposition that (:3x)Fx) is necessary and, in 
turn, whether the sentence 'N[(:3x)Fxl' is true or false in a given model. 
Cocchiarella's error seems to arise from a kind of generalised use/mention 
confusion, that the syntactic form of a linguistic expression of a proposition 
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and the modal status of the proposition should match up. But this only 
happens in special caseSj it does not typically happen. 
By the way, incompleteness of first-order intensionallogic would follow 
if one adopted the following premise (which is adapted from an argument 
that Cocchiarella gives elsewhere about completeness results in first-order 
modal logic): for any first-order extensional sentence r AI, the first-order 
intensional sentence r N[A]' is true in a model if and only if rA I is a log-
ically valid first-order extensional sentence, Le., a theorem of first-order 
extensionallogic. From this premise it follows that, for every such sentence 
r AI, the intensional sentence r .N[A]' is valid if and only if r AI is not a 
logically valid first-order extensional sentence. But the sentences rA I that 
are not logically valid first-order extensional sentences are not recursively 
enumerable, so the valid intensional sentences r .N[A] I are not recursively 
enumerable. Consequently, first-order intensionallogic is incomplete. How-
ever, the premise would be based on an error. To see this, let r AI be the 
invalid first-order extensional sentence '(3x)Fx', and consider any model 
like that discussed a moment ago, wherein interpretation I assigns to 'F' 
the property of being self-identical, Le., [x = x]",. In such a model the 
intensional abstract '[(3x)Fxl' denotes [(3x)x = x], Le., the necessarily 
true proposition that something is self-identical. Therefore, in this model 
the first-order intensional sentence 'N[(3x)Fxl' would be true. However, 
according to the premise, this sentence should be false because the first-
order extensional sentence '(3x)Fx' is not a logically valid sentence. So the 
premise does not hold, and thus the alleged incompleteness proof fails. Like 
the earlier erroneous premise, this erroneous premise seems to be based on a 
kind of generalised usefmention confusion, that the syntactic form of a lin-
guistic expression of a proposition and the modal status of the proposition 
should always match up. And of course this is not so. 
III: The Propositional-Function Thesis, 
Type-Free Predication Theories, 
and N onextensionality 
In this final part we will take up a few sophisticated issues in property 
theory, specifically, the propositional-function thesis, type-free theories of 
the predication relation, and the proof of nonextensionality within such 
theories. 
We have been defending the thesis that properties, relations, and propo-
sitions are required by our best comprehensive theory of the world. Part of 
the defense of the thesis consisted in the rejection of reductionist approaches 
which would have us believe that intensional entities can somehow be con-
structed from other primitive material. In compliance with this position we 
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took PRPs at face value as irreducible entities and showed how they could 
be modelled within the framework of certain intensional algebras. 
Formalisations of PRP theory within this framework run into some tech-
nical complexities in connection with the treatment offree and bound terms 
occurring in intensional abstracts. Many of these complexities seem initially 
to be avoidable by adopting the thesis that properties and propositional 
functions are structurally indiscernible. We do not mean by this that prop-
erties are reducible after all to a different realm of entities. It would be a 
grave mistake to construe the thesis of the structural indiscernibility as a 
strong identity thesis. Properties and propositional functions are not the 
same. But according to the thesis of struetural indiseernibility, proposi-
tional functions can serve as an external model that displays the structural 
conditions that are imposed by the characteristic axioms of T2. 
One aim of this section is to sketch a model for the consistent implemen-
tation of the structural propositional function thesis. The model we give in 
outline is a structural version of one variant of a predieation theory of prop-
erties. Actually it constitutes an extension of Aczel's Frege Structures.67 
We thus depart from the poliey we have adhered to in the main bulk of the 
paper, namely, to concentrate on problems that arise within the framework 
of theories of intensional abstracts. The simple reason for this departure 
is that we do not know how to eonstruct a fine-grained functional model 
without relying on the expressive power provided by (some analogue of) the 
predieation relation. 
Given the many competing versions of predieation theories of properties, 
we thought it appropriate not to present a formal syntax and an axiom sys-
tem. We have even left open the quest ion whether the model we indicate 
should be constructed using a elassical or an intuitionistie metalanguage. 
That both approaches are possible is shown by Flagg and Myhill [1987a] 
and by Ae;r,el [1980], respectively. With the addition of the relevant stipu-
lations our proposal could thus be made consistent with Feferman's [1984] 
observation that the arguments used to derive the paradoxes are already 
valid constructively. 
67The idea was presented in a talk by the second author at Augsburg (February 1987). 
In the meantime E. Klein informed us that a similar construction is carried through in 
the Edinburgh dissertation by F. D. Kamareddine. Scott's treatment of dass abstract ion 
using lambda-abstractioll [Scott, 1975] must be mentioned as weil. In the inductive 
truth definition of that paper he represents a E b as a defined formula and identifies 
it with b(a). He comrnents on his choice of the particular representation and the loss 
of fine-grainedness caused by it: " ... as long as we do not use the lambda-notation, 
the representation of forrnulas by elements is unique, because the whole system is based 
on tupies. (If we wanted full uniqueness, we could make the E-combination a primitive 
... and save the b(a)-part for the truth definition)" [Scott, 1975, p. 7]. It is exactly this 
strategy that we will use below. We will introduce a primitive operator Pred. This allows 
us to abide by the requirernents on the internal structure of propositions that characterise 
propositional-attitude contexts. 
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To give the reader an idea of the reduction of complexity that can initially 
be achieved by working with a functional structure, let us briefly consider 
an illustrative example. The property of being believed by John to be a spy 
would be denoted by the following term of the formal language introduced 
above: 
The corresponding polynomial of the intensional algebra is as follows: 
In a suitable functional setting, by contrast, B 2 and 8 1 would stand for a 
binary and a unary propositional function, respectively. If the functional 
setting satisfies a dosure condition to the effect that every expression con-
structed in the expected way from variables, constants, and propositional 
functions stands for a propositional function, we are assured that the follow-
ing is a complex propositional function: B 2 (j, 8 1 (x)). This function sends 
an object b into that proposition that is the value of the binary function B 2 
on the pair of arguments whose first component is the individual John and 
whose second component is the proposition that the function 8 1 connects 
with the object b. The last step of the interpretation procedure within a 
functional framework would depend on the availability of a functional that 
maps every unary propositional function into a corresponding object. In a 
Frege Structure, lambda is a map that establishes the required association. 
Scott aptly summarises the general idea behind the functional approach 
" ... a formula with a free variable is a mapping from constants to the cor-
responding substitution instance. In this way we eliminate all fuss with 
variables in the formalisation-the use of lambda does all the work behind 
the scenes" . 68 
As we have noted in Part I, the iterative conception of set is ultimately 
analysed in terms of membership. This conception, which was introduced 
by Cantor and formalised by Zermelo, has to be distinguished from the 
Fregean logical notion of a dass that is ultimately to be analysed in terms of 
predication. This logical notion of dass is usually thought to be incoherent 
because ofthe derivability ofRussell's paradox within a system that contains 
an unrestricted comprehension principle. The logical notion of dass can be 
explicated somewhat more precisely as follows. To any formula r A(x)' that 
has 'x' as its only free variable there corresponds a dass {xIA(x)} such that 
for any object b the proposition that b E {xIA(x)} and the proposition that 
A(b) are equivalent.69 Ifwe assume r A(x)' to be the Russell formula 'x f/. x' 
68Scott [1975, p. 8]. Lest the reader accuse us of confusing use and rnention we should 
perhaps observe that the cited passage appears in a context where the inductive truth 
definition is still to corne. 
69We want to be neutral at this stage of the discussion with respect to the proper 
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and let 'R' denote the dass {xix rf x}, then the proposition that R E R is 
equivalent to the proposition that R rf R. 
There have been many attempts to formulate type-free theories that allow 
the sort of unlimited self-reference implied by a general abstraction principle 
without suffering from the devastating effect of RusseIl's paradox. The 
story is a long and intricate one, and we are not going to recount it here. 
Feferman [1984] contains some very useful historical remarks. According 
to these remarks and other written records, it is Fitch [1948] who is to be 
credited for the renewed interest in type-free theories. 
Our idea is to formulate a type-free theory of properties in which the no-
tion of property corresponds dosely to the Fregean logical notion of dass, 
except, of course, that the identity conditions on properties will be inten-
sional. The particular version of a type-free theory of properties on which 
we will base our discussion in this section intro duces a primitive notion of 
proposition. Intuitively, propositions constitute the category of objects that 
can be true or false. If such a propositional formulation of the logical dass 
concept does not contain among its theorems the assertion that R E R is a 
proposition, no Russell paradox can be derived from the axiom schema of 
full abstraction. This is the style of resolution we will pursue here. 
It is weIl known that Frege espoused an extensionalist position according 
to which concepts differ only in so far as their extensions are different. 
This seems to be abasie mistake. We commented above on the intuitive 
justification of a theory of intensional entities that rejects the principle of 
extensionality. What we attempt now is to back this intuitive justification 
by something approximating a proof. Given full abstraction, the principle 
of extensionality assumes the following form: 
(Vx)(A(x) ++ B(x)) ~ {xIA(x)} = {xIB(x)}. 
(We use '{ xIA(x)}" as a neutral abstract; our purpose is to show that, 
within a predication theory with an unrestricted abstraction principle, these 
abstracts must denote intensional entities, contrary to what Frege thought.) 
Let Q be the object {xix E x = FALSE}. Q E Q certainly should be a propo-
sition because, given full abstraction, it is equivalent to Q E Q = FALSE, 
and we have seen above why it is highly commendable to regard identity 
as a transcategorial relation that can be predicated of any two objects, al-
ways yielding a proposition. Now given full abstraction and extensionality, 
Q E Q would be identical to the proposition Q E Q = FALSE. In this case, 
however, Q E Q can be neither a true proposition nor a false proposition. 
Q E Q cannot be a true proposition because, by this last identity, it follows 
that Q E Q = FALSE would be a true proposition. But, in this case, it 
reading of the schema r u E {xl ... x ... }". 'E' may indicate functional application and 
the abstract r {xl . .. x ... }' may accordingly stand for a propositional function. Anather 
construal would interpret 'E' as a symbol far the binary application operation of a com-
binatory structure. Finally, 'E' could be read as a binary predication relation. 
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follows by the principle of full abstraction that Q E Q is identical to FALSE, 
and so Q E Q is a false proposition. On the other hand, Q E Q cannot be 
a false proposition, for the principle of extensionality implies that there is 
only one false proposition, namely, FALSE. SO if Q E Q were a false propo-
sition, it would be identical to FALSE. But, in this case, the principle of full 
abstraction implies that Q E Q = FALSE would be a true proposition. But 
since this proposition is identical to Q E Q, it follows that Q E Q would be 
a true proposition. 
This argument shows that the principles of full abstraction and of exten-
sionality, combined with the ass um pt ion that identity is a transcategorial 
relation that always yields a proposition when predicated of any pair of ob-
jects, lead to contradiction.70 Since the unlimited self-reference embodied in 
the principle of full abstraction is part and parcel of a theory of properties, 
relations, and propositions and since the transcategorial characteristic of 
identity cannot be given up in a type-free framework, it is the extensionality 
principle that is at fault here. Our conclusion is that intensionality is a nec-
essary feature of a type-free system that allows for unlimited self-reference 
in the form of an unrestricted abstraction principle (Notice, incidentally, 
that our original derivation of Russell's paradox did not invoke any exten-
sionalist claim. That contradiction cannot be blocked by relying on some 
high degree of fine-grainedness for the particular proposition presumably 
denoted by 'R ER'.) 
If a predication theory of properties is committed to an intensionalist 
stance, we were well advised to ass urne the same attitude towards the mean-
ing of intensional abstracts within the weaker framework constructed earlier. 
Can we provide a similar justification for our decision to regard PRPs as 
particular types of objects as against, e.g., certain kinds of propositional 
functions (where propositions would then be treated as constant propo-
sitional functions)? The debate around the strict propositional-function 
thesis-that is, the thesis that properties and propositional functions are 
identical-has been obscured by a number of confusions. We address some 
of them in the following discussion in order to illustrate our point of view 
and to forestall certain objections that might be engendered by these issues. 
Frege is even better known for his idiosyncratic ontology than for his 
extensionalist position. He divides the world into objects and functions and 
attempts to impute an understanding of the latter notion by resorting to 
metaphors of unsaturatedness and completability. We think it is perfectly 
legitimate to speak of 'incomplete objects' and other entities of such ilk if 
one wants to im part an understanding of a category otherwise proved to 
be ineliminable. One such well known proof runs as follows. Suppose that 
Fregean concepts are objects and can be designated by proper names. That 
70The argument is due to [Aczel, 1980]. The special form in which we have presented 
it is taken from [Flagg and Myhill, 1987b]. 
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an object a falls under (or is an instance of) the concept denoted by 'P' is 
to be indicated by 'P(a)'. We have formed a new predieate by appending a 
pair of parentheses to the name of the object that is by supposition identical 
with the original concept. In sentences such as '-,P(P)', '-,Q(Q)', etc., we 
can discern a common pattern of predication. Assuming this pattern stands 
for a concept, we denote it with the proper name '5' and construct a new 
predicate '5( )'. Does the object referred to by '5' fall under the concept 
expressed by '5( )'? According to its definition, '5(5)' is true if and only 
if '-,5(5)' is true, contradiction. A Fregean would conclude from this: "To 
escape this absurdity, we must deny that any concept is an object or can 
have a proper name; and the two sorts of quantification that answer to 
proper names and to predieates must be strictly distinguished" . 71 Is there 
no other way out? 
This question is connected with the problem of empty proper names and 
the acceptability of non-definite concepts, where a concept P is non-definite 
if the following assertion fails: 
(Vx)(P(x) V -,P(x)). 
We leave open the question whether Frege changed his mind on these issues 
under the weight of Russell's paradox. At one time he seems to have enter-
tained the idea of allowing denotationless nominalisations into his system. 
Realists will sense a tension between their basic world-view and the notion 
of a non-definite concept. The same tension exists between a realist meta-
physics and the primitive not ion of proposition we mentioned above. But 
since, to repeat, it is highly unlikely that in the foreseeable future we are 
really going to understand the pathology of the paradoxes or that we are 
really going to know what form an ideal resolution of them should take, we 
feel justified in pursuing the way out indicated by the primitive notion of 
proposition. 
If at the moment there is no proof that both objects and functions have 
to be counted among the primitive ontological categories, is it then at least 
technically feasible to work within a framework that models properties as 
propositional functions? It is possible, and we will show in outline how 
this can be done. But first we have to explain what we understand by 
'technically feasible'. 
The coarse-grained and fine-grained algebras above were presented as 
certain sets. We took for granted the necessary amount of set-theoretical 
machinery that enabled us to state the definitions and carry through the 
completeness proof. Nobody will want to identify properties, relations, or 
propositions with sets. For the same reason it does not make any sense to 
identify the operation Predo with a particular single-valued set of ordered 
pairs with respect to every algebraic model. The set-theoretic definition 
71 [Geach, 1972, p. 229]. 
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of validity fulfills a useful role, nevertheless. Set-theoretic semantics can 
serve as a guide in our investigation of the realm of PRPs. This was true 
in the construction of the intensional algebras in Part II, and it is true 
in the investigation of type-free theories of predication. In the end, how-
ever, the set-theoretic ladder that we climbed has to be kicked away and 
supplanted by an intrinsic semantics stated wholly in terms of an applied 
theory of properties. According to the same line of reasoning, it would be 
completely implausible, for example, to equate sensible properties with func-
tions. Propositional functions are to be invoked for no other purpose than 
to serve as an external criterion for such formal characteristics as sound-
ness and completeness of a theory of properties. The two types of external 
modellings cannot claim any advantage over the other from this perspective. 
The relevant literature contains an argument that purports to show that 
propositional functions do not have the right structure for being of much 
use as a reliable external guide in the realm of PRPS.72 Stripped of all irrel-
evant details, the argument boils down to the following steps. The logic of 
propositional attitudes demands that very fine-grained distinctions be made 
among propositions. These distinctions are thought to be analogous to the 
syntactic pattern of expressions that convey propositional content. Let 'R' 
be a two-place predicate and a and b two different objects. Comprehension 
allows us to introduce by stipulation two properties P = {xIR(x, b)} and 
Q = {yIR(a,y)}. (As before, we are using r{xIA(x)}' as a neutral kind of 
abstract.) If properties are indeed identical to propositional functions and 
if the general characteristics of functions find an adequate expression in the 
lambda-calculus, then the following equations are instances of the rule of 
ß-conversion and of the intersubstitutivity of definitional identities: 
P(a) {xIR(xb)}(a) = R(a, b) = {yIR(a,y)}(b) = Q(b). 
To illustrate the fact that these equations model a far too coarse-grained 
notion of proposition, let Rexpress the relation of following and a and b 
stand for Jane Fonda and Rajneesh, respectively. Then we can stipulate 
that 
and 
Being an x such that x rajneeshes = being an x such that x 
follows Rajneesh. (= P) 
Being an x such that x fondalees = being an x such that Jane 
Fonda follows x. (= Q) 
From these stipulations and the propositional-function thesis we have by 
ß-conversion: 
72[Bealer, 1988, Section 4]. 
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The proposition that Jane Fonda rajneeshes = the proposition 
that Rajneesh fondalees. 
But this seems wrong. When a person consciously and explicitly thinks 
that Jane Fonda rajneeshes must that person be consciously and explicitly 
thinking that Rajneesh fondalees? It certainly does not seem so. The order 
of predication seems to be a relevant factor of propositional identity. 
The same point can be made perhaps even more palatable if we restate 
the example within a quasi-categorial framework where every element can 
be required to be either a projection or a constant function of arity n ~ 0 
or a definable function in some suitably restricted sense. Definability is 
to be understood as closure under application, functional composition of 
the basic set of constant and projection functions, and an additional set of 
functionals which counts lambda among its members and where lambda is 
defined as a map that sends elements of the space of unary functions into 
the universe of objects. When these closure conditions are made precise, it 
is not very difficult to check that such a structure of functions is nothing 
else but a model of the lambda-calculus.73 
If we interpret the relation R of our example as a two-place function, 
a and b as zero-place constant functions, and the variables as one-place 
projections p, we obtain the equations as follows: 
Po a = R 0 (p, b) 0 aR 0 (a, b) = R 0 (a,p) 0 b = Q 0 a 
where 0 indicates functional composition74 such that 
1 0 (gI, ... ,gn)(al, . .. , am) = 
I(gl (al, ... , am ), ... ,gn(al, ... , am)) 
for 1 an n-place and gi an m-place functions. Something like functional 
composition cannot be separated from the very notion of a function. Is it 
logically possible for a function to behave in a way that violates the principle 
of functional composition just stated? 
It is, of course, possible to construct 'intensional' models in which the 
order of execution of a complex operation determines its meaning. In such 
models the 'subject-first' and the 'object-first' R could be distinguished in 
73Spelled out in more detail, the functional structure adurnbrated above corresponds 
to what Barendregt calls a lambda-family [Barendregt, 1981, p. 110] and to what Aczel 
calls a lambda system [Aczel, 1980]. The notation seems due to H. Volken. 
74We have been 'cheating' in stating the equations. R as a two-place function cannot 
be composed with a pair of functions one of whose components is a one-place (p) and 
the other cornponent is a zero-place (a or b) function. Therefore, the constants in the 
argument-positions of 'R' have to be read as actually standing for the cornposition of 
the unique function which maps the universe of objects into the terminal element with a 
zero-place function. 
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the sense that, even though for all pairs of objects both operations would 
have the same value they are nevertheless not the same: 
.[(V'z) ('Subject-first' R(z) = 'Object-first' R(z)) -t 
{zl'Subject-first' R(z)} = {zl'Object-first' R(z)}]. 
This intensional notion of a nmction that incorporates aspects of sequential 
behaviour is of no help with respect to our problem of the internal structure 
of propositions in propositional-attitude contexts. If P(a) and Q(b) are the 
same proposition, then the fact that the dynamic behaviour of P is to be 
analysed in terms of 'Object-first' R and the dynamic behaviour of Q is to 
be analysed in terms of 'Subject-first' R gives us no handle on the resulting 
proposition unless these sequential stages could be discerned as parts of the 
final value. But this is denied by the presupposition that the input-output 
behaviour of the two sequential ingredients is the same. 
Proponents of the propositional-function thesis seem to be caught in a 
dilemma. On the one hand, they have an elegant solution to the worries that 
have plagued those scholars who tried to reconstruct intensional entities out 
of the primitive elements provided by the possible-worlds approach. They 
have the option of relying upon a principle of individuation for intensions 
that is finer than necessary equivalence, the latter notion being reduced to 
identity of truth value on all possible worlds in the case of propositions. It is 
certainly true that anything that is triangular in a possible world is trilateral 
in that same world. This does not imply that for any object b the proposition 
that b is triangular is the same proposition as that b is trilateral. When a 
person consciously and explicitly thinks that bis triangular mustthat person 
be consciously and explicitly thinking that bis trilateral? It certainly does 
not seem so. The propositional-function thesis does not entail the unwanted 
identifications implicit in the possible-worlds approach. Thus, on this score, 
there is no objection against an external semantics that models properties 
as propositional functions and interprets the operation of predication as 
functional application. 
On the other hand, the propositional-function thesis still seems to im-
ply a sort of unwanted identification, namely, the unwanted identification 
illustrated in the rajneeshjfondalee example. Moreover, some of these un-
wanted identifications that involve an inverted sequence of predications do 
not even depend upon the availability of a functional that permits one to 
assert the existence of an object that is specified (or projected or compre-
hended) by a complex predicate r A(x)'. As we have seen the same problem 
arises within a functional structure that treats the predication operation as 
functional composition instead of first forming a new object corresponding 
to the original one-place propositional function and then combining this 
new object and its argument with the help of the binary application oper-
ation. Both lambda-abstraction and functional composition have a specific 
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intended meaning that is enshrined in the principle of ß-conversion and the 
principle of functional composition that we have stated above. Giving up 
these basic principles or distorting the intended meaning of either lambda-
abstraction or functional composition are but two sides of the same coin. 
And these two principles are operative in the semantic conßation of syntac-
tically distinct expressions. Since we see no way of tampering with either 
lambda-abstract ion or functional composition and their attending princi-
pIes without violating in essential respects the basic intuition that guides 
our understanding of the notion of function, we have to admit that the 
propositional-function thesis is mistaken. 
Or is it? As we have put it, the thesis is that properties can be ex-
ternally modelled by propositional fllnctions. In our discussion we have 
made the assumption that this "model-theoretic" decision would entail the 
identification-again in the sense of an external criterion-of the operation 
of predication with functional application. The two identificatory decisions 
together lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that .Tane Fonda's rajneesh-
ing and Rajneesh's fondaleeing stand for the same thought. But would it be 
possible to split the propositional-fimction thesis into two separate claims 
and retain the first half of the thesis of external modelling while rejecting 
the second half? The answer , as we have indicated already is that a ma-
noeuvre like this can be carried out technically. We will show one way to 
do this in amoment. There are two purposes in doing this. The first is 
to construct a 'predication structure' over certain functional models; such 
a structure can serve as a model of PRPs. The second is to provide an 
illustration of how there could indeed be a distinction between functional 
application and predication. 
To motivate the construction, it is perhaps helpful to look at the prob-
lem from a syntactic point of view. If one tries to repeat the story about 
fondaleeing and rajneeshing within the confines of the expressive power pro-
vided by the first-order language Lw for intensional abstraction, one stum-
bles upon the problem of how to indicate the predication relation that is 
to hold between the abstracts [Rx, b]x and [Ra, Y]y on the one hand and 
their respective arguments on the other. Abstracts are names, and the re-
sult of juxtaposing an abstract and an individual constant does not form a 
well-formed expression. Would a more liberal syntax that imposed no type-
restrictions on the concatenation of expressions bring granularity troubles 
on the semantic level in its wake? Not necessarily. As long as such lib-
eral theories contain no principles to the efIect that schemata of the form 
'[A(x)]x(t), have the same meaning as '[A(t)]', we still steer dear of the 
troubled waters of intensional individuation problems. What this amounts 
to semantically is that predication ancI functional application should be dif-
ferent functionals. Our construction will show that there can indeed be a 
functional model with distinct functionals like this. 
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Specifically, we are looking for a model that contains a functional Pred 
that sends pairs of propositional functions and objects into propositions and 
that satisfies the following principles: 
Pred(P, a) = Pred(Q, b) -t (P = Q & a = b).75 
Pred(P, a) f+ P(a). 
As we have seen, the justification for a functional satisfying these princi-
pies derives from the requirement of fine-grainedness that is generated by 
propositional-attitude contexts. 76 
The construction of Pred makes use of a standard inductive definability 
approach. The technique go es back to Fitch as we mentioned above. Closely 
related ideas have been used by [Feferman, 1975; Scott, 1975; Aczel, 1980]. 
Let M be a model for the lambda calculus. For definiteness we assume 
that it belongs to the class of lambda-systems or lambda-families. Within 
the model we can define elements like =, N", &, V, -t, V, 3 and Pred in the 
following way: 
=df (0, x, y) N =df (l,x) 
, 
=df (2, x) & =df (3, x, y) 
V =df (4, x, y) -t =df (5,x,y) 
V =df (6,AX(fX») 3 =df (7, AX(fX») 
Pred =df (8, AX(fX) , y) 
Since we are working within a lambda-system, the closure conditions ensure 
that every element actually denotes a function of the model. Furthermore, 
these functions enjoy a certain independence property. In the special case 
of Pred this means that the following holds: 
Pred(P, a) = Pred(Q, b) -t (P = Q & a = b). 
Based on the above definitions two subsets T, the set of truths, and P, the 
set of propositions, can be obtained as the least fixed point of a monotone 
75This is a particular case of the axiom schema 11 of T2. 
761t may be questioned whether this requirement alone can provide a firm basis on 
which to erect a defensible non-ad hoc theory of a notion ofpredication within a functional 
approach. We do not rule out there being good reasons of a different sort that would 
finally vindicate the introduction of a fine-grained doppelgänger of functional application. 
It should be mentioned that [Aczel, 1985] introduces a related distinction between func-
tional application and predication. Since he retains both properties and propositional 
functions within the framework he sketches, he needs a second operation pred' and a 
corresponding principle which allows hirn to derive a bijective correspondence between 
properties and propositional functions. On philosophical grounds a system that encom-
passes both properties and propositional functions may have certain advantages. For our 
limited objective, though, the defense of propositional functions as external modelling 
objects, we thought it appropriate not to complicate the technical issue by admitting 
properties and propositional functions side by side into our model. 
246 GEORGB BEALER AND UWE :\rÖXXrCH 
operator on the lambda-system. The clauses of the monotone operator are 
constituted by a family of T-positive and P-positive formulas that express 
the expected characteristics of the defined elements. Except for Pred these 
clauses (with minor variations) can be found in the cited papers by Scott, 
Feferman, ACJ\el, or Flagg-Myhill. The clause for Pred can informally be 
stated as follows: 
PREDICATION. 11 f is a propositional function (i.e., il f is a lunctional 
all 01 whose values are propositions), then Pred(f, a) is a proposition such 
that: Pred(f, a) is true iff f(a) is true. 
From the predication schema it becomes clear that, semantically, the new 
functional is nothing else but 'proper-name' quantification.77 
To emphasise the main goal of our discussion of propositional functions: 
It has not been our objective to provide an argument for the propositional-
function thesis in its strong form. We wanted rather to make clear that the 
functional approach, as an external modelling technique, is flexible enough 
to accommodate any degree of structural discrimination that is deemed 
necessary. 
George Bealer 
University 01 Colorado at Boulder, USA. 
Uwe Mönnich 
University 01 Tübingen, Germany. 
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